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Summary
The focus in this thesis is on sensemaking in organisations and the aim was to offer an
interpretation of the thought of Karl E. Weick. The interpretation subsequently consists
of a description and discussion of concepts, underlying theories and paradigmatic
perspectives that are integrated into and deployed in Weick's sensemaking framework.
After a description and definition of sensemaking terms and concepts, it is argued that
a process cosmology forms the ground theory in Weick's sensemaking framework. In
order to elucidate this interpretation, the organic model of the world of Bergson and
Whitehead is introduced. Special attention is given to pragmatism's underlying process
ontology and themes which social consructionism, symbolic interactionism and
ethnomethodology share in common with pragmatism. The aim is to show how these
perspectives and themes are taken up in Weick's sensemaking in organisations and
organisational theory.
A failure to make sense is both consequential and existential. This aspect of Weick's
thought is discussed in the context of Bergson's process cosmology. It is followed by a
description and discussion of Weick's use of systems theory with special attention
given to Weick's concept of 'enactment' .
How and why does an organisation becomes what it becomes? This question is
addressed in the context of a description and discussion of complexity theory. A core
concept in both complexity theory and Weick's thought is self-organisation. The aim is
to show how sense making appears on systems level.
Finally, this thesis attempts to addresses the question of the relationship between
organisation and organising and how both terms is to be understood in terms of
Weick's ontological view of the world. This aim is to show that Weick's
understanding of "the" organisation (noun) can be conceived of as an abstraction and
organisation (verb - 'organising') in terms of relating and as process in becoming and
how he thereby gives social construction an ontological twist. The conclusion reached
is that, in the type of world Weick describes, it makes sense to make sense.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie tesis fokus op 'sensemaking' in organisasies - om die dubbelsinnige,
onduidelike en onverwagse meer duidelik, begryplik and redelik te maak vir persone
om te weet wat besig is om te gebeur en gepaste aksies te neem. Die doel was
derhalwe 'n interpretasie van die denke van Karl E. Weick. Die interpretasie omvat
gevolglik 'n beskrywing en bespreking van konsepte, teorieë en paradigmatiese
perspektiewe wat Weick in sy sensemaking raamwerk integreer en ontplooi.
Ná 'n definiëring en beskrywing van terme en konsepte word geargumenteer dat 'n
proses beskouing van die werklikheid Weick se sensemaking raamwerk onderlê.
Hierdie interpretasie word toegelig met 'n bespreking en beskrywing van die organiese
model van Bergson en Whitehead, sowel as die proses ontologie onderliggend aan
pragmatisme. Gevolglik kom pragmatisme, sosiale konstruksionisme, simboliese
interaksionisme en etnometodologie aan die orde. Verskeie temas word beskryf en
bespreek in die konteks van sensemaking en organisasie-teorie.
'n Mislukking in sensemaking het newe gevolge en is dit ook eksistensieël van aard.
Hierdie aspek van Weick se denke word beskryf en bespreek in die konteks van
Bergson se proses kosmologie en word die interpretasie opgevolg met 'n bespreking
van sisteem-teorie. Hoe en waarom verander organisasies wanneer hulle verander? Die
antwoord op hierdie vraag kom aan die orde in die konteks van 'n bespreking van
kompleksiteits-teorie. 'n Kern konsep in beide Weick se sensemaking en
kompleksiteits-teorie is self-organisasie. 'n Baie belangrike doel is om aan te dui hoe
sensemaking voorkom en plaasvind op sisteem-vlak.
Ten slotte poog die tesis om die verband tussen organisasie en organisering in Weick
se denke meer verstaanbaar te maak. Die argument hier is dat Weick se verstaan van
"die" organisasie (selfstandige naamwoord) as 'n abstraksie en organisasie
(werkwoord) in terme van relasies en proses in wording geïnterpreteer kan word, en
Weick sodoende 'n ontologiese kinkel in die verstaan van sosiale konstruksionisme
teweeg bring. Die slotsom tot waartoe in hierdie studie gekom word is dat, in die
wêreld wat Weick beskryf, maak dit 'sense' om 'sense' te maak.
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BiographicalSketch of Karl. E Weick!
1. Karl E. Weick, PhD, is the Rensis Likert Collegiate Professor of
Organisational Behaviour and Psychology, and Professor of Psychology at the
University of Michigan Business School.
a. His graduate level teaching is focused on the craft of
scholarship, social psychology of organising and micro
foundations of organisation studies.
b. His executive education teaching is focused on the management
of uncertainty through sensemaking and improvisation.
2. His research interests include such topics as how people make sense of
confusing events, puzzlement and fascination, the effects of stress on thinking
and imagination, the social psychology of organising and improvisation,
organisational sensemaking under pressure, high reliability performance,
continuous change, learning moments in organisations, social commitment,
small wins as the embodiment of wisdom, and the linkages between theory and
practice.
3. Karl Weick started his career with a strong educational background. He
earned an undergraduate degree from Wittenberg University in 1958, a MA in
Psychology from Ohio State University in 1960, and his doctorate degree from
Ohio State University in 1962.
4. While working in a variety of universities, Dr. Weick found the time to
publish more than eighty different journal articles, presented over two hundred
papers and publish six books. To add to his accomplishments, he has received
eleven academic awards.
5. The shift in our culture to break away from rules and structure, has
allowed Dr. Weick to study differences.
a. To begin working, he says, all he needs is some kind of
difference, something that attracts attention.
b. His "finding situations" can be understood in terms of: "Until
you act, you can't know what I think until I see what I say".
c. He says, "To know my contexts, therefore is to know my
work .. .1 was struck by the frequency with which I seem to study
what happens when people don't understand what is going on.
My concern is not déjá vu (I've been here before), but rather,
vuje de (I have never been here before and have not an idea
where I am). Consider the evidence ... ".2
6. Dr. Weick's interests, aside from writing and editing, include jazz big
bands, railroading and photography.
7. Dr. Weick's most significant contributions are considered to lie in the
fields of sensemaking in organisations, management and organisational theory,
the social psychology of organising, communication and information theory.
I Kaye 2000; Prelip 2000; Weick 1995
2 Lundberg 1999: 9
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Problem statements, assumptions and central theses, aim and intended contribution, approach
1. Problem Statements, Assumptions and Central Thesis
If the Social Psychology of Organizing' can be considered to be Weick's 'magnum
opus' on organising, then Sensemaking in Organizations' can be taken as his 'magnum
opus' on sensemaking. The first (he refers to it as the "organizing book,,)5 embodies
his "theorising"; his attempt to talk about organisations. The picture that emerges is
one in which organising is essential for collective sensemaking. Sensibility, the quality
of the sense that is made by an organisation, in other words, is dependent on a
particular type of organising. In the second, the picture is reversed. The way an
organisation organises itself is dependent on the type and quality of the sense being
made. It is reasonable to say, then, to organise means to make sense, and to make
sense, is to organise and is this what is meant when Weick6 says that both these
processes "are cut from the same cloth". This understanding, this "subtle" switch, is
the first area that needs clarification for the student interested in sensemaking in
organisations, as it is not readily evident in itself.
To an attentive student of sensemaking, it becomes quickly clear that Weick
reformulates almost every standard assumption about organisation and management in
organisational theory.' As he expresses it, "I will discuss reformulations throughout
3 1979
4 1995
s 2001: 5
6 1995: 82
7 Although they are too numerous to cite, the interested reader is invited to consider the following examples: (I)
decisions are the products of sense making (1995: 10-11; 2001: 4,106); an outcome comes before a decision
(2001: 191); (2) action precedes thought; believing is seeing (1995: 133; 2001: 226); (3) process precedes
structure (2001: 299); (4) organisations exists largely in the mind (2001: 308); (5) improvisation is a natural form
of organisational life; it is the negation of foresight and the pre-planned (1995: 30; 2001: 285, 352); (6) strategy is
defined as "good luck rationalised in hindsight" (1995: 28-29; 2001: 307); (7) goals are discovered in retrospect
(200 I: 7); (8) design is equal to improvisation and self-design (200 I: 58); there is no such things as "the" design;
organisational design is social (200 I: 65, 71); the practical implication of this argument is to do away with the
top-management team (1995: 117); (9) behavioural control is meaningless and control over performance is apt to
7
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the book ... " [that is, Sensemaking in Oganizations]. The issue becomes problematic
since the basis of such new formulations is not readily self-evident.
The second problem relates to Weick's multi-/interdisciplinary approach to his subject
matter. He uses insights from disciplines such as organisational theory, organisational
behaviour, social and cognitive psychology, anthropology, sociology and the
complexity sciences; theoretical perspectives such as systems theory (cybernetics and
autopoiesis), sociological theory (symbolic interactionism, activity theory,
ethnomethodology, social constructionist theory, frame theory, organic theory and
dialectical method), and philosophical perspectives such as process, pragmatism,
existentialism, phenomenology and idealism.' As such, his multidisciplinary approach
draws on the knowledge of several disciplines, each of which provides a different
perspective on a problem, issue or argument. In contrast, in his interdisciplinary"
approach Weick draws on the specialised knowledge, concepts or tools of these
disciplines and integrates these pieces to create new knowledge or deeper
understanding. As an interdisciplinary scholar then, having drawn on appropriate
disciplinary insights, Weick reconfigures them in novel ways, not only to address a
question at hand, but combines the disciplinary insights in such a way that the resulting
understanding is greater than simply the sum of its disciplinary parts. However, as
Thompson & NeweUlo have noted, integration is not always neat and tidy, it may
indeed be "messy". The third problem thus relates to the complexity of subject matter.
It can become a problem if a student has to become familiar with concepts and
approaches across disciplines, the result of which is often a feeling of incoherence or
fail (1995: 72-73; 2001: 77); (10) The idea of an individual manager is a fiction (1979: 8, 15; 200 I: 70); (II)
managers do not create cultures; they emerge (200 I: 78); (12) orderliness is a mixture of order and chaos (200 I:
194); (13) defining a problem is when the problem starts; "problem" does not necessarily imply "solution" (1995:
88-90; 2001: 426); (14) there is no such thing as "the" organisation (1995: 69, 74-75; 2001: 65,184), and (15) it
is an illusion to assume that organisations are rational (200 I: xi).
8 The reader should note that the aim here is merely to point toward the interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinary
aspects of his thought. References are provided in the subsequent chapters and the contexts to which they pertain.
9 Interdisciplinary study may be defined as "a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a
topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession" (Thompson &
Newe1l1998: 3).
1°1998:3
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loss at making necessary and important theoretical connections in the context of real
and pressing time constraints. II
Despite the fact that Weick's major work on sensemaking has been described as
"artful" and "masterfully" constructed, as "the clearest, most complete and interesting
statement of sensemaking in organisations available",12 it makes for difficult reading
and understanding and for developing a coherent picture of the whole as the style of
writing disperses the core ideas all through the whole. The impression is one of
continuity, of new ideas constantly flowing into a single stream of thought and,
therefore, inconclusiveness.P However, it should be interpreted as an approach in line
with Weick's fundamental arguments about organising and sensemaking, that is, to
keep action, thinking and communication going. It is in utter contrast to people's
deeply nurtured tendency to bring things to conclusion, or finality. As, for example,
when they approach 'problems' as something to be solved, once and for all.
The fourth problem relates to the central thesis of this study, namely, an inconsistent
picture of sensemaking in literature. On the one hand there is an emphasis on and
recognition of the failure of sensemaking in organisations and crises environments, and
on the other hand, a huge gap in the understanding of the particular mindset, paradigm
or perspective required by the sensemaking framework, especially the aspect of
ontology consistent with that framework and the conceptualisation of organisations.
The contention of this thesis is that the inconsistency can be bridged if Weick's
thought and thinking is understood in terms of his overall ontology and cosmological
outlook. Part of the problem can be seen in what both Drucker'? and SengelS so
forcefully argued, namely, that while it is possible to use new terminology, it is also
possible at the same time to still think within the context of old models. The result is
that, not only until a crisis hits, do people realise that they have been acting on old and
outmoded assumptions - despite espoused theories.
II Thompson & Newell 1998
12 See backcover of Sensemaking in Orgainisalions (1995)
13 It is acknowledged that this description might be the subjective opinion of only one individual, and that others
may find the style of writing both interesting and challenging - which it is indeed!
1999: 1-4014
15 1990: 8-9
9
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2. Aim and Intended Contribution of this Study
With the statement of problems, assumptions and central thesis expressed, the aim of
this study emerges. From Weick's various writings it is clear that different theories are
integrated and deployed in his theorising about organisations and sensemaking. What
is not so clear, are the sources from which those theories derived from. Whereas it is
possible to have accessed Weick's theorising from the point of various disciplinary
perspectives, such as Psychology, Sociology or Management Science, or conceptual
topics such as decision making, problem solving, leadership, management functions,
strategy and knowledge dynamics, the approach chosen here is through 'wholes'. In
other words, in relation to the thesis the aim is to inquire how larger frameworks
inform the parts (theories) in order to see how the parts inform the whole (the
sensemaking framework).
To substantiate this approach, it is useful to see how Beach 16 differentiates among
paradigms, theories and models. Although the terms are often used interchangeable,
they are not the same thing. In fact, as he points out, they are hierarchically related:
paradigms are the most general - like philosophical and ideological frameworks or
worldviews. Theories are more specific, based on the paradigm and designed to
describe what happens in one of the many realms of events encompassed by the
paradigm. Models are even more specific, in that it provides the mechanisms by which
events occur in a particular part of the theory's realm. Of the three, models come and
go, theories give way when only evidence is overwhelmingly against them, and
paradigms stay put until a radically better idea comes along.
The picture that emerges from this depiction is that paradigms (worldviews,
philosophy and ideology) inform theory that informs models. The choice of paradigms
as the main themes of study thus follows Beach's depiction. The choice of paradigms,
of pragmatism, existentialism, systems theory and complexity theory all share one
cosmological outlook in common, namely, process philosophy, despite different
approaches, emphases and nuances in the thinking of the proponents of the respective
meta-perspectives. It thus follows that it is impossible to understand Weick from a
16 1997
10
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single paradigm, and that the best approach is to take his cosmology as a point of
departure, then paradigms to theories.
It needs to be said that no other researcher is approaching the topic in the manner
stated above.l" The aim and intended contribution of this study is therefore stated as
follows: (1) to bridge the problems discussed under point 1 above; (2) to locate and
describe and discuss four major paradigms in Weick's narratives and to show how they
are taken up in the theories deployed by Weick, consistent with his overall cosmology.
This will allow clarification of the sensemaking framework and, in conclusion (3) to
show how Weick's understanding of organisation (noun) can be conceived of as an
abstraction, and organisation (verb) in terms of relating, a process in perpetual
becoming and social construction - never final, never complete - and that organisation
and organising are essentially one and the same thing. As a thought leader on
organisational matters, Weick opens up understanding of the inherent complexity and
ambiguity of real-world organisations. The grasping of Weick's thought as expressed
in his sensemaking framework would place managers and leaders in a position to
revise their mental models as these ideas have substantial implications for their
practices as participants in everyday organisational life.
3. Approach
Since the unit of analysis is the sensemaking perspective of Karl E. Weick, the four
major works that will be incorporated into this study are The Social Psychology of
Organizing,18 Sensemaking in Organizations, 19 Making Sense of the Organizatior/" (it
comprises sixteen of his manuscripts that first appeared in other sources) and
Managing the Unexpected" (co-authored with Kathleen M Sutcliffe).
17 Databases at the libraries of the University of Stellenbosch and Rand Afrikaans University, the Internet (Google,
MSN and Looksmart) was searched for the past twenty months for articles and books, which explicitly used the
words sensemaking and or Karl E Weick.
181979
191995
202001
212001
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Because the unit of analysis is Weick's thought and thinking as embodied in narrative,
the approach chosen for this study is interpretation. Dent and Powley,22 for example,
contend that "knowing that an idea occurs in a paper may carry more information
about the author's perspective than does the frequency at which the idea occurs". The
interpretive approach chosen for this study differs from content analysis, in that it is an
attempt to capture ideas rather than words. Content analysis as often described23 is
inadequate for this purpose because it is overly reductionistic, for example. The
approach here, however, endeavours to balance the whole and the part and focuses on
content-within-context, rather than just content.
An interpretive approach allows the researcher to be the instrument of data collection,
analysis and interpretation. In this regard, Miles and Hubermarr" suggest four
characteristics critical to the trustworthiness of the author as coder: (1) the degree of
familiarity with the phenomenon and context; (2) a strong interest in the conceptual
area; (3) an ability to take a multi-disciplinary approach; and (4) good investigative
skills. In any research approach, the author is a source of bias; therefore, the role and
assumptions of the author have been made explicit in this study.25 The author not only
has experience in hermeneutics, but also knowledge of organisational life and practical
management experience consistent with what is necessary to conduct this study.
On a most fundamental level, Weick opens up understanding of three things: (1) an
overall cosmology and/or worldview is indispensable to people as it has consequences
for how they deal and cope with in the world of everyday organisational life; (2) the
importance of a discussion of 'the world' in organisations, that is, the matter of
ontology, and (3) by drawing on so many and diverse theoretical perspectives, Weick
is demonstrating that no point of view is in itself complete, that a collective process of
thought is the means by which understanding can be enriched.
To summarise, Weick's sensemaking in organisations poses certain problems for the
student interested in sensemaking. In order to open up appropriate understanding of
22 1988, in Dent & Powley 200 I : 6
23 Weber 1985
24 1984
25 They can be seen in the problem formulations, the assumptions about Weick's process ontology and the
methodology chosen for this study.
12
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Weick's sensemaking framework, this study will aim to clarify: (1) The intertwineness
of organising and sensemaking; (2) Weick's theorising in terms of his cosmological
outlook, the paradigms that are informed by that outlook and the theoretical
perspectives derived from it and deployed in the sensemaking perspective; (3) the
complexity of subject matter; and (4) to overcome the possibility of misinterpretation
and consequently inconsistent application of Weick's sensemaking framework in
literature.
It will therefore be appropriate to begin this inquiry into and interpretation of Weick's
thought with a description of sensemaking.
13
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CHAPTER 2
SENSEMAKING DESCRIBED
The sensemaking perspective, paradigm, mindset, sensemaking and two meanings of 'meaning'
The topic and theory of sensemaking in organisations forms part of the field of
organisational science, broadly defined as organisational behaviour, organisational
theory, human resource management and business strategy." The focus of this chapter
is on Weick's sensemaking theory as a 'perspective', 'paradigm', 'mindset', and the
concept of 'sensemaking , and 'meaning'. The aim is to create some sort of
understanding of the sense in which Weick is using these terms.
1. The Sensemaking Perspective
The dictionary meaning of the term perspective states that "it is a mental picture of the
relative importance of things,,27 and "the relative importance of events from a specific
point of view".28 It is linked to the idea of "looking closely, to see through". Broadly
speaking, then, in this sense it means a way of looking at and thinking about things or
events from a specific point of view. Thus the issue here is Weick's point of view, his
mental picture and what it is all about.
Weick29 states that the sensemaking perspective "is a frame of mind about frames of
mind". As such it means a way of looking at and thinking about other kinds of looking
and thinking, as a support for other kinds of thinking and states of mind, in the form of
a set of principles or processes by which ideas can be evaluated. It therefore also
means, firstly, to make sense of how other people make sense and construct meaning
about things happening around them. Secondly, as will become clear during this study,
it relates to Weick's view of the world as being malleable, unpredictable and turbulent.
In other words, his mental picture of the world and reality forms the frame in which he
casts his formulation of sensemaking and organisational life.
26 Weick 1995: vii
27 The Oxford Dictionary 1983: 487
28 Collier's Dictionary 1977: 752
29 1995: xii
14
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Since people invest actions, objects, events and utterances with subjective meaning
that helps make their world intelligible to themselves.i" what is important from a
sensemaking perspective, is how, why, what and with what effect people construct what
they construct.
2. The Sensemaking Paradigm
In his discussion of the sensemaking paradigm, Weick refers to Firestone'! who stated
that paradigms are revealed in textbooks, lectures and research experiments of the
exemplars representing a specific scientific community, and "by studying them and by
practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade".
However, herein lies a trap. To understand this is to note that while Weick argues that
the content of sensemaking can be embodied in frames, he also argues that they
represent a set of simplifying heuristics rather than an algorithm.Y
Algorithms refer to a sequence of operations that may be repeated over and over again
that, in theory, guarantee the solution to a problem or satisfied a condition. However,
unlike computers, the human mind does not specialise in high-speed computations of
multitudinous possible combinations. The limits of working memory allows for only a
few operations at anyone time. In order to overcome this limitation, humans make use
of heuristics - informal, intuitive, speculative strategies ("mental shortcuts") that
sometimes lead to an effective solution and sometimes not." In other words, the
sensemaking paradigm must not be construed as something that offers or guarantees
final answers or solutions. It registers recognition of human limitations.
It is useful to take cognisance of a few additional points about paradigms as discussed
by Weick in the context of what others have to say on the topicr'"
When people agree on a paradigm, they are more likely to agree on its
existence than on its rules or rationalised form.
30 Weick 1995: 14
31 1990 (in Weick 1995: 119)
32 1995: xii, 118
33 Sternberg 2003: 367
34 Weick 1995: 120-121
15
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Because paradigms are transmitted in discrete artefacts rather than a coherent
formulation, the collection of artefacts can be interpreted differently. Diffe-
rences trigger new interpretation.
Paradigms are preserved in the exemplars and exemplars take the form of
representative anecdotes. There exist gaps between exemplars in a paradigm.
Exemplars take the form of stories, as collections of illustrations of how
theories are applied conceptually, observationally and instrumentally to
representative organisational problems.
Theories within a paradigm provide a frame within which sense is made.
The conclusion reached is that Weick wishes the sensemaking student to view the
sensemaking framework in terms of the points highlighted above.
3. The Sensemaking Mindset
Weick argues that a focus on sensemaking induces a mindset" focused on process
(note the singular). If 'mindset' is taken to mean one's resolve, one's mind being set
on something, a focus, an approach and commitment, it is found that, in addition to a
commitment to process, Weick is also arguing for a commitment to accept change and
holism. It is therefore useful to take a closer look at this type of mindset in order to
deepen understanding of the sensemaking framework.
(1) Mindset committed to and focussed on process
(a) In organisations. Process theorists define organisational processes as consisting
of multiple events. Abbott." for example, states that "every process theory argues for
patterned sequences of events" and Mackenzie " defines a process as "a time
dependent sequence of elements governed by a rule called a process law", with the
following components:
The entities involved in performing the process;
The elements used to describe the steps in a process;
The relationship between every pair of these elements;
The links to other processes; and
35 1995: 13,191-196
36 1990: 375
37 1986: 45
16
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The resource characteristics of the elements.
In this view, an event is a process that signals or sets off the transition from one
process to another. Mackenzie recognises that in an organisation there are multiple
events, chains of events, parallel events and exogenous events. There are adjacent
events and sequences of events that may be mutually causally interdependent" - all
affected by broader fields or environmental factors.
For Weick the idea of process implies impermanence, ~hich means a concern with
flows, with flux (change) and momentary appearancesr" In this regard, he uses the
metaphor of "streams" to portray the continuous flux associated with organisational
processes. The image is not one of a single viscous flow that moves at a constant rate,
but that of "multiple, heterogeneous flows of diverse viscosity moving at variable
rates"." The picture that emerges through this discussion is that streams, flows and
change are thus the essence of what managers manage for Weick, the ongoing flow of
actions and words, punctuated by events.
(b) In sensemaking and organising. Sensemaking is grounded in personal identity,
retrospect, salient cues, ongomg projects, plausibility, enactment of sensible
environments and social context. Weick states that "all seven can be crudely
represented as a sequence (people concerned with identity in the context of others
engage ongoing events from which they extract cues and make plausible sense
retrospectively, all the while enacting more or less order into those ongoing events)".41
It is in this context of the seven properties of sensemaking that it can be seen how
organisations and sensemaking processes are "cut from the same cloth".42 As process,
both organising and sensemaking are attempts to impose order in ongoing flows in
organisations and as people attempt to make collectively sense of the meaning of what
is happening around them. It is of utmost importance to note that sensemaking and
organising are not two separate processes, sensemaking "and" organising, but indeed a
single process. As Weick puts it, it is organising as sensemaking, organising through
38 1986: 46-47
39 1979: 44
40 1979: 42
41 1995: 18
42 1995: 82
17
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sensemaking and organising for sensemaking.f It is therefore reasonable to say that
people make collectively sense in terms of the sensemaking processes and organise, in
terms of the same processes, to make collectively sense.
If sensemaking and organising is taken to be a single process, together with what has
been highlighted in subsection (1) (a) above, it becomes apparent that both organising
and sensemaking operates in the service of ongoing adjustment to change. It is in this
context that Weick and Quinn's'" distinction between episodic and continuous change
becomes more than relevant. Episodic change could be viewed as discontinuous and
intermittent and change that is continuous, as evolving and incremental. Episodic
change is driven by inertia and the inability of organisations to keep up, while
continuous change is driven by alertness and the inability of organisations to remain
stable. They stated that, however, when change is continuous, a different mindset is
necessary and refers to one possibility as suggested by Marshack" derived from
Confucian thought: "cyclical assumption (patterns of ebb and flow repeat themselves);
processional assumption (movement involves an orderly sequence through a cycle and
departures cause disequilibrium); journey assumption (interventions are to restore
equilibrium and balance); appropriateness assumption (correct action maintains
harmony), and change assumption (nothing remains the same forever)".
Their review of organisational change and development thus serves as a challenge to
gain acceptance of continuous change as change never starts because it never stops.
This becomes even more significant when it is noticed that Weick argues in the same
breath that "Sensemaking never stops. The reason it never starts is that pure duration
never stops"." One of the key aspects of process is the fact that it is ongoing. Although
the ongoing stream may take rapid turns and even be interrupted, it still remains one
continuous flow. It is therefore no surprise that Weick argues that people are always in
the middle of things and that flows are the constants of sensemaking.V
43 200 I: 95
« 1999
45 1993 (in Weick & Quinn 1999: 13)
46 1995: 43
47 1995: 43
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(2) A Mindset committed to holism
It is significant that Weick,48 in the context of his discussion of a "mindset for
sensemaking", refers to Emerson's essay "The American Scholar" where he said,
"[T]he scholar loses no hour which the man lives", and Mills' point when he said,
"The most admirable thinkers within the scholarly community you have chosen to join
do not split their work from their lives. They seem to take both too seriously to allow
such dissociation, and they want to use each for the enrichment of the other". He also
cites a poem written by a doctoral student in order to focus the same point that she too
"took her work and life too seriously to split them". In other words, sensemaking is not
a program, something people can start on Monday, drop on Friday and take up on
Sunday again. It is the ongoing process that sensemaking addresses - it is life, and it
requires commitment.
What Weick is proposing here, through the three aforementioned examples, is an
holistic approach to life instead of a separatist mindset and that he suggests that
people's general way of thinking of the totality is crucial for overall order of the
human mind itself. If people think of the totality as constituted of independent
fragments, then it is how their minds will tend to operate, but if they could include
everything coherently, as undivided and unbroken, and without a border, then their
minds will tend to move in a similar way, and from this will flow an orderly action
within the whole.
Weick49 states explicitly that the sensemaking processes are set apart from other
explanatory processes such as 'understanding', 'interpretation' and 'attribution'. It is
therefore useful to inquire what these processes entail and how they differ from.
sensemaking in order to develop a sense of the uniqueness of the concept of
'sensemaking' . The aim is to show that sensemaking is a meta-cognitive process that
not only demands a higher level of engagement by the actor, but also that sensemaking
is 'more than the sum of its parts' or components.
48 1995: 191-193
49 1995: 17
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4. 'Sensemaking'
(1) Sensemaking and understanding. To 'understand' may mean "to grasp the
meaning or significance of; to comprehend and be clear about; to be thoroughly
familiar with an individual's judgement and specific interpretation't.Ï" It may also
mean "to know how someone feels and why they behave the way they do, and feel
sympathy for them?" or, to put oneself "in the shoes, the situation and the skin,,52 of
another person. As such, both meanings of "understanding" imply or denote that
understanding is thorough, total and fully certain and that the spectator can penetrate
the thinking of the actor. No such assumptions are to be found in the sensemaking
framework. In fact, Ryle53 argues that minds are impenetrable to one another.
It is noteworthy that Weick argues, just as Ryle,54 for example, that what the spectator
actually finds is merely what the actor is inventing. In other words, although people
may think that they understand another person's situation or an event, it can never be
complete, once and for all,55 as something that may count for all times and all
occasions. Understanding essentially involves interpretation that cannot be reduced to
knowledge, in a traditional sense. This also means that understanding is never "mere
reconstruction" of some original meaning. 56
What sets sensemaking apart from understanding, then, is that not only is sensemaking
an ongoing process, but sensemaking is also the process of rearranging our
understanding of experience so that we can know what has happened, what is
happening and can predict what will happen. In this sense, sensemaking is constructing
knowledge of oneself and the world5? and, as such, is creating coherence out of
people's experience.
50 Colliers Dictionary 1997: 1084
51 Longman Active Study Dictionary 1998: 724
52 Ryle 1949: 54
53 Ryle 1949: 55. See also Weick 2001: 40 I.
54 1949: 54
55 Ryle 1949: 55
56 cf. Gadamer 1975: 311
57 This view is also called 'constructivism' - see Drath & Palus 1994: 3.
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(2) Sense making and interpretation. Weick argues that 'interpretation' is a
component of sensemaking. 58 In other words, sensemaking is something more than
mere reading; it is also about authoring. While 'interpretation' and its concomitant
processes of explanation and translation assumes special knowledge, something "out
there" waiting to be discovered, sensemaking in contrast, refers to what is placed
"there" and invented by the actor. When sensemaking discovers, it does so in
retrospect; when it translates, it makes the ambiguous and equivocal sensible, that is, it
explains how the subjective becomes more tangible " (clear, definite for noticing), how
something is made reasonable, how meaning is constructed'" and the "out there" is
invented'" -literally.62 In other words, "making" refers to something the actor actively
does and creates ("enacts"), and as such, makes it possible for people "to see what they
think".63
(3) Sense making and attribution. Byron and Byrne'" define "attribution" as "the
process through which we seek to identify the causes of others' behaviour", and argue
in this regard that the Why?-question is the central attributional task people face in
countless life situations. People want to know why others have acted as they have, or
why events have turned out in a particular way.
Whereas attribution theory is mainly beset with behaviour and the causes thereof,
sensemaking in contrast, shifts the emphasis toward events and the interruption of life
lived in ongoing projects in order to give meaning, purpose and direction to the
organisation.f As Drath and Palus66 pointed out, if there is one thing all people share-
across all cultures, geography and time - it is "the ability, and the hunger, to make
things make sense".
581995:7
S9 Weick 1995: 14
60 Weick 1995: 6-16
61 Weick 1995: 13-14
62 Weick 1995: 4, 15-16. It is important to note that Weick argues that sense making is not a metaphor.
63 Weick 1995: 30
64 1991: 16,57,84
6S Weick 1995:4, 100-105
66 1994:2
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From a sensemaking perspective, then, the emphasis is not so much the seeking of
causes and the why of the behaviour of people that is important, but the why, the what
and with what effect people construct what they construct. In other words, the
emphasis is rather on meta-cognitive and interactive processes between people that
shape subjectivity, such as intersubjectivity.
5. Meaning
Bolman and Deal67 asserts that meaning is a human being's most basic need. In a
general sense, it has been observed that whenever there are questions that cannot be
answered, problems that cannot be solved and events that are not understood, people
vest objects, utterances and actions with subjective meaning that helps make their
world intelligible.f" In striving to make the world understandable and manageable,
they often make sense of the complexity of everyday life by reading into things the
meanings they wish to see. Similarly, people respond to the meanings they give to
things, not to the things themselves. As a result, the meaning of an object or event is
often far more powerful than the reality. Hence, the significance of Bolman and Deal's
assertion that organisational events and processes are important more for what they
express or mean than for what they produce.
In sensemaking in organisations, mainly two distinct aspects of the meaning of the
word 'meaning' is detected: the first is the sense (called Sinn by Frege)69 or the
significance of that which words point to or designate, and the second, meaning in its
existential sense. The first aspect roughly parallels connotation and denotation.Ï"
Abefl states that reference is how language bites into the world, as a distinctly human
activity, and unlike thinking, it is public. The most elementary way in which to refer is
to name or label. In this section the aim is to discuss the first from a social
constructionist point of view and the second from an existential point of view.
(1) Meaning and social constructionism. The first aspect of meaning refers to the
way people refer to and make sense of things or events that people perceive or
67 1991: 309
68 Weick 1995: 14
69 Abel 1976: 67
70 Abe11976: 67-68
71 1976: 66-67
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experience, be it an object, an interruption, a sudden change in work routine or a crisis.
In this sense, people want to know what it means, what it implies and how they can
deal with it. The know is of primary concern here, since it refers to, from a social
constructionist point that which people construct, invent or create themselves. That
which they construct becomes their reality, and as has been pointed out, from a
sensemaking perspective, the concern is with the what, the why and with what effects
people construct what they construct.
The "reality" that people construct in everyday organisational life is, in other words, a
matter of ontology and epistemology. In this respect, Weick draws on what Berger
and Luckmann 72 mean by knowledge, what the individual and organisation take to be
real about the everyday world in which they live. As they stated it, " ... the sociology of
knowledge must first of all concern itself with what people 'know' as 'reality' in their
everyday, non- or pre-theoretical lives ... common sense knowledge ... It is precisely this
knowledge that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could
exist"." In short, their interest is not in the status of knowledge, but to understand how
a sense of reality is constructed and maintained, regardless of whether this "reality" is
valid or not. The obvious point is that any reality can be taken to be valid by those who
"inhabit" it.
Burr74 identifies four basic assumptions of the constructionist position (all of which
feature in Weick's sensemaking framework): (a) a critical stance toward taken-for-
granted knowledge. The world does not present itself objectively to the observer, but is
known through experience, which is largely influenced by language; (b) the categories
in language used to classify and describe things emerge from social interaction within
a group of people at a particular time and a particular place. Understanding is thus
situational and contextual; (c) knowledge is sustained through social process. How
reality is understood at a given moment is determined by the conventions of
communication in force at that time; and (d) knowledge and action go together.
Ontology (reality) is thus constructed by interconnected patterns of communication
72 1967
73 1967: 15
74 1995
23
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
behaviour and reality is defined not so much by individual acts, but by complex and
organised patterns of ongoing actions.
From these assumptions, attention is focused on just two important points. Firstly,
social constructionism has a relativist epistemology. That is:
Semantic relativism. The meaning of words is specific to languages, or
vocabularies.f and cannot be translated without loss of meaning.
Ontological relativism. The existence of a thing is tied to a conceptual scheme,
which may be real for some people, but not others. Reality therefore is a
negotiated accomplishment. 76
Epistemological relativism. Theories are historically and contextually situated;
it is best understood when located in the conditions of their emergence.
Secondly, social construction of reality stems from an epistemological position - not an
explanatory theory. It is an approach that focuses on meaning because its
epistemological position dictates that meaning is all that people really can claim to
know about. It is called social constructionism because it aims to account for the ways
in which phenomena are socially constructed.
To translate all this into Weickian77 terminology: language actually constructs the
world and the self through the course of its use; people do not respond to physical
objects and events themselves, but to the meaning of events; it is not the experience
that is meaningful, but the meaning people attached to it; meaning is not a property of
objects and events themselves, but a construction; people generate that which they
interpret, and meanings and understandings arise from communication between
people. In the words of Paul Cilliers 78, meaning is conferred not by a one-to-one
correspondence of a symbol with some external object, but by the relationships
between the components of the system itself. It is the result of a process, of 'between'
as opposed to 'within', in an active and complex system.
75 1995: 4, 106-109
76 Abel 1976: 41; see also Weick 1995: 15
77 1995: 14-16,25-27
78 1998: II, 124
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In stating that meaning is a "composite of language, imagination and action that has
worked in the past but may not work in the future"," Weick cautions his readers to
remember that in a changing world that is difficult to know and predict, it is important
to hold retained meanings lightly. It is through sensemaking that people structure the
unknown, and if they do not look "too closely ",80the world makes sense and things are
under control. In other words, people can take a socially constructed world as a stable
world (however, as will be seen later, it is only momentary stability).
(2) Existential meaning. In existential meaning, the emphasis shifts from the social
construction of reality as in the minds of people and how to make sense of the world,
to the meaning or significance of life itself. When this type of meaning breaks down,
people refer to it as an existential crisis, or what Weick calls a cosmological episode."
In other words, it is not the narrow species of meaning that resides in language:
Weick borrows the term "cosmology" from philosophy, a branch of philosophy
subsumed under metaphysics, which combines rational speculation and scientific
evidence to understand the universe as a totality of phenomena. As such, cosmology is
the ultimate macro perspective, directed at issues of time, space, change, cause-and-
effect relations and contingency. A person's cosmological view refers, in other words,
to an integrated whole, how the person thinks the world hangs together. In its deepest
sense, it means that which people take for granted; they assume that is the way the
world works - how things cohere and how change and order unfold. But, as Weick
points out, everyday cosmologies are subject to disruption, and when severely
disrupted, a cosmological episode occurs. That is when all meaning is lost, suddenly,
and life itself becomes meaningless. What makes such an episode so shattering is that
both the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse
together.
The same point is also emphasised by Boisen,82 albeit from within a different context.
In his scheme of things, an existential crisis refers to the upsetting of foundations upon
79 Weick 2001: 357
80 Weick 1995: 170
81 2001: 105
82 In Aden & Ellens 1990: 209-210; Boisen's context was the hospital and the psychology of religion his subject
matter.
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which critical judgements are made. By the wordfoundation he means the individual's
"philosophy of life". A person's philosophy of life he conceptualised to be the entire
system of meanings that influences and determines all reactions and all thinking. It
signifies the individual's orientation with reference to the world, self-conception,
purpose in life, loyalties and values, and system of beliefs and attitudes.
It is therefore no surprise that Weick83 grounds sensemaking on the first most
important characteristic or property of sensemaking, namely, identity. The construction
of identity aside, in its deepest sense it is an existential issue, as it represents the
totality of how people think of themselves and their place in the world. It is this
importance that Weick84 stipulates when he says, "I make sense of whatever happens
around me by asking, what implications do these events have for who I will be ... what
the situation means is defined by who I will become while dealing with it or what or
who I represent". Finally, in the words of Weick, "Sensemaking matters. A failure in
sensemaking is consequential and existential. It throws into question the nature of the
self and the world ... ".85 In its most dramatic form then, "sensemaking deals with the
issue of how to accept the diversity and mutation of the world while retainirig the
mind's power of analogy and unity so that this changing world shall not become
meaningless=Ï"
5. Summary
This chapter discussed Weick's sensemaking theoretical framework from the
standpoint of perspective, of paradigm and mindset. Meaning was described from a
social constructionist as well as from an existential perspective. Several themes bind
these aspects together, namely, a particular view of the world, an emphasis on the
malleability, unpredictability and turbulence of the environment, and process - the
interdependency of elements and the ongoing and continuous flow of events and the
need to make sense of interruptions in that flow. The emphasis is on making, the
process of arranging people's understanding of experience so that they can know what
83 1995: 18-24
84 1995: 23-24
85 1995: 14 (emphasis added)
86 1995: 171 (emphasis added)
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has happened, and what is happening. As such, it is a matter of invention, of
constructing knowledge (epistemology) of themselves and their world (ontology).
It has become necessary, at this point, to ask where the sensemaking perspective,
paradigm and mindset derive from? The central argument in this thesis is that Weick
demonstrates a distinctively process view of reality. The first can be called an organic
view of the world, linked to his conceptualisation of organising;87 while the second, a
psychological process view of reality can be linked to his conceptualisation of
sensemaking. 88 Thus, in light of what has been described and discussed so far in this
chapter, Weick's thought must be seen as a unity - people (collectively) organise in
terms of the sense they make, and organise to make better sense. Conversely, people
(collectively) make sense in terms of their organising, and make sense to better
organise - it is therefore a single process. Put differently, what can be regarded as
social processes of organising, is psychological in nature, and what can be regarded as
psychological organising processes, is social in nature.
Both the organic and psychological processes will become clearer in the chapters that
are to follow. It is to the organic process model of Bergson'" and Whitehead's9o that
we tum to first in the next chapter.
87 See The Social Psychology of Organising (1979).
88 See Sensemaking in Organisations (1995).
89 1974 (1946)
90 1978
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CHAPTER 3
PROCESS COSMOLOGY AS GROUND THEORY
IN
SENSEMAKING IN ORGANISATIONS
Introduction to process philosophy, Bergson and Whitehead
Weick91 states that sensemaking induces a mindset to focus on process and that
sensemaking is, after all, about the world. The aim in this chapter is to show that the
guiding idea behind Weick's approach 92 to sensemaking is that the world and, by
implication the organisation, is best understood in terms of ontological categories such
as processes, events and occurrences, rather than things and substances - of modes of
change rather than fixed stabilities. Rescher'" points out that for 'processists', change
of every sort - physical, organic, psychological - is the pervasive and predominant
feature of the real.
In the twentieth century, 'process philosophy' has been strongly associated with names
such as Leibniz, Bergson, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Weiss, Alexander, Morgan and
Ushenko.94 Because both the organic and psychological process view of reality are
central aspects of Weick's thought, the organic model of the world as embodied in the
thought of Bergson" and Whitehead96 will be the focus in the chapter, while the
psychological process model, in the context of pragmatism, will be discussed in the
next. This chapter thus describes the ground theory in sensemaking in organisations, in
light of which the rest of this project will make sense. It must be kept in mind that, like
any philosophical tendency, process philosophy is fundamentally complex and has
internal variations."
91 1995: 13, 132
92 Note that this chapter merely lays the ground for what is to follow. Weick's process thinking will become
clearer in the subsequent chapters.
93 2002: I
94 Reseher 2002: 2
95 1974
96 1978
97 Reseher (2002: 5) points out that the unity is not doctrinal but thematic.
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1. Introduction to Process Cosmology
According to Butler/8 the three great problems of philosophy are the problems of
reality, knowledge and value. He stated it as follows: (1) The problem of reality: What
is the nature of the universe in which people live? Or in the last analysis, what is real?
The branch of philosophy that deals with this great problem is named metaphysics
(nowadays sometimes referred to as ontology). (2) The problem of knowledge: How do
people know what is real? How do they come by their knowledge and how can they be
sure it is true, not error or illusion? The area in philosophy devoted to solving this
problem is named epistemology. (3) The third great problem, the problem of value, is
this: What are the important values desired in living? Are they rooted in reality, and
how can they be realised in human experience? The branch of philosophy that deals
with such questions as these is named axiology.
The branch in metaphysics that deals with the character of the world and the beliefs as
to the organisation and orderly arrangement of the various parts of the universe, is
concerned with cosmology. The things that are to be taken into consideration in
cosmology include the nature of time and space, change, contingency and causality.
Weick99 describes cosmology as the ultimate macro perspective, and added that
cosmology issues are not just the handiwork of philosophers, but of all people.
Just when modem science was reaching its most impressive heights of achievement,
two bold speculative philosophers called into question the basic assumptions of the
scientific mode of thought. Neither Bergson'Ï" nor Whitehead10l wished to deny the
considerable contributions made by the scientific method; what concerned them
primarily was a philosophical question, namely, whether reality, the basic nature of
things, was what science assumed it to be. During the last half of the nineteenth
century, and the early decades of the twentieth, the major assumption of science was
that nature consists of material objects located in space. Matter is the final irreducible
stuff out of which all things were formed. The model for thinking was the machine
model. All the particular things in nature were parts of a large mechanism. This means
98 1968: 13
99 2001: 105; see also, e.g. Bergson's The Creative Mind (1974).
100 1974
101 1978
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that each part could in time be described with mathematical exactness, since material
objects moved in space in accordance with precise rules or laws. Things were related
to each other in a tight sequence of cause and effect. As parts of a tightly organised
cosmic machine, humans were thought of as being wholly determined, as cogs in a
wheel, as possessing little, if any, freedom of will.
Bergsonl'" and Whiteheadlo3 questioned these assumptions. They wondered whether
nature really consist of inert material objects, whether the intellect is capable to
discover an "out there" and whether there can be any novelty in nature if the basic
reality is material and organised in a tight mechanism. Science itself had recently
developed the theory of evolution, which made the mechanical model of nature less
and less plausible. While Whitehead moved from science to metaphysics, drawing out
many of the implications of the emerging new physics, Bergson had no intention of
rejecting science, but thought that the two could enrich each other.
It is useful to point out that the notion of a process view of reality is an ancient one,
going back at least to the Greek theoretician Heraclitus of Ephesus who depicted the
world as a manifold of opposed forces joined in mutual rivalry, interlocked in constant
strife and conflict. Fire for him, was the most fundamental and unchanging elemental
force in nature; for "fire" was the destroyer and transformer of things. To illustrate the
changeability of all things that so pervades our world, he said that "one cannot step
twice into the same river".lo4 As Heraclitus saw it, reality is at bottom not a
constellation of things at all, but one of processes; for him it meant that people must
avoid at all costs the fallacy of substantialising nature into perduring things
(substances) because it is not stable things but fundamental forces and the varied and
fluctuating activities which they produce that make up this world of humans. Process is
fundamental: the river is not an object, but an ever-changing flow; the sun is not a
thing, but a flaming fire. Consequently, everything is process, activity and change -
everything that is, is the process of becoming.ï'"
102 1974
103 1978
104 Reseher 2002: 2
105 cf. Bohm 1980: 61ff.
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2. Henri Bergson
All of Bergson's (1859-1941)106 work is concerned with duration, movement and
ongoing process in all things - the reality of change. His work implies a continued
striving after adaptation to reality. For him the world is duration; the world is
evolution. He saw through the discovery of biological evolution that something new is
produced all the time, nature is no scene of dull uniformity, with no fixed pattern
repeating itself mechanically as in physical causation. What was revolutionary, was
Bergson's idea about the nature of existence. For him nature was in flux (or in Greek
phraseology, becoming), as an ongoing process of change, as opposed to a mechanical,
permanent, unchanging substance. His contribution to philosophy then, was this new
conception of existence as change in time, as duration, as the free, creative moment in
life.
Bergson made a very important distinction between the subject matter of physical
science and the study of life. Whereas one can study matter as real, and is aware of the
real as separate from oneself (Descartes), Bergson maintained that life is not the same
as matter, and the person is aware of that directly in himself. Consciousness is an
indivisible process; its parts mutually penetrate each other. The sense of the whole is
present throughout. Here in experience was the pattern Bergson saw applicable to life
everywhere - duration as the significant aspect of existence. He thought of the self in
terms of continual mobility, "for our past follows us, it swells incessantly with the
present that it picks up on its way; and consciousness means memory".107 In ourselves,
memory is the vehicle of duration. The person possesses memory and is therefore not
at the mercy of the present or impulse. By means of memory, existence is made
continuous. Ideas such as these also give people a more accurate notion of time - as
real, continuous time, as compared with the "spacialised" time created by the
intellect.i'" For Bergson, the intellect slices in what in reality is an ongoing and
continuous flow.I09 People's desires and actions are not momentary; they carry with
them their entire past. Their thoughts, by contrast, are more selective.
106 1974; see also Stumph 1982: 384-388
107 Stumph 1982: 385
108 Stumph 1982: 386
109 Durant 1961: 464
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Another signal point of originality in Bergson was his suggestion of a new mode of
knowing. Whereas the intellectual faculties of the person developed as an instrument
of action in the service of successful adaptation to the world in as far as it is an orderly,
'law-abiding' cause and effect, the evolutionary process had turned up another sort of
agency of successful adaptation, as a supplement to scientific knowledge, and Bergson
called this capacity and the knowledge it yields, intuition.t''' For him, the true nature of
(
things is apprehended by intuition - to "seize from within". III It is useful to note in
this regard that knowing signifies immediate consciousness, a vision that is scarcely
distinguishable from the object seen. 112 Most important of all, says Bergson, to think
intuitively is to think in duration.
Concepts he considered to be static, one-sided. When people try to analyse anything,
they distort and deform it; they get one view but not another; they freeze the thing in
time and fail to understand the thing's growth, its development, its life.1I3 Analysis is
lifeless and at best proceeds by taking successive points of view. But it is, of necessity,
always dissatisfied, for there are infinite angles, endless movements. Bergson not only
rejects the idea of simple things, simple facts and simple sensations, but the very idea
of facts, things and sensations in philosophy. His basic ontology is ontology of change,
not the change of this thing or that property but change as such, change as the whole.
Through intuition people see things in their wholeness and time, as "the things"
embody oppositions that justify opposing viewpoints. He therefore views the intellect
as an emergent property of the relations among the various parts in the organism.
To summarise, Bergson was obviously trying to get people to see something else - to
see the functional unity of an organism - which requires that any variation in one part
must be accompanied by variations throughout the organism - to see what life is and
means, and was bound to emphasise the aspects of experience ignored or neglected in
the scientific thinking of his day. Itmade people to think, too, more seriously about the
meaning of time and the creative possibilities of life.
110 1994
III Solomon & Higgins 1996: 265
112 cf. Weick 1995: 24-26
II] Bergson 1974
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3. Alfred North Whitehead
Whitehead (1861-1947) 114reacted, as Bergson had, against the analytic mode of
thought, which assumed that facts exist in isolation from other facts. Much of
Whitehead's philosophy was written from a sense of contrast between the variable,
superficial elements that stand out clearly in human experience, and the persistent,
dimly feIt background that is basic but hard to describe. His main theme was that
"connectedness is the essence of all things".115 He insisted that all actual entities are
able to being interconnected in a stream of experience. In describing Wordsworth's
romantic reaction against the scientific mentality, he goes on to say that "neither
physical nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential
factors in the composition of really real things whose interconnections and individual
characters constitute the universe't.J" He was repulsed by the fact that scientific
analysis had left something important out: intuitions and life itself.
The Newtonian conception of natural fact, which Whitehead saw as "a high
abstraction" from our concrete experience of nature, convinced him that it should be
corrected and replaced by a broader cosmology, which he expanded into a metaphysics
of process. 117He was also very critical of Hume's notion of experience as a discrete
series of sense-impressions and ideas. I IS An occasion of experience, is rather, an
organic unity of feeling; 119it is a process, a concrescence 120of past experiences and of
114 1978
115 Stumph 1982: 389
116 Stumph 1982: 389
117 He referred to his philosophy as a philosophy of organism or an organic philosophy and may be described as a
metaphysical pluralism in that he sees reality as consisting of a multiplicity of actual entities or occasions. His
philosophy is also subjectivist since it accepts that knowledge of subjective reality is based on inference from
subjective modes of perception (Scott 2003). Whitehead himself explains that his philosophy is the inversion
of that of Kant. For Kant the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject
emerges from the world (Irvine 2003).
118 1978
119 Feeling is the integration of an actual entity or occasion into the internal constitution of a subject (Scott 2003).
They are vectors, for they feel for what is there and transform it into what is here (Suchar 2000).
120 Whitehead 1978: 24-26. Whitehead defines concrescence as a process in which prehensions are integrated into
a fully determinate feeling or satisfaction. A satisfaction is a unity of physical or mental operation attained by
an actual entity. The nature of each actual entity is bipolar, physical and mental and the concrescence of each
involves the integration of the physical and mental. It is important to note that Whithead's philosophy is
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external qualities and energies, which are appropriated - in Whitehead's technical
language, prehendedr" - into its own private unity. The experient, as 'physical,
unconsciously feels its environment as causally efficacious upon it; as mental, the
experient makes a novel integrative response, so that it is a partially self-creative
process, an aesthetical achievement. There is no unchanging substance underlying this
process of becoming, and there is no process devoid of intrinsic value, that is, of a
pattern of feeling. He therefore explains the various kinds of things in the world in
terms of contrasts, repetitions, divisions and unions among the prehensions involved.
His concept of experience as an active integrating process is designed to overcome all
dualisms of modern philosophy.
In discussing Newton who followed Democritus in assuming that the nature of things
consists of individual bits of matter existing in space, Whitehead admits that it is
possible to locate an individual part, but only through a process of abstraction. To
abstract means to lift something out of its concrete environment. To mistake the
abstraction for the concrete is the error that Whitehead calls the "fallacy of misplaced
concreteness".122 Such things as the instants of time, points in space, or independent
particles of matter are helpful concepts for scientific thought, but when they are taken
as descriptions of ultimate reality, they are distortions of concrete reality123. His own
concerned with two levels of meaning and reality: (I) the formal structure of actual entities (or occasions), and
(2) the givenness of the world in which actual entities or occasions occur. For him, givenness is potentiality.
Givenness is the definiteness of actuality, which both excludes and includes potentiality. Each actual entity is
in the process of becoming another actual entity. Even more important to note, is that an actual entity may
become an object of prehension for another actual entity. Actual entities may become objects of prehension by
a process of either "causal" or "presentational" objectification. In causal objectification an object is directly
perceived and in presentational objectification an object is indirectly perceived as a result of a direct perception
of an actual entity. Both "causal efficacy" and "presentational immediacy" are modes of perception. Causal
efficacy is a direct perception of prior (past) actual occasions which are causally related to a subsequent actual
occasion, and presentational immediacy is a direct perception of present actual occasions, which may lead to a
process of integrating these occasions with actual occasions in the past (Scott 2003).
121 Contrasts (or patterned entities) are modes of synthesis of entities in one prehension (Whitehead 1978: 22).
Prehensions are physical or mental representations of actual entities or occasions.
122 1978; see Stumph (1983: 390-391, 394) for a more detailed description.
123 As Whitehead himself puts it, "In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times. For every location
involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatia-temporal standpoint mirrors the world".
Further, every-real-life object may be understood as a similarly constructed series of events and processes. As
Irvine (2003: 3) points out, underlying his work is the idea that, if philosophy is to be successful, it must
-
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formulation of the units of reality differs in two ways from those of Democritus and
Newton, namely, in their content and their relations to each other. For the term atom he
substituted actual entities or its equivalent actual occasions. For Whitehead, actual
entities are chunks in the life of nature and as such, never exist in isolation. They
permit people to view nature as a living organism.
Whitehead saw in human consciousness a good example of an actual occasion. In
consciousness, past occasions is connected to our immediate occasion of experience,
which suggests "the connectedness of all occasions in nature".124 But an actual
occasion is not to be understood as a material thing, it is best understood as an
experience. As such, these occasions do not exist, they happen. The difference is that
merely to exist implies no change, whereas to happen suggests a dynamic alteration.
Whitehead's actual occasions represent continually changing entities, this change
coming about through the impact of entities upon each other. 125When considering a
person having an experience, the usual way to think is that there is a permanent
subject, on the one hand, and something "out there", on the other. However,
Whitehead argues that subject and object are both in a continual process of change and
that every experience the subject has affects the subject. In other words, Whitehead's
actual entities have no permanent identity or history. They are always in the process of
becoming.V" They feel the impact of other actual occasions and absorb them
internally. If they (the occasions) take on a determinative form or character they
become actuality, and when they do, they "perish". Perishingl27 is what Whitehead
means by memory or causality, that with the passage of time something of the past is
preserved in the present.
The term prehension also describes how the elements of actual entities are related to
each other and how these entities are further related to other entities. Since nothing in
the world is unrelated, Whitehead's stated that every prehension consists of three
explain the connection between the objective descriptions of the world and the everyday world of subjective
experience.
124 Stumph 1982: 391
125 Stumph 1982: 392
126 Scott 2003
127 Stumph 1982: 392
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factors: the "subject" that is prehending, the "datum that is prehended" and the
"subjective form", which is how the subject prehends the datum.128 For the purposes
here, it is necessary to note that while people can distinguish between physical and
conceptual feelings (for example, emotions, valuations, purposes and consciousness),
they do not imply the older dualism of mind (thought) and body (extension) - as in
Descartes' thinking. To insist on their separation is to again commit the fallacy of
misplacement. This fallacy, it will be recalled, is committed when one mistakes an
abstraction for the concrete. For Whitehead, both the body and mind forms a society,
or nexus (contextual unity). They are sets of actual entities, and they can be organised
into something like, for example, a body politic (the abstraction), where only the
citizens are the concrete reality.
To summarise Whitehead's Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology,129
Whitehead visualised reality as a continual process in which actual entities are
constantly becoming, a process in which what an actual entity becomes depends on
how it becomes. Here he places the emphasis on creativity, the fundamental
characteristic of the process of nature - a conjoined action of all entities in "novel
togetherness", embodied in the term "concrescence". Instead of focusing on material
objects, people should focus on events, conceived of as not static instants (or
"snapshots") but rather as moments in a process of realisation.F'' Instead of inanimate
objects, Whitehead concentrates on the notion of organism, "an event, coming into
being through patterns". An organism is not a mechanism. It functions through time; it
is vibrant, not static. The category he uses to describe this activity, is creativity. Since
nature is itself creative, novel and imaginative, people have to, accordingly,
perpetually invent new and changing language, a poetic language, to capture the
evolving patterns of reality.
The process approach has been a particularly important development in and for
American philosophy, especially owing to its increasingly close linkage to pragmatism
in such thinkers as Peirce, James and Dewey. It is to pragmatism that we now tum to.
128 Stumph 1982: 393
129 1978
130 cf. Weick 1995: 32-33
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CHAPTER4
PRAGMATISM
AND
SENSEMAKING IN ORGANISATIONS
Introduction to pragmatism and its roots, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology,
pragmatism and Weick in organisational theory, process ontology, social constructionism, the self,
experience and action, practical reason and context, communication and meaning, relating
The following five theoretical frameworks feature strongly throughout the work of
Weick: the symbolic interactionism of Meadl31 and Blumer,132 the ethnemethodology
of Garfinkel133 (which arose out of the phenomenology of Schutz+"), the frame
analysis of Goffman 135 and the social construction of reality of Berger and
Luckmann.l'" What bind them together are their roots in the philosophy of
pragmatism. It is therefore not surprising to find that they all share the same emphasis
and focus, namely, the sociology of everyday life, which includes how people make
sense of their world and meaning, action and experience, interaction, communication
and relationships, practical knowledge, context, humanity's place in the world and
reality (process, evolution and social construction). The aim in this chapter is to show
how some of its central ideas are integrated into the thought of Weick and deployed in
his theory of sensemaking in organisations.
131 Weick (1995: 41) states that symbolic interaction ism is the "unofficial theory of sensemaking", Mead argued
that mind and self arise and develop within the social process. To use the image of symbolic interactionism is
to ensure that one remains sensitive to the ways in which people actively shape each other's meanings and
sensemaking processes.
It was Blumer who coined the term symbolic interaction ism (Ritzer 2000). For a discussion of Blumer's112
arguments in Weick, see 1995: 37, 40, 42-43.
133 Weick 1979: 150-151, 195,200; 1995: 12-14,24, 51, 67, 94-95; 2001: 20-21. Weick acknowledges the
continuing influence of ethnomethodology on the study of organisational sensemaking (1995: 24).
134 Weick 1979: 46, 194, 198: 1995: 24-26, 28, 41, 67
135 Weick 1979: 171-173; 1995: 35,51
116 Weick 1995: 67,123-125. Berger & Luckmann (1967: 27-29) acknowledge the influence of both Schutz and
Mead on their work in The Social Construction of Reality. Ritzer (2000: 338) also indicates that the symbolic
interaction ism was influenced by the pragmatists.
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The focus and discussion in this chapter is pragmatism and social constructivism in
organisational theory in general, and to symbolic interactionism and ethno-
methodology as developed and applied by Weick in sensemaking in the organisation in
particular.
Before proceeding with the discussion, it is important to understand something more
about pragmatism as a philosophical perspective.
1. Introduction to Pragmatism and its Roots
William James called pragmatism "a new name for an old way of thinking".137
Solomon and Higgins':" stated that it was James who attempted to bridge the old and
new worlds by establishing a fully American version of what in Europe was being
coined "phenomenology" (the science of experience). The names commonly
associated with the rise of pragmatism in America are Charles S. Peirce, William
James and John Dewey. Butler139 regards Peirce as the originator of the single root
idea from which pragmatism has grown, and states that James popularised the idea and
lent it some shades of meaning never intended by Peirce. Dewey developed a full-
fledged philosophy, radically experimental, and building out of it an inclusive
worldview with its own peculiar implications for every phase of life.
Yet pragmatism did not spring from nowhere; it has roots in the past and some of them
are ancient. Two of the earliest appearances of beliefs found in the pragmatism of
today occurred in the teachings of Heraclitus and Protagoras.l'" In the previous chapter
it was noted that Heraclitus stress the fact of change in the world; he rejected dualisms
(so-called opposites) - for him their appearances pass into one another; everything is
in a state of flux, constant movement and process of becoming. 'Thinghood' or
essences, he also did not regard as adequate categories for understanding this ever-
flowing reality. What is seen to be dichotomies or opposing forces (subject/object,
mindlbody, means/end, knowledge/practice, for example) he argued are interrelated
137 Butler 1968: 361
138 1996: 259
139 1968
140 Butler 1968
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and should be joined together.i'" In other words, the rejection of a sharp dichotomy
parallels the relationship between part and whole.
Tom between the total change of Heraclitus, on the one hand, and the total unchanged
of Parmenides, on the other, the sneaking suspicion that nothing could be certainly
known to be true, grew on the Sophists until it became their true conviction.
Protagoras, however, agreed with Heraclitus that all things change. He, for instance,
defined knowledge as sense perception.Y One phase of the eternal flux, he held, is
comprised of the stimulations arising from the world that impinge upon people and
evoke a response. Neither stimulus and response, nor the resultant sense perception can
be considered a representation of the world. All are but phases in constant flux. Each
sense perception is the nearest approach to genuine knowledge that the person can
have. And therefore the saying for which Protagoras is most famous, "man is the
measure of all things".143 That is, whatever perceptions a person may have at a given
time, those perceptions are true for him or her.
Pragmatism is equally distrustful of knowledge. It seeks to provide no basis for
certainty in knowledge. For pragmatists the social mind,144 by virtue of its ability to
experiment, is the measure of all things. However, sense perception, pragmatism holds,
is neither passive nor purely receptive. In sensory relations with the world, people are
actively engaged in a give-and-take with the world; people are doing things to the
world and/or objects at the same time that they are doing things to people, impressing
or stimulating them. It is therefore not true that the senses are merely gateways, when
sensation is an avenue of active relation with the world.
Butler145points out that the inductive method of Francis Bacon was another influence
on pragmatism. While by no means identical with pragmatism, it occupies an
important place in that school of thought in that it doubts the validity of all
141 Joas 1993
142 Butler 1968: 356
143 Butler 1968: 357
144 Pragmatist cognitive psychology recognises 'social mind' and is thus closer to social psychology. Mead was
influenced by 'psychological behaviourism' and referred to his basic concern as 'social behaviuor' (Ritzer
2000: 239-240).
145 1968:360
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generalisations and rather seizes upon particulars. Each new situation is taken as
unique and therefore to be faced freshly, without superimposing generalisations upon
it.
Perhaps the most influential figure looming in the background of pragmatism is
Kant.146 Kant's patient analysis of the knowledge process did not yield any sure
content regarding the nature of the thing-in-itself. He brought empiricism and
rationalism together by arguing that the individual mind was endowed with a set of
primitive categories through which it experienced the world. Peirce, having been an
avid student of Kant, sought to bridge the gap between subjective processes of the
mind and the objective realities of the world.l'" He saw knowledge as social rather
than strictly cognitive, a step that led him to develop a semiotic approach to
knowledge.
Pragmatism can also been seen as a species of the New England "transcendentalists"
who were direct descendants of Kant and Hegel.148 Beside Thoreau, the most famous
transcendentalist who had an essential influence on pragmatism, is Emerson.149 Not
only did he write his doctoral dissertation on Kant, but has he also, because of being
mystic in orientation emphasised humanity's union with nature and the importance of
intuitive insight over logical reasoning.
Not only was the pragmatists heavily influenced by Darwin,lso but were they also
fierce opponents of Darwinism of the day because it focused more on natural-selection
than interaction with the environment. The evolutionary psychology of James, Dewey
and Mead emphasised the way individuals solved problems and adapted to
environmental demands.
Finally, there is the influence of Aristotle. lSI Where pragmatists differ from him is at
the point where he defines objects by their essences (substances) instead of
146 Butler 1968
147 Butler 1968
148 Solomon & Higgins 1996: 239-240
149 Solomon & Higgins 1996
150 Butler 1968; Stumph 1982
151 Butler 1968: 388-390
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relationships. They were in agreement with him as far as he emphasised active
engagement with the world and the social and political nature of being human.
2. Symbolic Interactionism
Lewis and Smith 152distinguish between two branches of pragmatism - "philosophical
realism" (associated with Mead) and "nominalist pragmatism" (associated with James
and Dewey). While Ritzer153 is of the opinion that Mead is the most important thinker
in the history of symbolic interactionism, it was actually one of his students, Herbert
Blumer.l'" who established symbolic interactionism and coined the term. In Lewis and
Smith'sl55 view, Blumer was influenced more by the nominalist approach, the position
of which is that although micro-level phenomena exist, they do not have "independent
and determining effects upon the consciousness of and behaviour of individuals". The
difference between them is essentially what Mead called his basic concern, social
behaviourism and Blumer's move toward "psychical interaction ... the psychical
interactionist holds that the meanings of symbols are not universal and objective;
rather meanings are individual and subjective in that they are attached to the symbols
by the receiver according to whatever he or she chooses to interpret them".156
(1) Basic principles of symbolic interactionism. The principles'Y of symbolic
interactionism can be summarised as follows: (l) Human beings are endowed with
thought; the capacity for thought is shaped by social interaction; (2) through social
interaction people learn the meaning and symbols that allow them to exercise their
capacity for thought; the meanings and symbols allow people to carry on action and
interaction: (3) people are able to modify and alter the meanings and symbols that they
use in action and interaction on the basis of their interpretation of the situation; (4)
people are able to reflect on their options, examine possible courses of action and
choose an option, and (5) the intertwined patterns of action and interaction make up
groups and societies. Each of these principles will be briefly discussed next.
152 1980
153 2000
154 Ritzer 2000
155 1980: 24
156 Lewis & Smith 1980: 172
157 Ritzer 2000: 357
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(i) Capacity for thought. While the symbolic interactionists recognise that the
ability to think is embedded in the mind, for them the mind is not a thing; the mind is
originating in the socialisation of consciousness. They also conceive of the mind as a
continuing process. ISS
(ii) Thinking and interaction. While they recognise that people have a general
capacity for thought, the view of the interactionists is that the capacity for thought
needs to be shaped and refined through a process of socialisation+" A central tenet of
the interactionists is that symbolic interaction requires mental processes, and in
relation to objects, it is not so much what is "out there" that is of importance, but the
way they are defined by people. As Biumer160 said: "The nature of an object. .. consists
of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object".
(iii) Meanings and language. Symbolic interactionists conceive of language as a
vast system of symbols. Whereas signs stand for themselves (for example, the gesture
of an angry dog) "symbols are social objects used to represent (or 'stand for', 'take the
place of) whatever people agree they shall represent't.l'" Words are symbols because
they are used to stand for things. Words make all other symbols possible. What is of
importance, is that meaning stems not from solitary mental processes but from
interaction - it is in essence a social activity. What connects the "symbolic" and
"interaction" is communication.
(iv) Action and choices. Symbolic interactionists' primary concern is with the
impact of meanings and symbols on human action and interaction. For them, social
action means acting with others in mind.162 In other words, people act in a process of
mutual influence. Since actors have the ability to form new meanings, they have the
autonomy and ability to make choices. This creative ability is underscored by Weickl63
in his reference to Thomas and Thomas who stated: "If men defines situations as real
they are real in their consequences". Here, Weick alerts his readers to the fact that
158 Ritzer 2000
159 Ritzer 2000
160 1969: 11
161 Charon 1998: 47
162 Ritzer 2000
163 1995: 66
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subjective bases of action have non-subjective results, that groups vary III their
definitions of a situation, and that a situation determines behaviour.
(2) The Self. To symbolic interactionists, the self is of enormous importance.
According to Ritzer'I", all sociological processes and events revolve around that hub.
It is therefore of great significance, in this regard, that Weickl65 grounds his seven
properties of sensemaking in identity construction as the first in a sequence of a
process. Meadl66 states that, "Emergence involves reorganisation [and that] reorgani-
sation brings in something that was not there before. The first time oxygen and
hydrogen come together, water appears. Now water is a combination of hydrogen and
oxygen, but water was not there before in the separate elements". It is in terms of this
description that Weick conceptualises the self as in essence a synthesis or merge and
emergent property of a dialectical process.167 In other words, to properly conceive of
the self, it is necessary to see the self as pure process and, hence, neither as an object
or a subject. As will be seen later, it is also in essence a social psychological process.
In his talking about organisation from a macro-level perspective, Weickl68 uses
Wiley's argument that there are three levels of sensemaking "above" the individual "I"
subjective level. The first is the "l-You" - intersubjective level, then the "we/us" -
generic subjective level and finally the extrasubjective - cultural level. Here the
concern is with the "individual", and in this regard draws attention to two aspects from
Weick's discussion, in order to strengthen the argument given so far: (1) movement
from one level to the next takes place through, in and by means of organising (that
serves as a bridge between forms of socialising), that is, self-organising social
interaction, and (2) each new level above the "individual" level is a synthesis, a merge
or emergent out of a dialectical process between two or more social processes.
The first point to note is that the individual's self consists of an "I" (the reflective
aspect) in interaction with the "me" (the generalised other - to use Mead'sl69 words).
164 2000
165 1995: 17ff.
166 1962: 198
167 cf. Weick 1995: 71; 2001: 113
168 1995: 70-75
169 1962: 175
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When the I adopts the Me a synthesis occurs, called the self. In other words, in the
spirit of thesis-anti thesis-synthesis, this constitutes an ongoing dialectical process of
becoming - never final, never complete. To elucidate the point, people are capable of
weanng many 'hats', playing out various roles at different times and switching
between roles with little apparent effort. What it means, from asensemaking
perspective, is that what a situation will have meant to a person is dictated by the
identity he/she adopts in dealing with it. And that is a negotiation and organising
process, cognitively and socially, between the "I" and "me" (generalised other), that in
tum gives the person a new synthesised self, able to deal with each new situation,
repetitively and continuously. It therefore makes sense when Weickl70 argues that the
more selves people have access to, the less the likelihood that they will find
themselves surprised or astonished when confronted with the unexpected.
It is also important to note that sensemaking is never solitary because what a person
does internally is contingent on others - even if sensemaking occurs only in the mind
of a single individual. Any single sensemaker is a "parliament of selves",171 hence,
Weick's statement that individual sensemaking is something of an oxymoron.V'
Finally, if the self is not a thing, then it must be an abstraction of that which is in
essence a process of becoming. Mead 173 consistently argues that, not only is
consciousness not a thing, but also mental images, meaning and mind. All these
processes are social phenomena; as such, emergent phenomena that arise out of
interaction between people. Goffman' s 174 study of the self confirms Mead's argument.
In other words, the self is not an organic thing that has a specific location; neither is
the self the possession of an actor, but a process of relating between an actor and "the
other". And as such, the process may also be seen as a communication process with
oneself and others, while at the same time interpreting and handling of meanings.
To summarise this section, when people are looking at individual behaviour ID
organisations, they are actually seeing two entities: the individual as himself and the
170 1995: 24
171 Weick 1995: 18
112 1995: 80
173 1962: 75, 77, 112,267,332; cf. Weick 1994: 41
174 1959: 252-253
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individual as representative of his collectivity. The self is a social construct out of
interaction and organising (communication and interpreting) processes. Thus, identities
shift and change as situations change; it is fluid as the self that is in a perpetual process
of becoming.
3. Ethnomethodology
Although ethnomethodology was "invented" by Herbert Garfinkel in the late 1940s, it
was only systematised with the publication of his Studies in Ethnomethodology in
1967.175 Given its Greek roots, the term ethnomethodology literally means the
"methods,,176 that people use on a daily basis to accomplish their everyday lives.
Zimmerman and Wieder177 point out that ethnomethodologists are not concerned with
causal explanations of observably regular, patterned, repetitive actions by some kind of
analysis from the actor's view. They are concerned with how members of society go
about the task of seeing, describing and explaining order in the world in which they
live. Simply stated, ethnomethodology means the study of the ways in which people
make sense of their social world.
Since Weickl78 has acknowledged the continuing influence of ethnomethodology on
sensemaking, it becomes necessary to briefly discuss the central principles in
ethnomethodology.
(1) The everyday world as an accomplishment. For the ethnomethodologist, the
world of everyday life is seen as an ongoing accomplishment. 179Whereas symbolic
interactionists regard social order as something that is created and recreated everyday
in the multiplicity of interaction situations - the "negotiated order" - the process of
definition, interpretation and negotiation, ethnomethodologists in contrast, start out
with the assumption that social order is illusory.l'" They believe that social life merely
appears to be orderly; in reality it is potentially chaotic. A closer look at Weick seems
to reflect the same understanding. Although he argues that a socially constructed world
175 TimashetT & Theodorson 1976: 300-30 I
176 Ritzer 2000: 381
177 1970: 289
178 See footnote 133 on p. 370fthis study.
179 Garfinkel 1991
1 BO Poore 2000
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IS a stable world,181 the impression that he leaves is that, that may be just an
appearance - the world makes sense and is under control if people do not look "too
closely".182 Weick, in the spirit of the ethnomethodologists, also argues that order is
enacted into the world,183and that sensemaking focuses attention upon the idea that the
reality of everyday life must be seen as an ongoing accomplishment'f" through
symbolic processes reality is created and sustained.185
(2) Practical reason and context. People are seen by ethnomethodologists as
rational, but they are using "practical reasoning", not formal logic, in accomplishing
their everyday lives.186This is in line with pragmatism's model of practical reason 187
or, as Weick refers to it in sensemaking in organisations, "reasonableness".188 Practical
reason suggests that individuals do act in an intentional and purposeful manner, but
that the cognitive processes often departs from contemporary textbook accounts of
analytical rationality. The point is that practical reason works in quite different ways
than suggested by analytical rationality.
Practical reason suggests that people make decisions in situationally-specific contexts
under conditions heavily laden with the associations drawn from past experience.
Hence, practical reason implies a "situational rationality".189 What is clear, however, is
that this rationality considers people "skilled" decision makers that have to draw on
past experiences that influence reasoned judgement in present situations. Skilful
judgement comes, in part, through pattern recognition, analogical reason and intuition
with a more limited place for analytical reason and logic.190 Skilful judgement is also
181 1995: 154
182 1995: 170
183 2001:6
184 2001: 106
185 2001: II
186 Ritzer 2000
187 Note that Toulmin (200 I: 110) makes a distinction between rationality and reasonableness. Reasonableness is
equated with practical reason.
188 1995:57,60-61
189 On "situated rationality" see Manning (1988: 266) and Weick (200 I: 259-279). One of Goffrnan's (in Manning
1992: 10-11) basic themes is "situational propriety", the idea that the meaning of actions is linked to context
and that we cannot understand behaviour without knowledge of the situation.
190 For a discussion resembling a self-fulfilling prophecy, see Weick 2001: 391-393.
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very close to "craft knowledge"!" - practical knowledge - knowledge developed
through what Weick refers to as 'trail and error' Iearning.i'" and is at least partly
tacit.193What is important for the purposes here, is to note is that the model of skilful
craft judgement and knowledge corresponds closely with Weick'sl94 description of
'improvisation' - the ability to refashion prior solutions for new situations. In other
words, reflexivity reflects the creative action of the present, the ability to improvise by
drawing on the resources from the past while at the same time transcending the past.
(3) Retrospective sense making. Ethnomethodologists have been particularly
interested in how facts are made sensible in retrospect. In Weickl95 we have noted
Garfinkel's study, in the context of jury decisions, how people define retrospectively
the decision that have been made and so justify a course of action. The core of
retrospective sensemaking entails a particular process in the social construction of
reality. The idea here is that the meaning of behaviour, in this case past behaviour, is
continually re-evaluated based on the exigencies of current situations and typified
understandings.
What is of significance for the purposes of this study is that Weick 196cast his
discussion of retrospective sensemaking in the context of process philosophy. The
importance of it is captured by the concept of time as pure duration. Pure duration is "a
coming-to-be and passing away that has no contours, no boundaries and no
differentiation't.l'" Whenever people punctuate (focusing their attention) on something
in the ongoing stream of experience, they abstract from this experience. But, what is
perceived is in reality a past world. Although some moments in this continuous flow
are retained in memory (that serves as a bridge between the past and future), it cannot
be recalled without distortion.!" In other words, the meaning of an event or passed
191 Majone 1989
192 Weick 2001: 193, 330-331. For a discussion of trial and error learning, see cho 6 of this study.
193 On "tacit knowledge", see Nonaka and Takeucchi (1995).
194 :1001: 62-64. Weick uses the concepts of bricolage and bricoleur in a fascinating portrait of the importance of
improvisation in organisational studies.
195 1995: 10-11. For a comprehensive discussion of retrospectice sensemaking, see Weick 1995: 24-30.
196 1995: 24-30
197 Schutz 1967 (in Weick 1995: 25)
198 Weick 1995: 28-29
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object has only constructed, and reconstructed meaning. Finally, as Weickl99 points
out, the "feeling" of order, clarity and rationality is an important goal of sensemaking,
which means that once this feeling is achieved, further retrospective processing stops.
However, the world still goes on. It is for this reason that Weick cautions that people
should hold their retained meanings lightly.200
4. Pragmatism and Weick in Organisational Theory
(1) Experience and action. The hallmark of pragmatism is experience. In fact, it
was James who coined the phrase "stream of experience'Y'" At the core of the -
pragmatism perspective that links experience, knowledge and problem solving (as with
life) into a stream of situations that humans confront that requires a solution
(adaptation), is Darwin's model of living evolving organisations.i'" On the one side
there are experiences that become part of people's past, a reservoir of habit, routine,
pattern recognition and emotion to solve future problems; and on the other side, there
is an active mind that actively organises experience. The mind operates through
conceptual and symbolic structures that mediate between past experience and imagined
future, and the distinctive characteristic of the mind is reflexivity.i'" its ability to
consciously reflect upon and manipulate its own and symbolic structure. The balance
between the two is a variable one, but pragmatists and Weick204 suggest that
experience prevails until people confront intractable or anomalous problems.
Pragmatism treats knowledge as social as well as personal. Although knowledge is
largely viewed as intersubjective (as opposed to subjective), individuals must test this
knowledge against personal experience. Furthermore, pragmatists and Weick205posits
that groups, such as organisations, are bound together by similar or shared experience.
The conceptual and symbolic structure of the mind is paralleled by knowledge as a
social construction stored in diaries, memories and irnagination.P" Reflexivity at the
199 1995: 29
200 200 I: 357
201 Solomon & Higgins 1996: 259; Weick 1995: 25
202 Butler 1968: 373-375; Solomon & Higgins 1996: 262
203 Wiley 1994 (eh. 4) discusses the pragmatist versions of reflexivity.
204 1995: 2-3
205 1995: 188-189
206 Weick 2001: 71
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organisational level, then, refers to dialogue, meeting and deliberation about shared
knowledge. From the pragmatist perspective this constitutes an intersubjective process:
while individuals make their private experiences and ideas available to others, they
may also at the same time appropriate the experiences and ideas of others.
This model also implies ongoing action.207 Dewey states that "acting is ongoing, as is
the experiencing that is integral to it. Action is mainly routine; interrupted routine
action, usually by some sort of blockage that is usually environmental or situational in
source, precipitates mental processes that involve a review of imagined options, the
making of choices among them that leads to the reorganisation and continuance of
action. Transformation through interaction - of lines of action, objects, environment,
self and the world - is central to this theory of action".208 To solve problems people
encounter in the present, they must be able to imagine possible futures. In this regard
Weick209 argues that action in the present mediates between past experience and
imagined future.
(2) Emotion and images. That imagery occupies a large place in pragmatism and
sensemaking theory " is a matter that has been rarely appreciated in organisational
theory. Alongside an affinity with the role of imagery, pragmatism also emphasises the
importance of emotion in cognitive reasoning. As Kosslyrr'!' notes, "Imagery is a basic
form of cognition and plays a central role in many human activities - ranging from
navigation to memory to creative problem solving".
(3) Knowledge, reflexivity and social constructionism. From a pragmatist
perspective, how is knowledge produced? Both the pragmatist and sensemaking
framework's emphasis on an active mind and on the collective and social structure of
207 Weick 1995: 13ff. & I56ff.
208 in Strauss 1993: 3. See also Weick 1995:43-45.
209 1995: 13. This reflect Peirce's model of the iteration between observation and speculation (abduction). Scheff
(1997: 41-42) states Peirce's position as follows: "General intelligence requires both deduction and induction,
a rapid movement between imagination and observation. Peirce called this abduction. He was referring to this
movement between imagination and reality".
210 Strati 1999; Weick 1995: 4, 125-126, 171
211 1994: I. She also notes that imagery played a major role in theories of mental events until psychology and
philosophy parted ways. The centrality of imagery and the imagined event in cognition found a central place in
the philosophy of Mead (Sadoski & Paivio 200 I).
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knowledge is strongly grounded in "social constructionism'V'f However, there are
some clear limits to this constructionism. First, pragmatism does not deny the
existence of an external world. Second, pragmatism takes a stand against the argument
that social constructs are merely arbitrary social conventions that posits an underlying
idea of power. Although pragmatism does not oppose the idea of power, it does not
treat this as an. This is perhaps so because the pragmatist's considers rugged reality as
the best ground where ideas can be tested and experience can be found to be real.
Social constructionists hold that social conventions, including institutions and
organisations, have a conceptual and symbolic structure.i':' Pragmatists therefore focus
on the interaction between how concepts are formed in the mind in relation to the
symbolic meanings of institutions.t'" Pragmatism's anti-formalistic stance toward
institutions and external objects (as with all objectivism) leads to the view that they are
subject to conscious manipulation. They are products of social convention but 'dead'
until acted upon.
The interaction between the 'internal' conceptualisation of the mind with 'external'
conceptual structures may lead the inquirer to the idea that the 'external' depends for
its existence on the powers of the mind. This idea moved Simon215 to develop a
computer model of the organisation based on the information-processing processes of
the human mind. However, Simon's information-processing model can be critiqued as
overly mechanistic since it not only absence the social aspect of organisation, but also
because its conceptualisation of decision making is based on normative decision
logic.216 What Simon's model has in common with pragmatism is the view that
rationality can also appear at group level. Hutchins.i'" for example, has used Simon's
information-processing model to demonstrate how interpretations based on distributed
cognitions are formed. The relevant ideas are associated with 'connectionism' and
'neural networks'.
212 Weick 1995: 67, 123-125. See also Berger & Luckman 1967.
213 Cicourel 1968
214 Garfinkel 1967
215 1976. See also Sternberg 2003: 13.
216 Shapira 1997: 3-4
217 1995
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The basic idea is that knowledge in very large networks of very simple processing
units resides in patterns of connections, and not individualised local symbols. Weick
and Robert's'"" description of heedful interrelating captures the idea that patterns of
heedful interrelating is an ongoing social process that can be internalised and
recapitulated by individuals as they move in and out of the collective. Not only does
heedful action allow for adaptation to change, but does it also allow the organisation to
understand more and respond with fewer errors.219
Dewey's brand of pragmatism he called instrumentalism that places emphasis on
practise and learning by doing.22o Not only is experience and learning associated with
practical doing, but so also intelligence. He considers intelligence- a habir21 by which
the human organism adapt to its environment. But habits do not purely refer to simple
mechanical stimulus-response behaviour; they are ways of thinking about the
environment.
In the field of organisational learning Argyris and Schon222 distinguishes between
single loop and double loop learning. They describe single loop learning as the ability
to review performance based on feedback to an existing set of conceptual structures
and double loop learning as the ability to reflect on performance in order to improve
and change conceptual structures prior to action. In terms of reflexivity, they
constitute frames - social constructs - that organise people's perception. Weick223 also
conceptualises Argyris' theories-in-action and espoused theories as frames through
which people perceive the environment and asserts that "theories of action are for
organisations what cognitive structures are for individuals".
Through a pragmatist lens 'ends-means' are often indistinct and inseparably
intertwined.r'" Pragmatists and Weick225 are also of the opinion that mental models are
218 2001: 259-280
219 Weick & Roberts 2001: 260
220 Solomon & Higgins 1996: 262
221 See James' discussion of habit in Allport 1961: 1-17.
222 1978:352-371
223 1995: 121-124
224 Strauss 1993: 55
225 2001: 14,71, 112
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continually revisable in light of experience and manipulable through imagination. In
line with the constructionist view, an empirical understanding of the world as well as
people's values, are considered constructs that need to be tested against experience.
Values are also subject to endless revision, just as all empirical claims.226 In light of
his positivist stance on reality, Simon227 sought a theory by which to distinguish
between fact and value, and means and ends. To this end, he adopted a hierarchical
model of organisation. James March,228however, has been much more attentive to the
intertwining of ends and means, and he as well as Weick229 argued that play was a
much more appropriate image to capture the interaction of ends and means. In child's
play, means and ends are interactive and is it difficult to separate them from each
other. Play also depends more on imagination and improvisation. March moved away
from the hierarchical model of organisation and developed the garbage can theory of
organisation instead, and combined it with an anarchical model of organisational
structure.230
(4) Communication and Meaning. For pragmatism as well as for Weick,231
symbols mediate both the internal cognitive process known as thinking and the
intersubjective process known as social interaction. As one of the founders of
semiotics (the meaning of ideas), Peirce,232 rejected empiricism and the position that
ideas were simply epiphenomena of sensory information. For him, meaning derived
not from intuition but by experience or experiment. He was also of the opinion that
meaning could be stabilised through ongoing conversation that is public and social,
and not private or individual. Although Mead was more directly influenced by Dewey
and James than by Peirce, it is significant that he arrived at a framework similar to that
of Peirce. Wiley233 has pointed out that Mead's concept of the self mainly derives from
semiotics.
226 cf. Weick 1995: 158-160
227 Luthans 1992: 496
228 1988: 253-265
229 2001: 416-417
230 cf. Weick 1995: 144, 160-161
231 1995: 74-75; 2001: 11,20
232 Butler 1968:366
233 1994
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Pragmatism shares with Weick234 as well as with anthropology, sociology and social
psychology the assumption that human behaviour is fundamentally social in nature. In
organisation theory, that assumption leads back to the Human Relations School of
Elton May0235 that grew out of the Hawthorne Studies conducted between 1926 and
1932. The critical intellectual figure in emphasising the social nature of organisation
was a social anthropologist named Lloyd Warner,236 and under his influence the
interpretation of the Hawthorne Studies emphasised the importance of informal social
organisation and social norms. This emphasis led to seeing organisations as a
community. This perspective led to Bamard's=" emphasis on informal organisation
and his stress on the participative aspects of leadership and authority, ideas he held in
common with Follet.238 The emphasis the Human Relations School placed informal
relationships and organisation is also reflected in connectionism and the
"embeddedness'v" of social action.
As has been noted earlier, central to social order, pragmatism emphasise signs and
symbols in communication.i'" Although Simon's model of organisations approximates
a pragmatist model of communication, March241 raised critique against the view of
information as a simple commodity. Manning242 described the idea of coding -
interpretation and translation of a message, as "messy work". This idea, a hermeneutic
(interpretive) approach to communication, can be linked to pragmatism's treating of
meaning as a problem. While pragmatism emphasise active problem solving, the
semiotic perspective adds the insight that all actions are signs, irrespective of whether
intended or not. It is information, but this information requires interpretation. From
symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological and phenomenological perspectives, the
mutual intelligibility of people's actions is a problem. The question then is, how is
234 1995: 38-43
235 1945, in Ivancevich & Matteson 1992: 5-7
236 Gillespie 1991
237 1938
238 1924
239 Granovetter 1985: 481-510
240 Duncan (1962) has elucidated "communication" as one of the central aspects of pragmatist philosophy.
241 1994
242 1988
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social order produced? Strauss et al.243 has developed a symbolic interactionist
perspective on organisations that treat the meaning systems of organisations as
negotiated orders. Following Garfinkel'<" and ethnomethodologists, Weick245 has also
treated shared understanding as problematic which led them to put an emphasis on
face-to-face interaction.
Pragmatism's incorporation of the semiotic view on language is also linked to practical
reason. In this regard, Toulmin246 highlights the rhetorical basis of rationality,
emphasising the importance of argumentation in social deliberation. Majone247 makes
a similar point to the effect that policy analysis has less to do with proof and
argumentation or tradition that defines rationality not in instrumental terms, than about
providing acceptable reasons in order to justify choices and actions. This rhetorical
view of rationality also acknowledges the role of ethical judgements and emotion in
reason. Forester248 emphasises the importance of storiei49 in context of a discussion of
planning processes in order to communicate lessons from past experience, ethical
judgements and emotional sensitivity.
It is worth noting here that pragmatism also gives language a central place in cognitive
psychology.F" Cognitive psychology, however, adopts a more computational view on
language as functional. In line with Dewey and Mead's position on aesthetic
experience, pragmatism also clearly reflects an affinity with poetic language. This
aspect of pragmatism is seen in Burke' S251 argument that poetry is "weighted"
language as opposed to "neutral" technical language. Its purpose is to persuade
through emotions, feelings and images. Although the combination of utilitarian and
poetic language goes hand-in-hand with the current emphasis on narratives in social
14J 1963
244 1967
245 1995
246 200 I
247 1989
248 2000
249 See also Weick 1995: 127-131
250 Eysenck & Keane 2000; Sternberg 2003
251 1984
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analysis, it is useful to note that Weick252argues in this regard that despite the fact that
the word "sensemaking" may have an informal poetic flavour, it should "not mask the
fact that it is literally just what it says it is".
(5) Process ontology. To understand pragmatism as a philosophy, a starting point
is to look at its underlying ontology. It can be described as both relational and a
process ontology.253 To pragmatists=" and Weick255 reality does not exist "out there";
it is, instead, actively created or invented as people act in and toward the world.
Relational ontology posits the view that social beings are to be understood in terms of
their relationships rather than in substance terminology and or categories. Hoskingv"
and Mauws257 elaborate this argument from a pragmatist perspective. It is essentially a
holistic view of the world, a whole in which the parts are in constant interaction to
prevent either too tight and or too loose coupling. As James258wrote: "The great point
is to notice that the oneness and the manyness are absolutely co-ordinate here. Neither
is primordial or more essential or excellent than the other".
Pragmatism's ontology also appears in organisation theory and Weick's sensemaking
theory.259 It is commonly acknowledged that systems theory is the older version of this
relational perspective. Emphasises is placed on patterns of interrelationships that exist
among the parts of an organisation. It is widely recognised that Simon's26o systems
view and his analysis of hierarchy as a network has had far-reaching influence on
organisation theory. Structural contingency theory261 argued that tasks can be
organised into different structures and postulated that efficiency and survival depends
on a fit between structure and context. Morgan' S262discussion of the distinction
between the mechanistic and organic types of organisations reflects not only an
252 1995: 16
253 Butler 1968
254 Hewitt 1984
255 We discuss this aspect of Weick's thinking in chapter 80fthis study.
256 1999
257 1996
258 1907
259 For a discussion of Weick's connection with systems theory, see chapter 50fthis study.
260 1985
261 Morgan 1997
262 1997
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
emphasis on Weber's bureaucratic conceptualisation on the one hand, and the concept
of flatter organisation on the other, but has the systems concept also been strongly
influenced by open systems263 and Weick's264 tightly and loosely coupled perspectives.
A newer systems perspective is network theory. Eccles and Nohria265 have shown that
the literature on network theory took off during the late 1980's. It is noteworthy that
pragmatism is also close to Homan and Blau's266 exchange perspective developed in
sociology. The process of reciprocity - of "give and take" or exchange - in social life
is a longstanding scholarly concern. The basic analytical unit employed in this
approach is the face-to-face interactions of individuals. This perspective led Pfeffer
and Salancik267 to develop a model of organisations as open systems. At the core of
this model is an emphasis on the interaction between an organisation and its
environment. This interactive model has found favouritism with pragmatists since it
lays heavy emphasis on social interaction and the influence of reciprocal influence.
Another pragmatist theme that derives from its underlying process and relational
ontology, is the preference of triads over dyads.268 This is apparent in Peirce's
emphasis on the tripartite semiotic scheme of sign-object-interpretant and Mead's269
ideas about "third parties" as mediators of social consciousness and his analysis of the
"generalised other". At the core of the relationship ontology is process since the
emphasis is on ongoing interaction through which order and meaning is realised. It is
for this reason that process ontology does not take substance as its point of
departure.i? It is rather that beings and events are always in a process of unfolding.
The point is not that everything dissolves into 'nothingness', but rather that meaning
and unity out of interaction and relations. It is thus no real than substance ontology ..
263 Katz & Kahn 1966; cf. Weick 1995: 70
264 1979; 1995; for an excellent exposition, see 2001: 380-40 I
265 1992
266 in Ritzer 2000: 407-441; TimashetT & Theodorson 1976: 340-350
267 1978
268 It also ties back to the influence of Simmei (in Ritzer 2000: 152-156). See also TimashetT & Theodorson 1976:
120-126. A triad has a potential existence independent of each of its members. If one member leaves it does
not automatically cease to exist as in the case of the dyad.
269 Ritzer 2000: 353-355
270 It has been indicated and discussed in chapter 30fthis study.
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Various versions of process theories can be detected organisational theory. Indeed, as
our thesis in this study has already demonstrated, Weick's social psychology clearly
reflects a process view of reality. Suffice to say here is that Weick developed the most
explicit process ontology for organisational theory in his The Social Psychology of
Organizing.27I In this regard, he argues that organisation theory should focus on
organising rather than organisation.Y' He not only combines process and
interrelationships, but also argues that control in organisations is accomplished by
interaction and not by people?73 He argues the merits of his preference of triads over
dyads as the basic unit of analysis in organisation theory.274
A pluralistic perspective is also detected in pragmatism in that it acknowledges the fact
that different experiences is elicited from same types of stimulus and that people will
follow different routes to solve perceived problems.275 Both pragmatism and Weick
acknowledge the influence of socialisation as one of the primary processes by which
people form perceptions of reality. Finally, as has been noted earlier, pragmatism
balances the parts and the whole. Taken together, pragmatism comes naturally to the
embedding of small groups in larger networks. If this group-oriented perspective is
combined with an action-oriented perspective, the result is process and pluralism.
A pluralist and process model of organisational decision making is also reflected in the
writings of theorists from the Carnegie School in organisation theory.276 This is seen,
for example, in Simon's model of information-processing and organisational decision
making. March and Simon277developed the idea that the organisation is a coalition and
also a site for conflicting preferences and politics. Such ideas eventuated in what has
come to be called a 'garbage-can decision process'. In a garbage-can process, it is
assumed that there are exogenous time-dependent arrivals of choice opportunities,
problems, solutions and decision makers. Problems and choices are attached to
choices, and thus to each other, not because of their means-end linkage but in terms of
271 1979
m Weick's idea of organisation and organising is elaborated on in chapter 90fthis study.
273 1979: 8
274 1979: 137-138
275 Butler 1968
276 Shapira 1999
277 1993
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their temporal proximity. At the limit, almost any solution can be associated with any
problem. The temporal pooling is, however, constrained by social and organisational
structures.
Observations of the disorderliness in organisational decision making have led some
people to argue that there are very little order to it, that is best described as random. A
more common position, however, is that the ways in which organisations bring order
to disorder is less hierarchical and less based on means-ends chains than is anticipated
by conventional theories. There is order, but it is not conventional order. Goffman's278
dramaturgical model also offers a model close to the interactive perspective of
pragmatism. Whereas in a play parts are "scripted", the pragmatists place more
emphasis on interpretation and improvisation. Roles, such as leadership are seen as
emerging phenomena from self-organising processes.i" Weick uses Jazz orchestras
and improvisation theatre to illustrate the same point. What is central to the theatrical
performance is that it is embodied comrnunication.P" Thus, if the communication
stops there is no organisation. The central idea in the dramaturgical process approach
is that everyday life, and by implication organisational life, must be understood as a
performance.
It is thus not difficult to see how everyday organisational performance correlates with
the interdependence in theatrical drama. While avoiding the more scripted or
teleological aspects of dramatic narrative, it can also be seen that performances begin
to cohere into narratives because of the interactional development of mutual
expectations. Manningr" puts forth a "two selves thesis" to describe this aspect of
Goffman's thinking; people have both a "performance self' and a hidden, "cynical
self'. People expect the 'me' to perform in a particular way, just as the 'me' expect
them to perform in a certain way. The "performance" perspective, thus appear to be
most useful in Weick282 for studying micro-dynamics of social processes.
278 1959
279 See also Weick 1979 & 2001
280 See Weick 1995: 75
281 1992
282 2001: 181, 198,286-297,351; note Weick's concept of the "orchestral organisation".
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As noted earlier, Darwin's somewhat modified evolutionary process model plays a
central role in pragmatism. Pragmatism thus embraces an evolutionary model of
organisational reality in which groups and individuals constantly face the challenge of
adapting to a changing environment in order to survive. It therefore reflects a huge
problem solving component. Not only must ideas be tested against experience, but can
ideas also be retained for future use.283 This argument has strong affinities with
Weick's claim that "enacted information" (based on selective attention to past
experience) is the input to subsequent cycles of evolutionary "selection" and
"retention".284 Weick's model of the psychology of organising also emphasises trial
and error learning.i'"
Pragmatism's strong stand on relationships and pluralism brings Darwin's theory of
evolution right into the center of organisational analysis.286 In addition to the
underlying process ontology is also the evolutionary model that emphasise mutual
interaction and reciprocal interaction for survival. Haverman and Ra0287have shown
that a number of organisations had success with the evolutionary perspective.
However, what all these models and perspectives stress is the open systems view of
organisations, best understood as ongoing processes rather than collections of parts.
Another process vies with which pragmatism has strong affinities is complexity
theory.288 At the core of this theory is the idea of emergence and self-organisation
processes, in view of which order emerges out of dynamic interaction.i'" Self-
organisation also correlates strongly with connectionist models in psychology.i'"
These models explain self-organisation as emerging from spontaneous interaction
between parts rather than central control. Weick and Roberts291 use this study to
283 For a discussion on "retention" from a sensemaking perspective in the context of organisations as cognitive
maps, see Weick 2001: 237-302, 305-354
284 1979
285 See also Nelson & Winter 1982
286 Morgan 1997: 60ff.
287 1997
288 We discuss complexity theory in cho 70fthis study.
289 Kauffman 1993, 1995; Holland 1998. See also Stacey et al. 2000.
290 Cilliers 1998; Morgan 1997; Sternberg 2003
~I 2001:259-279
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develop a connectionist model of organisations as collective minds. Their model builds
on the notion of social 'heed' and on Hutchin's292 model of learning via distributed
cognition. However, Weick points out that connectionism is a shaky theory on which
to erect a theory of organisational mind, the reason being that there is no turnover of
units as is found in organisations. What makes this model attractive to pragmatists is
the appearance of order on a collective level due to incremental action on the local
level.
It is useful to conclude this section of the discussion by briefly drawing attention to the
concept of 'problem' in Weick's thought. Whereas pragmatism lays heavy emphasis
on problem solving, for Weick 'problem' does not necessary imply something that
needs to be solved. As he expresses it, "Ironically, people often can't solve problems
unless they think they aren't problems't.i'" In this regard he points to the implication of
Smith's294 definition that problems are conceptual entities that are designed rather than
discovered. If problems, it means they will be addressed with a person's general
cognitive resources, especially reflective thought. It therefore requires "rich language",
as it affords rich reflective thought. The whole point is, to label something as a
problem is a cognitive act. Form a sensemaking perspective it means, once something
is labelled a problem, that is when the problem starts.295
To summarise, this chapter has focused discussion on a number of themes in
pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology and social constructionism
that also strongly feature in Weick's thought and, hence, in the sensemaking
framework. The aim was to show that they all have one common root, namely,
pragmatism. They also share the same view of reality, that of a relational and process
ontology. In the next chapter, we continue with the central thesis in this study by
focusing on Weick's thought from the perspective of existentialism.
292 1995
293 2001: 427
294 1995: 89
295 Weick 1995: 90
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CHAPTER 5
EXITENTIALISM
AND
SENSEMAKING IN ORGANISATIONS
Introduction to existentialism, existentialism distinguished from related types of philosophy,
phenomenology, idealism and existential themes
In chapter I, a link between Weick's sensemaking in organisations and existentialism
has already been established with the discussion of meaning in its existential sense.
This chapter serves as an expansion of the thesis that Weick's sensemaking theory can
also be understood from an existential perspective.
According to Patka,296 philosophers may be divided into two categories, each of them
representing either logos - the idea - or bios - life and existence. Almost at any
historical period "rational intellectualists" are found, defending the priority and the
primacy of logos and creating systems of philosophy such as idealism or rationalism.
On the other hand, there are others who demanded more importance for and attention
to the fate of the human existent with all hislher existential concerns demanding some
solution. The latter have been known as philosophers of life, or existentialists. It is in
this sense that Weick can be understood as a "philosopher of life". Having said that, it
is acknowledged that there may perhaps be some opposition to the association of
Weick with existentialism. Instead, the argument to be put forward here is that Weick
can with all due respect be described as a 'social existentialist'. In other words, it is
perhaps more appropriate to describe Weick as an existentialist that focuses primarily
on the social psychological process of sensemaking as an outgrowth of people's
ongoing (collective) struggle for existence.i'"
He298argues, for instance, against the idea of deconstructionists that an organisation be
viewed as a text. To argue that the bulk of organisational life is captured by the
metaphor of reading texts is to ignore most of the living that goes into that life. Thus,
296 1972
297 Where to draw the line between individual and social is still an unresolved tension. See Weick 1995: 6.
298 1995: 15-16
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the focus will be on existential themes shared by Weick and to distinguish
existentialism from related types of philosophy. Matters that are of great interest to the
philosophers of life are questions about the nature of the world, people's place in it,
action, heed, practical knowledge, feeling and intuition, decision making and
commitment, the self and identity, meaning and the tragic elements in life. Some of
these themes will also be discussed in the context of Bergson's process cosmological
view.
1. Introduction to Exitentialism
Macquarrief" argues that existentialism be viewed as a "style of philosophising"
rather than as a single philosophy, since it has no common body of doctrine to which
all existentialists subscribe, comparable to idealism or other schools of thought. It is a
style that may lead those who adopt it to very different convictions about the world
and people's lives in it. Yet, however different the styles may be in the way they "do
philosophy", they all tend to concentrate attention on some common themes - on some
more than others. For the existentialist, people are never just part of the cosmos but
always stand to it in a relationship of tension with possibilities for tragic conflict. One
theme that recurs in the writings of its practitioners, is the emotional life of the human
being and the tragic elements in human existence - what they referred to as the
"human condition". 300 Where older schools of philosophy have been dominated by the
narrower kinds of rationalism, the feelings, imagination and intuition that has been
considered irrelevant to philosophy's task, or even a hindrance, the existentialists
claim that it is precisely through these that people are involved in their world and can
learn some things about it.
Existentialism, then, is presented as a theory that affirms the primacy, or priority, of
existence.l'" For them as for Weick302 "existence precedes essence". Shinn303 argues
that existentialism turns from abstract essences formed by the mind and focuses on
concrete, existing realities - the diversified and chaotic stuff of the world and the
299 1972
300 Macquarrie 1972: 17
301 Foulquié 1950
302 200 I: 96; see also Sartre (in Kaufmann: 1956: 290-291 )
303 1968
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struggling, striving selves of our experience - rather than abstract ideas that have been
mistaken for existent reality.304 It asserts that the actor perceives life more intensely
than the spectator, that any speculation detached from involvement gives a fraudulent
conception of actual existence.
2. Existentialism Distinguished from Related Types of Philosophy
Macquarrie+" also points out that, while most existentialists are phenomenologists
there are phenomenologists that are not existentialsists. And, although there are also
strong ties between existentialists and phenomenologists, idealists, empiricists and
pragmatists, there are some material differences between them. The focus in this
section will be to discuss some overlaps and differences between the different
philosophical approaches.
(1) Phenomenology. It seems that phenomenology has offered existentialists with
the kind of methodology they need to pursue their investigation into human
existence.i'" A major source of existentialism is the phenomenology of Husserl. The
core of this philosophy is description, an effort at improving understanding of
ourselves and our world by means of careful description of experience. 307The focus is
on a detailed description of the essence of a phenomenon as it is given to
consciousness. To ensure accuracy of description, it is necessary to clear the mind of
presuppositions and prejudices, and it is likewise necessary to stay within the bounds
of description and resist the move from description to inference. However, as
Macquarrie+" argued, this proves to be a very difficult undertaking. How can any
person be sure that s/he has screened out all her or his presuppositions or beliefs on
any subject? Or how can any person ascertain where description ends and inference or
interpretation begins?
It is important to note that neither Heidegger nor the other existentialists have simply
taken over Husserl's phenomenology in the form in which he taught it.309They have
304 cf. Whitehead's concept of "misplaced concreteness" discussed in chapter 3 of this study.
305 1972
306 Patka 1972
307 Boeree 2000
308 1972:22
309 Solomon & Higgins 1996
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developed phenomenology to suit their own purposes. One sharp difference between
phenomenology and existentialism is phenomenology's emphasis in essence ("toward
the thing!" - their motto)310 and that of existentialism on existence. Another important
difference is that where phenomenology emphasises standing back from the realm of
experienced existence in order to understand it, existentialists urge thorough-going
engagement and involvement.'!' Both Heidegger and Sartre reject the idea that behind
phenomena there could be "an utterly inaccessible thing in itself,.312 For Heidegger, as
for Weick, "speech brings to light".313 Speech articulates the phenomena, so that
phenomenology is letting be seen that which shows itself. It lets people see the
phenomenon in such a way that obstructions are removed and make structures and
interconnections known that had hitherto been concealed or not brought into the
light.314For Sartre, who rejects the dualism between a phenomenon and the mysterious
thing in itself, the phenomenon is simply a coordinated series of manifestations. 315
(2) Empiricism. Although both existentialism and empiricism make common cause
against earlier rationalism that (has) prevailed in English-speaking countries, this is
also the point where resemblances end. While the empiricists place the emphasis on
the outward and sense-experience, the existentialists turn inward for their data. It
represents itself in two modes of knowing: the empiricist knows by observation and
the existentialist by engagement, action or participation. This existentialist principle
features strongly in Weick's emphasis on action,316 his arguments that action precedes
thought'!" and that thought more than often stands in the way of action. 318Whereas the
empiricists claim that knowledge provides them with objectivity and universality,
310 Safranski 1998: 72
311 Stumph 1982
312 Macquarrie 1972: 24
313 Weick states that "we are linguistic beings" and meaning is given to life by language (200 I: 3). We also note
that Weick places a high premium on "words" (1995: 106fT.), "rich language" (1995: 3, 106ff.) and
"vocabulary" (1995: 4, 106fT.; 2001: 20, 96).
314 in Macquirrie 1972
315 in Kaufmann 1956: 222-311
316 1995: 4, 32, 155-168; 2001: 75-76, 225. The central point for Weick is "that when people act, they bring events
and structures into existence and set them in motion" (200 I: 225), and "People find what's going on first
making something happen. Doing something is the key. Until I say something ... " (200 I: 445)
317 1995: 168; 2001: 7, 85, 95,189,195,224-226
31B 1995: 108; 2001: 26
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existentialists reply that objectification and abstraction distort the living concrete
reality.i'" The only empirical stance the existentialists have is the fact that they will
avoid referring to "man" by designating the existent in the ontological term of Dasein
(Heidegger). 320
(3) Pragmatism and existential "rebels H. Both existentialism and pragmatism
protest against abstract intellectualism; both emphasise the relation of belief to
action,32I both acknowledge the risk of faith as an attitude about decisions.v" and both
look for confirmation or falsification.V' Despite these resemblances, there are
profound differences between them. The main difference is that pragmatists are usually
optimists and are very little aware of the tragic and frustrating side of life (with the
exception of James) as expressed in most existential writings. It is in this sense that
Weick puts himself squarely in the existentialist camp.324 It would only seem fair to
say, in light of what he has to say, that his interests are an outgrowth of his own deep-
seated desire to understand life and make sense of the world in which people engage
an "ongoing struggle for existence".325
Macquarrie=" asserts that existentialists are usually rebels against the establishment -
in any field - in that they struggle against the accepted authorities and the traditional
canons. Although the term rebel may be too strong a word to apply to Weick's style of
theorising (unconventional is perhaps more appropriate), it is evident to the attentive
student that he "recasts", "reformulates" or "deconstructs" almost every standard and
readily accepted textbook assumption in organisational theory. 327It is in this context
that he32sargues, for example, that resistance to change is an unfortunate mindset and
that we should rather talk of "confronting" in contrast to "oppose" or "combat". In
319 Macquarrie 1972
320 Macquarrie 1972: 28
321 see also Weick 1995: 133-154
322 Altough it is not our purpose here to discuss organisational decision making. it is useful to note what Weick
(1995: 159) has to say about decision making and its implications for identity in an existential context.
323 Macquarrie 1972
324 See our discussion of 'meaning' in eh. 2 of this study.
325 2001: 5, 96, 98
326 1972: 31
327 See p. 9 in this study for an abbreviated list of some of these "reformulations".
328 1995: 33-34
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other words, reformulation for him is the means to create the opportunity for
integration, dialogue and the meeting of difference.
3. Phenomenology, Idealism and Weick
Existentialists reject idealism. Scruton329 argues that idealism is used of a variety of
positions. He pointed out that Berkeley, for instance, attempted to show that people
have no grounds for believing in anything, save the existence of ideas and whatever
perceives or conceives them. By idea, Berkeley meant any mental state, whether
perception, thought or sensation - in short, anything that would cause a person to look
inward. Berkeley was quite honest about what he was trying to say: there is no
physical world, and nothing exists except minds. This honesty earned him the label
"subjective idealist". However, Scrutorr'Ï" also registers another kind of idealism,
namely, 'objective idealism'. The objective idealist believes that reality is in some
sense independent of mind; it is objective in relation to the subject who perceives it.
But this type of idealist also believes that reality is organised mentally: it gains its
character through the process whereby it is known.
Phenomenology starts with phenomena, appearances, which people expenence. As
such, for the phenomenologists nothing is really, or merely as it appears to be. Husserl
developed the term reduction to refer to a manner of performing a perception - a
conscious process, in such a way that attention is focused not on what is perceived but
on the process of perception. This term also serves the function of bracketing out what
a thing is by focusing on how it presents itself to consciousness.r" Phenomenology
shows that people's perceptions and thoughts operate differently to what is commonly
assumed. Ultimately, bracketing means suspending judgement about the true nature or
ultimate reality of the experience (or world), even whether or not it exists.332 Solomon
and Higgins+" pointed out that Husserl was, while rebelling against Hegel's dialectical
pluralism, also an idealist ("with many qualifications") in that he believed that the
world was constituted by consciousness. Although he never doubted the existence of
329 1994
330 1994: 24
331 Safranski 1998
332 Boeree 2000
333 1996
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the material world for a moment, he did insist that consciousness is people's only
access to the world and that knowledge comes through experience.j " This argument is
also in line with that of Macquarrie.r"
Safranski336 is of the opinion that Husserl wished to demonstrate that the entire
external world is already present within the person and that people are not an empty
vessel into which the external world is poured, but that they are invariably relating to
something. For him, as for Weick, to be conscious, is always to be conscious of
something.r" It is important to note, as Solomon and Higgins pointed out, for Husserl
"the thing in itself' never meant a contrast between appearance and some underlying
reality, between a phenomenon and "thing in itself'. For Husserl the problem starts
when one supposes that what one experiences is not, or might not be, the truth. This
reflects his realist position, that things perceived are, in other words, not to be taken as
merely objects of consciousness, but the things themselves. Solomon and Higgins "
further argue that Husserl developed his phenomenology as a method for finding and
guaranteeing objective truth, and in so doing, defended his perspective against
relativism.
It is acknowledged that Weick can also be typified as both phenomenologist and
idealist, and it is clear that he theorises from both perspectives.Y" It is important to
bear in mind, however, that for Weick, life consists of one continuous stream of
experience (note the singularj.l'" In this regard, it is difficult to understand Weick's
position without understanding his concept of time. In referring to Schutz (the
sociological phenomenologist) and Hartshorne (the process philosophical-
theologianj.l'" he postulates that time exists in two distinct forms: as pure duration and
as discrete segments. The only time that people are conscious of the pure duration of
time is when they "step outside the stream of experience and direct attention to it" (the
334 Solomon & Higgins 1996: 248-249
335 1972: 23
336 1998: 75
337 1995: 55
338 1996: 252
339 We elaborate on this aspect of Weick's thought in cho 8 of this study.
340 1995: 25
341 1995: 24-25; we elaborate on time in cho 8 of this study.
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phenomenological position).342 As he argues, to cope with pure duration, people create
breaks in the stream and impose categories on those portions that are set apart
(bracketed).343 However, from a sensemaking perspective, when people bracket, they
not only bracket out important aspects that influences sensemaking, but also then act
"as if' there is something out there to be discovered - "as if' there is something "out
there" (the realist position). The point Weick labours is that the "out there" is invented
(the idealist and constructionist positions) and enacted. An enacted world, however, is
a real world for Weick. Reactors, pipes, valves exist, their existence is not questioned,
but their meaning, their significance and content is.344The "trick is to conceptualise
these things, not so much as 'out there', but 'in here' where perception, relating and
interaction are the tools for cognising them in ways that facilitate action".345 These
objects are inconsequential until acted upon. The challenge is therefore to grasp both
aspects of their simultaneity: the materialisation of ideas and the symbolic and
practical aspects of things. In other words, the enacted (invented) world is a socially
constructed world, not a by-product, after-thought or accident. What is first and
foremost in sensemaking then, is action, and not conceptual pictures of the world.346
Although Weick adopts a subjectivist stance toward reality, he defends his position
against Burrell and Morgan's=" accusation, for example, that people who stress a
subjectivist stance denies the existence of structures and concrete reality, yet, when
operationalising their ideas within an empirical context frequently smuggles in a realist
position through the backdoor. Weick's explains that the central insight of enactive
sensemaking is that action is "an ongoing input-output cycle in which subjective
interpretations of externally situated information become themselves objectified via
behaviour. This continual objective-subjective-objective transformation makes it
possible eventually to generate interpretations that are shared by several people. Over
time, individual cognitive structures thus become part of a socially reinforced view of
the world. The cyclical nature of interpretive activity implies, then, that the material
342 1995: 25
343 There is no result a/process, only in process; any descriptions are only moments in a process (1995: 33)
344 2001: 226
345 Czamiawska-Joerges (in Weick 1995: 165)
346 1995: 36
347 1995: 34
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and cognitive aspects are thickly interwoven'V" In other words, people oscillate
onto logically because that is what is helping them to understand other people and their
worlds. Finally, as Weick puts it, "If people have multiple identities and deal with
multiple realities, why should we expect them to be ontological purists?".349
4. Existential Themes
(1) The problem of knowledge. Existentialism or the philosophy of life is a
VIgOroUS"no" against two previous philosophic systems, positivism and Hegelian
idealism as the ultimate expression and extreme case of rationalism and
intellectualism. Both systems have one common assumption: the "absolute primacy
and superiority of man's reason and intellect over the rest of [human being's] psychic
disposition, such as imagination, feelings and intuition. Existentialists contend that
logos (reason) alone cannot account for the complexity of bios (life or being)".350
Patka351 argues that on the theoretical level, all idealists maintain the principle of
immanence as their fundamental thesis. Following Kant's account of the make-up and
the functioning of pure reason, all modem idealists teach man's failure to know reality
in itself. Human beings only know the internal object of knowledge whose being
consists in being known. Idealists maintain that there is no objective reality
independent of the knowing subject, and there is no way to break through the belt of
subjectivity into a region of transcendent or metaphysical reality. As such, the subject
becomes the center and the creative source of all reality. In Hegel, "Reason" has
become deified and for existentialists it came to mean the devaluation of the person.352
What follows is a description of the anti-intellectualist attitude of the existentialists
first, and then an analysis of their kind of knowledge, intuition, as proposed by
Bergson.
According to existentialists, pragmatists and the sensemaking perspective, the person's
intellect is meant by nature to be nothing more than a practical tool353or instrument for
348 1995: 78-79
349 1995: 35
350 Patka 1972: 14-15
351 1972
352 Patka 1972
353 Patka 1972: 16-17; Rorty 1989: 3-22: Weick 1995: 57.165.175.182-183
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the adaptation of an everchanging reality to the needs for practical action. This is
accomplished by freezing the fluid reality in the forms of static immobility required for
successful manipulatiorr'<' of realty. Objects are created by substituting the person's
logical categories for Bergson's élan vital355 of original reality. Evolution, said
Bergsorr ", is best explained in terms of a vital impulse, the élan vital, which drives all
organisms toward constantly more complex and higher modes of organisation. The
intellect clears the ground selectively by imposing arbitrarily upon the amorphous
reality of changing phenomena its own logical forms, such as identity, relation, cause,
effect, regularity, consistency, and so forth. In other words, it is pragmatic action, and
the intellect appears, therefore, as the organising power subjected to the demands of
pragmatic needs and concerns.
Patka357 pointed out that there are several conclusions existentialists draw from their
assumptions about the nature of the intellect: the process of knowledge is not
conformity to an intelligible order of beings; it is not correspondence between the
subject and object of knowledge either. The person's intellect does not discover, reveal
or unravel objective truth; it is, instead, confined to the concerns of pragmatic
projection into the future demands imposed on it by the imperative of efficient doing
and making. Given this predominance of useful activism over the detached analysis of
pure reason in the make-up of the person, it appears to be untrue to claim any
privileged situation for the person's reaching power. In the words of Bergson, "action
dominates knowledge'V" Consequently, people's universal concepts do not represent
"essences" of known objects; they only answer to a merely practical question about
what use is made of known things.
Thus, the value of intellectual knowledge becomes necessarily objective and relative,
insofar as it is specified by the organic needs of active subjects. Being relative, it also
means it is imperfect and deficient in character. It is also just "symbolic" in the sense
354 For a discussion of sensemaking as "manipulation", see Weick 1995: 135, 162-168
355 The essential interior element of all living beings, the creative power that moves in unbroken continuity
through all things - Stumph 1982: 387
356 See chapter 20fthis study.
357 1972: 17
358 Patka 1972: 18
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of adapting and thereby distorting reality understood as a constant flux, or change and
creative evolution. It is in this context that Weick argues that language is action, it
creates, rather than just describe reality. Words359 and the choice of words matter.360
Arguments, negotiation and meetings are necessary, since words and language impose
discreet labels on subject matter or impose discrete boundaries on the continuity of the
phenomenal world, and since there is always slippage between words and what they
refer to. "Words approximate the territory; they never map it perfectly. That is why
sensemaking never stopS".361
Intuition is what existentialists call their type of knowledge.P'' As have been noted in
chapter 3, Bergson introduces intuition as a form of "intellectual sympathy". The
psychological process through which intuition as an act of knowledge takes its form, is
a single total, and dynamic attitude directed at the totality of being in the constant
process of becoming and evolving. The proper object of intuition is not restricted to an
object or particular "aspect" of the real; it encompasses the real without freezing it in
separate pieces of particular information. It is aimed at the mutual copenetration of the
knower with the known. In this regard Weick363 argues that enactment is actually a
mutual creation, of people-world-people, and illustrates with the example from
Follet's364 farmer neighbour. In planting an apple-seed and watering, fertilising and
pruning it, a person releases energy in it, and it in turn, in the person. It is not only an
interdependent activity but also an ongoing codetermination. What is important to
note, however, is that behaviour here is not a relating of object to subject as such, but
of two activities in relationship. Thus the duality of subject-object relationship is
eliminated.
To elaborate on the elimination of duality, Weick365 also reasons that society and
individuals are not - they do not - denote two separate phenomena; they are simply
359 1995: 44
360 1995: 107, 183
361 1995: 107
362 Patka 1972: 19
363 1995: 32
364 1924
365 2001: II
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collective (society) and distributive (individuals) of the same thing.366 In the same vein
he refers to organisational designers that draw sharp boundaries between organisations
and environments, and states that what they miss "is the arbitrariness of the line
separating organisation from environment. They miss this because they neglect the
ways in which people construct environments that supposedly outrun them". 367 He
quotes Vaill368 who argued, "How is it, then, that we are unable to look at organisation
design for what they are - highly imperfect and tentative representations of what the
world should be like ... ".
For Weick, the problem is with the "the" before environment, and in this regard points
out that much of the talk about environments faced by organisations suffers from
"misplaced concreteness't''". People assume the existence of boundaries, insides and
outsides, inputs and outputs and consequently, a "the" is imported to imply a unique,
objective environment that exists independent of actors. The the causes people to act
"as if' it knows the environment, what and where it is, and forget that "the
environment is located in the mind of the actor and is imposed by him on experience in
order to make that experience more meaningful".37o In other words, there is nothing
that is singular or fixed. "The word environment suggests that this singular, fixed
something is set apart from the individual. Both implications are nonsense".371
What Weick is saying here, is that there are no two separate realities - of
society/individuals, of organisations/environments and of organisational/everyday life.
Both aspects are only one reality, part of one continuous flow. The closest people can
come to the environment is the moments that they punctuate, the portions that are
bracketed and separated out of the flow of the stream of experience and divided into
units.
For existentialists the outcome of the subject-object identification is described as the
emergence of a new reality, apprehended in its totality as a living becoming. There is
366 cf. Whitehead's argument of the same point in chapter 30fthis study.
367 2001: 84
368 200 I: 87
369 2001: 184
370 200 I: 185; the topic of organisations existing in the minds of people is discussed in eh. 90fthis study.
3711995:31_32
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only one deficiency, namely, communication. Since concepts are mere instrumenta-
lities, the existentialist must make use of metaphor, analogy and symbolic imagery.
Weick372 illustrates the importance of the link between words and the images it
inspires in his discussion of "the Battered-Child Syndrome". Patka373 draws attention
to the literary style of existentialists, in that they believe that the use of verbs and
adjectives is better able to illustrate certain aspects of reality than nouns. Weick also
argues to the same effect and states that the world of nouns is a world of fixed and
static things, "a perfectly consistent world of structures. The trouble is, there is not
much in organisations that correspond to that".374 Verbs for Weick,375 in other words
capture the idea of action and he states that people who think with verbs are more
likely to accept life as ongoing events into which they are thrown.
To summarise this section, both existentialists and Weick argue that it is the mind that
organises and unify raw data of sense experience. Both believe that activity (meetings,
argument and socialising, for example) dominates knowledge and makes rationality
possible, though it never reaches into the things themselves. The difference is perhaps
that Weick places more emphasis on social interaction, although existentialists do not
negate "being-with-others'Y" As Patka377 also points out, for Bergson, nature takes
care rather of society than the individual. The individual is just a cell in the social
organism without any detachment or independence of it.
(2) Thrownness and Complexity. Existentialists have a definite preference for the
new, the original, the a-typical and emotionally charged complexity of situations in
which the true existential condition of the person is manifested at its best. Patka378
informs us in his examination of existentialism that, "being aggressive thinkers, they
choose rather the problematic, exceptional, marginal, at times even the eccentric
contents of human life ... their emotional dispositions condition them to be prepared to
expect and experience the irrational, dangerous and disrupting dimensions of
372 1995: 1-4
373 1972
374 1995: 188
375 1995: 188
376 Macquarrie 1972: 102-123
377 1972:41
378 1972: 21
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existence", and adds that all these attitudes are reinforced by a profound dislike of and
contempt for the well organised, conservative, traditional and "philistine" way of life
led by the majority. The starting point for existentialists is existence, as has been
noted, "existence in its critical situations, or at its limits, where these limits and even
what lies beyond them are lit up and disclosed'<", and it is in situations that the
existentialist claims herlhis ontological insights, or vision of being. 380
Of great significance is to note that the whole of Weick's discussion of sensemaking in
organisations, his organisational theorising and research are marked by one particular
and definite setting, namely, that of interruption and the unexpected, disparity and
confusion, ambiguity and uncertainty, turbulence and complexity, the unexplainable
and inexplicable, of stress and crises, of multiple realities and interpretations, of action
and enactment, of shock and emotional arousal - all in the context of organisational
and everyday life - where "people are always thrown into the middle of things where
projects never seem to start even though they always seem to be interruptedv."! For
Weick, then, an unfolding crisis is the setting to watch the dynamics of sensemaking,
and in this regard he states that it may be one reason why his work "looks so much like
ambulance chasing".382 "To know my contexts, therefore is to know my work ... I was
struck by the frequency with which I seem to study what happens when people don't
understand what is going on. My concern is not déjá vu (I've been here before), but
rather, vuja de (I have never been here before and have not an idea where I am).
Consider the evidence ... ".383
What all these settings preserve is the flow, continuity, and dynamic change that are
associated with the process model of sensemaking''I" and they all share one question in
379 Macquarrie 1972: 243
380 Compare Weick's dissertation research discussed in 200 I: ix-xii. He states that it is in the complex mixture of
prospective and retrospective sensemaking that ontology and epistemology are woven together out of cognitive
necessity - that is, to be able to make sense, deal with the world and to justify what they are doing.
381 1995:43-49; 83-105
382 2001: 178
383 Lundberg 1999: 7
384 Weick 1995: 80
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common, namely, "what is going on here?". They could perhaps be best described as
settings of high-discretion'[' that combine high uncertainty with robust interpretation.
It is in this context that Weick also points to the destructive side of deconstructionism
that undermines the faith and belief necessary to get sensemaking started. "If there are
multiple meanings that collapse under scrutiny, why bother with sensemaking at all?",
he asked.386In this regard, he points to James' question, "Is life worth living?", and the
answer is we can make either yes or no valid.387 "Sensemaking, after all, is about the
world",388 and a failure to make sense is consequential and existential. A failure to
make sense "throws into question the nature of self and the world".389 It therefore
matters.
Heidegger'" suggests that the world gets "lit up" for us when something goes wrong
and, so to speak, shocks us into awareness of the instrumental complex that all the time
we take for granted. We are sometimes made aware, suddenly and unpleasantly, of the
vast interlocking apparatus on which life has come to depend, for instance, when a
heavy storm or a strike paralyses a company. Weick quotes Schroeder et al.391who
stated that shock stimulates people's action thresholds to pay attention and initiate
novel action. "People frequently see things differently when they are shocked into
attention, whether the shock is one out of necessity, opportunity, or threat". It is for
this reason that the world, though the necessary condition for people's existence can
also constitute a threat to existence.
It is also important to note that Weick392 argues that to watch jazz improvisation
unfold, is to have palpable contact with the "human condition". He observes that there
is a new urgency in organisational studies to understand improvisation and learning
that is symptomatic of a growing societal concern about how to cope with
discontinuity, multiple commitments, interruptions and transient purposes that dissolve
]85 Weick 1995: 176-177
]86 1995: 38
]87 1995:38
388 Weick 1995: 132
]89 1995: 14
]90 in Macquirrie 1972
]91 1995: 84-85
]92 2001: 297
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without warning. His idea is that living itself is an exercise in improvisation. People
compose their lives, and in this regard he quotes Mary Catherine Bateson's393 moving
composite description of "life as improvisation":
"I have been interested in the arts of improvisation ... (the idea of life as an
improvisatory art) started from a disgruntled reflection upon my own life as a sort of
desperate improvisation in which I was constantly trying to make something coherent
from conflicting elements to fit rapidly changing settings ... Improvisation can be either a
last resort or an established way of evoking creativity ... Much biography of exceptional
people is built around the image of a quest, a journey through a timeless landscape
toward an end that is specific, even though it is not fully known ... (These assumptions
are increasingly inappropriate today because) fluidity and discontinuity are central to the
reality in which we live .... As a result, the ability to shift from one preoccupation to
another, to divide one's attention, to improvise in new circumstances, has always been
important to women".
To summarise, Weick argues that people see many of the themes of thrownness,
ongoing experience, being in the middle as they move closer to organisations. He
therefore expresses the caution to remain sensitive to the reality of continuity,
thrownness and flows, and to remember that streams of problems, solutions, people
and choices flow through organisations and converge and diverge independent of
human intention.394
(3) Description of the world and reality. What is the world? This question seems to
always include the point of view of the person who is talking about the world. It does
not stand for something independent of those who talk about it, but rather for the total
environment as they are aware of it in Weickian terminology, as they mentally or
socially construct it. In this sense, the world is not just everything "that is", but that
which people construct as a setting in which to live. Again, as Macquarrie+" points
out, "This is not to be taken for a moment in the sense of some kind of subjective
idealism, as if the material universe depended on its existence on the minds that
perceive it". To see the world is to see it from a human point of view; in that sense it
becomes obvious that there are as many worlds as there are points of view.
393 2001: 297
394 1995: 44
395 1972: 79
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Furthermore, then, there is no world apart from the human mind that constitutes it.
And to put the matter in yet another way, persons are nothing apart from their
environment.
Another way the existentialist refers to the world, is the world of everyday life - the
daily life of routines, tasks and duties. It is a practically oriented view of the world and
concerned with "the satisfaction of ordinary human needs".396 In his discussion of the
self, self-concept and identity, Weick397 identifies three primary existential needs: "(a)
the need for self-enhancement, as reflected in seeking and maintaining a positive
cognitive and affective state about the self; (b) the self-afficacy motive, the need to see
oneself as competent and afficacious; and (c) the need for self-consistency, which is
the desire to sense and experience coherence and continuity". From a practical
concern, a 'thing' is viewed primarily in a pragmatic way, which means that the world
of everyday existence is an instrumental world. The notion of 'thing-in-itself, inert,
indifferent is certainly remote from everyday existing. To say "concern" is to say, in
the existential sense, that people are not content to "leave things lying around,,398, and
in the sensemaking sense, in organisational life people do not "take things for
granted".399
It is significant that Weick400 takes the existential term "concern" from Heidegger's
German Fursorgeï'" (translated as "care" or "heed"), instead of Besorgen, to describe
collective mind in organisations as "heedful interrelating" in order to focus the
importance of "mind as disposition to heed", or "a propensity to act in a certain
manner or style". He points out that "heed" is not itself a behaviour, but rather refers to
the way behaviours are assembled. "People act heedfully when they act more or less
carefully, critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly,
conscientiously, pertinaciously'V'l" Instruments are inter-locking. They imply one
another, in systems and sub-systems. A pen implies paper; the paper implies a social
396 Macquarrie 1972: 83
39' 1995: 20-24
398 Macquarrie 1972: 84
399 Weick 1995: 63
400 2001:263
401 Moenkemeyer (in Palka 1972: 102)
402 RyJe 1949: lSI (in Weick2001: 263)
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postal system and the postal system implies transportation. Today, as often heard,
people live in the context of a world of immense complexity where everything seems
to affect everything else. What articulates this world and gives significance to each
single item within it is human concern.
From the discussion so far, it is clear that existentialists are not positivists.l'" if they
are distrustful of rational metaphysics, it does not follow they reject all metaphysics.
So, to raise the question of the person is to raise the questions of the world. Some
existentialists may avoid the word metaphysics, some may even reject it, but they may
be found to substitute it for ontology, and engaging in a type of inquiry akin to
metaphysics.l'" What has also been noticed is that an existentialist's ontology takes as
its starting point 'existence'. The existentialist would doubtless claim some 'truth' for
hislher ontological vision, but it is not truth that is provable - it may be plausible.l'"
The only kind of testing is to ask others to participate in the vision ("the moment of
immediate consciousness'tj.t'" and then learn whether they reach the same ontological
insight. And even if something can be said to be known and to receive by direct or
indirect impression, it is known only in a context and from a point of view. Even if
other people can be brought in to share the ontological vision, the relativity of an
historical situation is not removed. The existentialist claims, then, even if a glimpse of
reality is granted to persons, language too may run out, and only indirectly can
anything be said about reality.407 Risk and commitment, in other words, are involved
when people decide what they will take for real and what for unreal. There is no
ontology that is final or adequate. Existentialism therefore lives in a tension between
belief and doubt.
It is in this respect that Weick's408 discussion of wisdom has more than a little bearing.
He refers to Meacham's argument, for example, that "wisdom is an attitude". "To be
wise is not to know particular facts but to know without excessive confidence or
403 See Weick 1979: 26, for example.
404 Macquarrie 1972: 241
405 cf. Weick 1995: 55-61
406 Weick 1995: 24-25
407 Macquarrie 1972
408 2001: 112-113; 368-369; 391-393
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excessive cautiousness ... Wisdom is an attitude taken by persons toward the beliefs,
values, knowledge, information, abilities, and skills that are held, a tendency to doubt
that these are necessary true or valid and to doubt that they are an exhaustive set of
those things that could be known".409 Extreme caution and extreme confidence, then,
can both destroy what an organisation most need in changing times, namely curiosity,
openness and complex sensing. Overconfidence shuns curiosity because it has the
feeling of knowing everything there is to know about something and doubt shuns
curiosity out of fear that it would deepen uncertainty - both positions are closed-
minded, which means neither makes good judgements. It is in this sense that wisdom,
which avoids extremes, improves adaptability.l'" It is also useful to note that wisdom
refers to an attitude toward knowledge; not the substance of knowledge itself.411
It is perhaps necessary at this point to take a look at what Weick himself explicitly has
to say about the world and reality.
The picture of the world that Weick carries across is that the world is not a tidy place.
People live in a turbulent, transient world, he says.412 If people think they can either
save or understand this world, they are kidding thernselves.Y' Weick states that his
own desire to understand the world has led him to attribute the same desire to the
world itself. "Thus, I view organisations as collections of people trying to make sense
of what is happening around them ... we inhabit a reality in which it makes sense to
make sense".414
In his discussion of the nature of sensemaking, he draws an analogy between the game
Mastermind and cartography'i" and, in so doing, challenging everyone to examine
their own cosmology and overall view of the world as it has implications for beliefs
and expectations that are both consequential and existential. The world is not pre-
ordered ("preformed") for us to know a priori what the exact building blocks are, or
409 2001: 112-113
41n 2001: 113
411 2001: 368
4122001:73,21
41J 2001: 5
4142001:3
415 2001: 8-9
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going to be. If that had been the case, there would have been no place for maps,
mapmakers, or meaning. It is the job of the sensemaker to convert a world of
experience into an intelligible world. In other words, order in the world is something of
people's making (actions) - rooted in imagination and human need - it is not dictated
to them. The problem is that the terrain keeps changing; the task is to carve some
moments of momentary stability out of continuous flow. Therefore, "For mapmakers
the idea ofa pre-ordered world has no place or meaning".416
For Weick the world is neither meaningless nor meaningful either. "Meaning and its
absence are given to life by language and imagination'Y'Ï Reality is created and
sustained through symbolic processes (language). Symbols, from asensemaking
perspective, assume principal significance as constructs through which individuals
concretise and give meaningful forms to their everyday lives. Sensemaking is the
"meaningful linkage of symbols and activity, that enables people to come to terms with
the on-going struggle for existence",418 he says. Reality of everyday life is an ongoing
accomplishment, as has been noted in the discussion of symbolic interactionism, which
takes particular shape and form as people attempt to create order. "Individuals are not
seen as living in, and acting out their lives in relation to, a wider reality, so much as
creating and sustaining images of a wider reality, in part to rationalise what they are
doing".419 In other words, people realise their reality by "reading into" their situation
patterns of significant meaning. Reality "out there" is therefore only really out there as
it is "in here".
Reality is also a matter of interpretation. People define situations as real; they pay
attention to some things and ignore others, which depends on many variables, such as
emotions and feelings, prior experience, beliefs, expectations and values. Weick420
refers to Shalin's quote of James' pragmatist dictum that, "We need only in cold blood
ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting if it were real, and it will
infallibly end by growing in such a connection with our life that it will become real".
416 2001: 9
417 2001: 3
418 2001: 98
419 2001: II
420 2001: 12
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In using Garfinkcl's't" "documentary method", Weick states that it serves as a linkage
between concrete events and meaningful forms. While the symbol speaks to the here
and now and the larger social scene, the documentary method is the means by which
these two worlds are connected.
Reality is also treated by Weick as a metaphor. It means that "reality" is only one
means by which people attempt to make sense out of a stream of experience that flows
by them. He422 states, "Literally, to enact an environment can mean to create the
appearance of an environment" or to "stimulate an environment for the sake of
representation"'. He 423 also quotes Bateson to illustrate the same argument: "An
explorer can never know what he is exploring until it has been explored". The
equivalence of that is that an organisation can never know "what it thinks or wants
until it sees what it does". "Know what I think" is the outcome and conclusion of an
effort at sensemaking and the activity of seeing what a person has said implies
organising, in meaningful ways, raw data of letters and words.
To conclude this chapter, a summary of Bergson's'f" thought as it relates to the topics
discussed here under existentialism and sensemaking in organisations is offered. We
will do so with the help ofPatka.425
Below the superficial layer of consciousness awareness of the world, of solidified
objects, is an intimate region apprehended as the uninterrupted flux or succession of
conscious states, which can be best described as "concrete duration" or "life" itself
engaged in the process of dynamic unfolding. The essential characteristics of this
intimate experience are described by Bergson in terms of a continual flow of
experiences in which the totality of one's existence is identified as the copenetration of
past, present and projected future. There is no break in the chain of inner experiences,
since any previous state announces the subsequent that, in its tum, still contains its
predecessor. What he argues is that the inwardness of life is an irreversible process in
which something new (novelty) always emerges.
421 200 I: 20-23
422 200 I: 188
423 2001: 189
424 1974
425 1972
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Life as spontaneous conation (striving) is radically opposed to all static methods of
interpretation. Reality should be described and interpreted "after the model of the
reality of our own person", that is, as constant flux and change. As has been seen in
Weick,426 this schematic organisation of reality serves the purpose of preparing the
field for manipulation of and control over reality by action. Instead of discovering the
purely pragmatic bent of practical thinking, philosophers of previous schools believed
that it reveals essences, structures of a given reality, or world of objects "out there".
They consequently failed to discover the true intention of nature. It is people's constant
conation to develop a new point of view by trying to see reality in the perspective of a
continuous, uninterrupted duration and succession. For this reason, for the
existentialist as well as for Weick, reality is restricted to experiences of personal
existence, whose depths must be explored through action and intuition.
The philosophy of life then, tends to be the descriptive analysis of human existence,
since one is thrown into a hostile world, the habitat for the "human condition" or
situation. "Existence" is the problem, in fact, the only problem of "existentialism".
Existence precedes essence.
We now tum to systems thinking in continuance of our analysis of Weick's thought
and in line with the central thesis of this study.
426 1995: 162-168
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CHAPTER 6
SYSTEMS THEORY
AND
SENSEMAKING IN ORGANISATIONS
Introduction to cybernetics, cybernetic ontology and epistemology, Weick's evolutionary model,
organisation as closed system, requisite variety, trial-and-error learning, enactment and cognitive
mapping
The principles of emergence, self-organisation, organising, connectivity, co-evolution
and interdependence are all familiar from systems theory. It is clear from a study of
Weick's sensemaking framework that he does not isolate one principle or
characteristic and concentrate on it in exclusion of the others. The approach taken in
this chapter argues for a deeper understanding of Weick's sensemaking theoretical
framework by focusing on several characteristics and philosophical assumptions of
cybernetics as systems theory and to show the deep ties between them. Cybernetics
and the theory of autopoietic systems are chosen because it links to the central thesis of
this study. In this chapter Weick's argument of a complex system as a closed system is
also discussed in order to highlight the significance of 'enactment' and since it can be
better understood from a closed system rather than an open systems perspective.
1. Introduction to Cybernetics
Systems thinking was the focus of study during the 1930s to 1950s of a number of
scholars working in related areas. The related areas covered systems of control, the
development of computer language, and the development of a new science of mind in
reaction to behaviourism, namely cognitivism. The new systems theories developed
along three pathways over much the same period of time: the general systems theory of
von Bertalanffyv" and Boulding.l" cybernetics of Wiener429 and Ashby,430 and
427 1968
428 1956
429 1948
430 1952; 1956
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systems dynamics of Forrester.431 Stacey et a1.432argue that it was engineers who
brought with them the notion of control that took the lead in developing the theories of
cybernetic systems and system dynamics, while biologists, concerned with biological
mechanism, developed general systems theory.
Cybernetics was first introduced by the mathematician Wiener,433 as the science of
communication and control in the animal and machine (to which might now be added:
in society and individual human beings). It grew out of Shannon and Weaver's434
information theory, which was designed to optimise the transmission of information
through communication channels and the feedback concept used in engineering control
systems. In its present incarnation of "second-order cybernetics", its emphasis is on
how observers construct models of the systems with which they interact.435
Cybernetics proposes a revolution with respect to the linear, mechanistic models of
traditional Newtonian science and the positivist viewpoint developed in science.
Heylighenv" describes cybernetics not only as a way of thinking about systems, but as
a worldview, officially referred to as an "evolutionary-systemic worldview", with an
ontology that is related to the organic process model of Bergson and Whitehead. Its
historical origin, he states, can be traced back even further to the development from
Kant to Schopenhauer. This worldview comprises concepts and principles developed
in cybernetics, systems theory and the theory of evolution. It serves as a framework
that guides action, that ties everything together, that allows people to understand
society, the world and their place in it. It also provides a picture of the whole, In
particular how to understand and cope with complexity and change.
Turchin et aI.437 describe the philosophy that underpins the evolutionary-systemic
worldview. It is on that description that this study focuses on in the next subsection.
431 1969
432 2000
433 Heylighen 1997
434 1949
435 Heylighen 1997
436 1997
4J7 1993
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2. Cybernetic Ontology and Epistemology
While being aware that ontology and metaphysics are sometimes considered to be
identical, Heylighent'" describes the differences as follows: Metaphysics is the branch
of philosophy that specifies the most fundamental categories of existence, the
elementary substances or structures out of which the world is made and seeks to
answer the question, "what is the nature of reality?". Ontology, the theory of being
itself, analyses the most general and abstract concepts or distinctions that underlie
every more specific description of any phenomena in the world, for example, time,
space, process, cause and effect and system. He also argues that an agent using a
particular model will only be able to perceive that part of the world that hislher
ontology is able to represent. In a sense, then, only the things contained in a person's
ontology can exist for that agent. In that way, ontology becomes the basic level of a
knowledge representation scheme.
Heylighen et al.439 also postulate that in a traditional systems philosophy, organising
might be seen as the fundamental principle of being, rather than matter or the laws of
nature. It is significant that Weick440 argues that it is useful to think about his
organising formulation as a metatheory, as "a general set of prescriptions for anyone
developing his own theory of organisations". As such, his organising principle is his
theory about organisation. But it should also be interpreted to serve the purpose of
connecting both theory and reality. From the perspective of a constructtve'"
evolutionary-systemic philosophy, the essence is the process through which
organisation is created. For this reason, its ontology starts with actions, rather than
from static objects, particles, energy or ideas. Heylighen et al. 442 also argue that these
actions are the "primitive" elements, the building blocks of their vision of reality, and
therefore remained undefined. Actions are neither general nor deterministic but
involve the element of freedom. A sequence of actions constitutes a process. It has
already been noted that Weick443 argues that sensemaking is understood as a process
438 1995
439 1997
440 1979: 235
441 Turchin et al. 1993
442 1997
443 1995: 17-18
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grounded in seven properties or characteristics, that each of the seven characteristics
incorporate action and context, which are key aspects of sensemaking, and that all
seven can be represented "crudely" as a sequence.
Heylighen et al.444go on to say that relative stable systems are constructed through
evolutionary processes and the mechanisms of variation and selection. This leads to
the spontaneous emergence of more complex organisations during evolution. The
development sequence provides the cyberneticists with a basis for their cosmology.
Not only does self-organisation make the existence of an external designer or director
superfluous, but is the whole more than the sum of the parts in such systems. The
behaviour of parts is at the same time constraint or directed by the behaviour of the
whole. A fundamental type of emergence is the "meta-system transition", the
movement from one level of control to another, while increasing the overall freedom
and adaptivity of the system. The description of this type of systems dynamic resonates
with Weick's445 discussion of organisations'l" and sensemaking as a central activity in
the construction of both "the" organisation and "the" environment it confronts, the
transition from one adaptive social form to the next and the movement of sensemaking
between social forms, and organising as bridging process during transitions and
movements.
Cyberneticists also consider language as a material to create models of reality, or the
world. The job language has, is organisation of experience that serves as predictions
about future events. As such, for language to be good at this task, it needs not be put in
a direct and simple correspondence with the observable reality. For example, when
Thales said that all is water, he did not mean it quite literally; his "water" should be
read as 'fluid', some abstract substance which can change its form and is infinitely
divisible. When language is understood in instrumental terms by which humans
organise reality, then the correspondence theory of truth becomes quite unnecessary.
Cyberneticists therefore use the term epistemology for the language based description
and the term ontology for the phenomenological experience or manifestation of the
consequences of the description. Ontology might therefore be considered as "purely"
444 1997: 1-2
445 1995: 69ff.
446 Note the absence of the article "the" in front of organisations.
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semantic - epistemology has both "syntactic" (the description itself) and "semantic"
(the ontological interpretation) aspects. This view of language and truth is also a
feature in the thought of Weick,447as his discussions of and references to concepts like
'plausibility', 'coherence', 'instrumentality' and 'linguistic beings' reflect.
A cyberneticists view of knowledge is described as both a pragmatic and evolutionary
epistemology.t" According to pragmatic epistemology, knowledge consists of models
that attempt to represent the environment in such a way as to maximally simplify
problem solving. While pragmatic epistemology does not give a clear answer where
knowledge or models come from, there is the implicit assumption that models are built
from parts of other models and empirical data on the basis of trail-and-error
complemented with some heuristics or intuition. Evolutionary epistemology, then,
assumes that knowledge is constructed by the subject or group of subjects as an
ongoing process in order to adapt to their environment in the broad sense. Pragmatism
also incorporates the view of knowledge from a social constructivist point of view, in
that it attracts attention to communication, negotiation and social processes and sees
consensus between different subjects as the criterion to judge knowledge. Again, from
a constructionist point of view, cyberneticists consider cognition to serve an adaptive
and organisation function of the experiential world, and not the discovery of an
objective ontological reality.
A review of constructivism reveals that it has its roots in Kant's synthesis of
rationalism and empiricism, which postulates that the subject has no direct access to
external reality, and can only develop knowledge by using in-built cognitive principles
("categories") to organise experience. In cybernetics, constructivism has been
elaborated by von Foerster449 and further developed by Maturana and Varela,45o who
see knowledge as a necessary component of the process of autopoiesis ("self-
reference" or "self-production") characterising living organisms. Maturana and
Varela's primary distinction of the biological roots of understanding is that they
propose a way of seeing cognition not as representation of the world "out there", but
447 1995: 55-60; 57, 60, 67, 90,107-109; 2001: 3, 9, 20, 96
448 Heylighen 1993
449 1984
450 1987
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rather as an on-going bringing forth of a world through the process of living itself.
Autopoiesis is consequently viewed as a process in which the organism and individual
remain in a continuous structural coupling. They also define language as "an ongoing
process that only exists as languaging, not as isolated items of behaviour".45I As far as
causality is concerned, cyberneticists make mutually causal assumptions and remind us
that there is always circularity between action and experience.V''
The discussion so far is an attempt to sketch a broad outline of the cybernetic
evolutionary-systemic meta-theory with a few cursory references to Weick in order to
establish a link between the two perspectives. The next section continues the
discussion with a specific focus on certain aspects of Weick's thought in order to make
this connection more solid.
3. The Cybernetic worldview and Weick's Evolutionary Model
An analysis of Weick's thought within the context of cybernetics, reflect a view of an
organisation as a living evolving system453 that not so much interacts with an
environment as creating/inventing its own environment, and that both organisation and
environment evolve out of interaction and are mutually constructed. Weick therefore
refers to organisation as an activity system that generates action 454,as a self-correcting
system455 that is constituted by consciousness through interaction, relationship and
interdependence. The emphasis in this description shifts therefore to flows,456
process,457 adaptation and adaptability.V" creativity, innovation and invention, and
learning. It is in the context of this understanding that his discussion of ontologyl " and
epistemology'P" takes a form that resembles that of the cybernetic systems view of
reality construction and evolution of life. This argument will be elucidated by focusing
451 1987: 210
452 See Maturana & Varela 1987: 26, 48-49, 244
453 200 I: 211
454 1995: 134
455 200 I: 194
456 1979: 120
457 2001: 81
458 200 I: 380-40 I
459 1995: 30-38; 200 I: ix-xi
460 1995: 69,121-123,125
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briefly on Weick's own evolutionary model of organisation and his concepts of
enactment, the law of requisite variety, trial-and-error learning and cause and cognitive
maps.
(I) Weick's evolutionary model. Evolution is about change. In this respect, it is
important to note that Weick461 emphasises evolution as change, as opposed to toward
change. In other words, the emphasis is on "raw change" or the process of change
instead of the outcomes of these processes. He462 describes the essential ideas in his
evolutionary model of organisation as follows: (a) three processes are responsible for
evolution - variation, selection and retention; (b) variations are haphazard, are selected
and retained that enhance adaptation; (c) variation and retention are opposed; (d)
planning or external guidance is unnecessary to explain the course of evolution; (e)
variation increases complexity that tends to curb rather than promote variations; (f) any
order is established in hindsight or retrospect and not foresight; (g) evolution is
essentially opportunistic - current advantages outweigh long-term disadvantages; (h)
characteristics are judged adaptive; and (j) evolution can be thought of as a winnowing
model.
These ideas are contained in the simple recipe of organising, namely, enactment-
selection-retention.t't' It is significant that Weick consistently applies this model
throughout his writings when discussing organisational life. It is also interesting to
note that sixteen of his papers in various academic Journals are grouped in his Making
Sense of the Organization'ï" under the headings of "Enactment", "Selection" and
"Retention". In tune with the cybernetic evolutionary-systemic view of life and
organisation, then, it is notable that Weick argues that the sensemaking process starts
with action (enactment), then selection (interpretationj'P'' and then retention (memory
and cognitive mapping).
461 1979: 120
462 1979: 122-126
463 Weick 1979: 2001: 189
464 200 I
465 Although it is not our purpose here, it is useful to note that Weick (2001: 237-284) is also discussing the
organisation as an interpreting system.
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(2) Learning, requisite variety and cognitive mapping. Weick466 states that an
evolutionary epistemology is implicit in sensemaking, and in this regard argues that
enactment, viewed as the generation and bracketing of raw data, can also be described
using imagery associated with that episternology.P" If we think of the trial and error
image then enactment is pure trial, with no judgement of error made, and perception of
error is then a selection activity. Error becomes associated with parsing the ongoing
stream of experience under the constraint of retained wisdom. In other words, people
make sense on a small scale by a stable process of collective trial and error that
resembles an evolutionary system.
From Weick's description of the evolutionary epistemology, it is reasonable to
conclude that the central idea is that of action, in that people learn by doing and that
knowledge is built up as people respond to the situations they encounter. The learning
takes the form of a trial-and-error sequence (Weick describes trial and error learning as
"the most reliable tool for learning"),468 which includes both defensive action (as
organisations adjust themselves to reality) and offensive action (as organisations
improve fits between themselves and environments).
Through enactment (trial and error learning) people actually engage in a process of
mapping their territory and a process of constructing mental models for the purposes of
coping with the environment and for future use. The cognitive map, the knowledge
structures and mental models provide meaningful frames that facilitate sensemaking. 469
Although all these things are constructed through action and are transmittable through
images in memory, beliefs and documents of what actions took place when things
happened, there is one thing that cannot be transmitted and that is action itself. Once
action is performed, it ceases to exist. That means that know-how embodied in practice
can also only be transmitted if it takes on symbolic meaning. As Weick puts it, the
more attention is paid to descriptions, "the better able successors will be to benefit
from the experience of predecessors. ,,470
466 1995:67
467 200 I: 193
468 200 I : 449
469 1995: 121
470 1995: 126
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Weick states that reasonableness, not accuracy, is the topic of interest in enacting
sensemaking.I" The issue is the pragmatic sensible rather than the strictly logical. If
environments are enacted then there is no such thing as representation, that is true or
false, there simply are only versions that are more or less reasonable. Discussions
about the way things really are, about who is right and who is wrong, will shift to
questions such as "What did we do? What senses can we make of those actions? What
didn't we do?".
Another idea that links into the ideas of evolutionary theory so far discussed, is the law
of requisite variety - a cybernetic concept and principle developed by Ross Ashby.472
This law states "that the variety within a system must be at least as great as the
environmental variety against which it is attempting to regulate itself. Put more
succinctly, only variety can regulate variety".473 Requisite variety simply means that
organisations have to be preoccupied with keeping sufficient diversity inside the
organisation to sense accurately the variety present in ecological changes outside it.
Weick, who states that requisite variety has been a central assumption throughout his
work, defines it as "complicate yourself if you want to understand complicated
environments't.V" Applied to organisations the implications is that organisational
processes that are applied to equivocal inputs must themselves be equivocal. If a
simple process is applied to complicated data, then only a small portion of that data
will be registered, attended to and made unequivocal. Therefore, most of the input will
remain untouched and will remain a puzzle to people concerning what is up and why
they are unable to manage it.
Weick475makes the point that it is the unwillingness to disrupt order, ironically, that
makes it impossible for an organisation to create order. If people will engage the
unequivocal but are unwilling to participate in the equivocal, then their survival
becomes problematic. To put it slightly differently, the three properties, many
elements, independence of elements and weak internal constraints (loose coupling and
471 200 I: 195
472 see also Morgan 1997: 112
473 Buckley 1968 (in Weick 1979: 188)
474 1995: 56
475 1979
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autonomy) are the properties associated with a good medium that registers accurately
the things to which it is exposed. And it is the detailed registering that has to occur if
an equivocal input is to be dealt with in all its variety.
4. Complex Organisation as Closed System
Weick's understanding of complex systems differs in two important respects from the
views of the philosopher, Paul Cilliers, namely: (a) in the application of insights from
chaos theory,476 and (b) complex systems as closed systems. The focus in this
subsection is therefore two-fold: Firstly, to discuss the concept of "sensitivity to initial
conditions" in chaos theor/77 and the importance of this insight for sensemaking
theory, and secondly, to discuss Weick's idea of the organisation as a closed system in
the context of Maturana and Varela's theory of autopoiesis.
(1) Initial conditions. In discussing the relationship between chaos and complexity
theory, Cilliers478 laid down some valid reasons why chaos theory does not help people
to understand the dynamics of complex systems, but then asserts that "a sensitivity to
initial conditions, for example, is not such an important issue". 479This assertion is
something sensemaking radically differs from. In fact, in sensemaking theory, it is one
of the issues in complex systems. A few examples will suffice.
In discussing the collapse of sensemaking in 'The Mann Gulch Disaster,480 in which
13 young men lost their lives, Weick uses the disaster to illustrate a gap in current
understanding of organisations. In the context of discussing the spread of a "small fire"
and the attitude of wisdom, he quotes what Maclean calls "the first principle of reality:
'little things suddenly and literally can become big as hell, the ordinary can suddenly
become monstrous, and the upgulch breezes can suddenly tum to murder'''.481
476 The inclusion of chaos theory in a discussion under systems theory and cybernetics is purely pragmatic. It
simply flows from Cilliers' (1998: ix) rejection of chaos theory's "initial conditions" in the context ofa
discussion of complexity and complex systems.
477 Gleick 1997
478 1998: ix
479 Emphasis added.
480 2001: 100-121
481 2001: 112
92
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Weick482 argues similarly in the context of self-fulfilling prophecies, and of what is
imagined is implied, that small-scale, micro behavioural commitments can have macro
consequences, and since social structure is acted into the world, it imposes order on
that world. Weick483also illustrates how improvisation shares an important property of
chaos theory. Finally, Weick and Sutcliffe.V" recently published an entire book to
emphasise the importance of mindfulness in organisational complexity, and argues to
the effect that much of organisational troubles develop into the uncontrollable because
of the overwhelming tendency to respond to weak signals with a weak response.
Because the world is both unknowable and unpredictable, "Sensemaking is about small
pockets of sense, often pragmatically helpful, that lie behind 'larger' understandings.
When people act their way into their values, these moments are seldom epiphanies.
Instead, they are usually small, everyday committing moments. These moments are the
feedstock of sensemaking. That is why students of sensemaking get so worked up over
the small acts that may have large consequences'V'F'
(2) Autopoiesis and enactment. Cilliers argues that complex systems are open
systems,486 not closed off and that social systems interact with the ecosystem.Y'
Although Weick488 states that there is no theory of organisations that is characteristic
of the sensemaking paradigm, he does add that there are ways to talk about
organisations. One of his discussions of organisation occurs in the context of open
systems.489 However, in explaining his 'organising formulation,49o he also draws
attention to a 'subtlety' "that should be mentioned lest the model should be
mispresented" , and that is that the organising model suggests that organisations can
and do act like closed systems. The imagery that we have of open systems, he reasons,
is that of interaction between "the" organisation and "the" environment. What is often
482 200 I: 14-16
483 200 I: 289
484 2001
485 Weick 200 I : 96
486 1998: 99
487 1998: 122
488 1995: 69
489 1995: 70-71
490 1979: 235-238
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misunderstood is that organisations enact their environments, as their environments
create them. Moreover, open systems models have also directed attention away from
understanding how self-containment can persist - that is, "if an organisation can
credits its retention in both the selection and enactment process, it can effectively seal
itself off from ecological changes for long periods oftime".491
It is necessary to labour Weick's conceptualisation of enactment. It is important to
understand why Weick purposely labelled the organisational equivalent of variation
enactment, and that is to emphasise that people construct, rearrange, single out and
demolish many "objective" features of their surroundings. When people act they
unrandomise variables, insert vestiges of orderliness and literally create their own
constraints. This holds true whether those constraints are in imagination or created in
actuality. Again, this argument is in line with the cybernetic constructivist view of
reality, which stress that reality is selectively perceived, rearranged cognitively and
negotiated interpersonally. It therefore makes sense to argue that the social order exists
precariously and has no existence at all independent of the person's cognition. What
the organising model highlight is that order imposed is order discovered, on the
grounds that action defines cognition, also because the basic sensemaking device used
within organisations is assumed to be talking to discover thinking. For Weick, action
does not only precedes cognition,492 but is it also his argument that cognition often
stands in the way of action.493 In the sequence of action-thought, the talking is then the
occasion for defining and articulating cognitions. The idea of reality as a social
construction then puts the whole emphasis on a negotiated reality, while construction
emphasises the idea that people put things "out there". It is that initial implanting of
reality that is preserved by the word enactment. The central idea of enactment is,
therefore, that when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set
them in motion.
With regard to the theory of Maturana and Varela that autopoietic systems are closed
systems, Morgan 494 points out that the idea that living systems are open to the
4911979:239
492 200 I : 224-225
493 2001: 7, 85, 95; see also Rorty 1989: 12.
494 1997: 253-254
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environment, is in their view, the product of an attempt to make sense of such systems
from the standpoint of the observer. To continue with Morgan, according to them
living systems strive to maintain their own identity by subordinating all changes to the
maintenance of their own organisation as a given set of relations. "They do so by
engaging in circular patterns of interaction whereby change in one element of the
system is coupled with changes elsewhere, setting up continuous patterns of interaction
that are always self-referential. They are self-referential because a system cannot enter
into interactions that are not specified in the pattern of relations that define its
organisation't.V" What they are saying then, is that the 'environment' with which the
organisation interacts, is really a reflection of its own organisation, or 'idea' of that
'environment'. In other words, that environment, is not a separate environment (as
Weick consistently argues), but one that is "in here" and enacted (as part of itself).
Morgan also makes the important point that, in saying that living systems are closed
and autonomous, Maturana and Varela are not saying that they are isolated. "The
closure and autonomy to which they refer are organisational. They are saying that
living systems close in on themselves to maintain stable patterns of relations and that it
is this process of closure or self-reference that ultimately distinguishes a system as a
system".496
Although Morgan" states that Weick's idea of enactment as self-referential process is
very consistent with the idea of autpoiesis, it is the contention in this thesis that neither
enactment nor autopoiesis can be fully understood outside the processl'" view of
reality that underpins it, and which we have attempted to describe in this and the
previous chapters. In addition to Morgan's insights, it is useful to draw attention to
another important insight as registered by Cary Wolfe.499
The key distinction for the theory of autopoiesis IS the distinction between
organisation (it signifies those relations that must be present in order for something to
exist), and structure (which denotes the components and relations that actually
495 1997: 253
4% 1997:254
497 1979: 256
498 For a more and readable exposition of process. see Bohm 1980.
499 in Rasch & Wolfe 2000: 180
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constitute a particular unity and make its organisation real). The important point that
she highlights is that all autopoietic systems are closed (self-referential) on the level of
organisation but open to environmental perturbations on the level of structure.i''"
Information is therefore not a prespecified quantity that exists independently in the
world and can act as the input to a cognitive system. The difference between a
cognitive system and a poietic system in general, is that brains use processes that
change themselves - "and this means we cannot separate such processes from the
products they produce'V'" As Varela et al. 502put it, "Our intention is to bypass
entirely this logical geography of inner versus outer by studying cognition not as
recovery or projection but as embodied action". In other words, a cognising system
engages the 'world' only in terms of perturbations in its nervous system, which is
"operationally closed" (its transformations only occurs within its bounds). To the
extent that the nervous system recursively interconnects its components (as in our
brains), the organism is capable of generating, maintaining and re-engaging its own
states as if they were literal representations of external phenomena.
In addition to the above, the concept of 'enactment' also points to the following three
insights. Firstly, it cautions us not to equate action with simple stimulus-response,
action-reaction behaviour. It is rather that people actively construct! organise/rearrange
the environments cognitively, which is then acted out and subsequently "discovered"
as the environment they wish to control. Secondly, the implicit message is that if
organisations can control their perceptions, they are not slaves of "the" environment. If
people want to change their environments they need to change their talk (to see what
they think) and walk (their doing). If organisations impose limitations on themselves,
they will surely enact those limitations into the environment. Finally, if 'environment'
in open systems imagery is replaced with 'world,503, a different picture emerges. It
follows (a) that organisations are already and always in a world (reality/ontology), a
world of its own making, and (b) it also reveals the source or location of that world,
namely, the social psychological processes of relating as the embodiment of people
500 2000: 180
501 2000: 180-18
502 in Rasch & Wolfe 2000: 181
503 "World" here is not to be confused with planet earth or the natural world, but must be viewed as in the sense of
"the world of science", "the world of computers" or "the world of a mathematician".
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interaction (read 'organisation'). To enlarge this picture, it is reasonable to say that an
organisation continuously "performs" its own world and may thus be seen as life lived
in ongoing projects. The world of the organisation is thus the result of what an
organisation does and how it makes sense.
We can summarise this chapter by listing some common assumptions between the
cybernetic systems approach, the theory of autopoietic systems and Weick.
(a) Holism. People who claim to take a systems approach focus on the whole as
their level of explanation, as opposed to a reductionist approach. In other words, an
entity can be best understood by considering it in its entirety. Every system is a unit of
many interdependencies, and when one division in the system is changed, the whole
organism undergoes correlative changes in many dimensions at the same time.504
(b) Unit of analysis. The level of analysis is relationships and patterns rather than
entities. Entities only take on definition when they are in interaction with each other.
Language captures reality and is an ongoing process that only exists as languaging,505
not as isolated items of behaviour.
(c) Environment. "The" organisation and environment are mutually constructed
and there is no reality "out there" detached or distinct from the perceiver. The
evaluation of whether there is knowledge is made always in relational context. There is
no separation between producer and product. The being and doing of an autopoietic
unity is inseparable.i'"
(d) Causality. The emphasis is on the interpretation of data and feedback loops,
which reminds us that there is always circularity between action and experience.
Knowledge generation and sensemaking do not consist of linear explanation that
begins with a solid starting point507 and develops to completion as everything becomes
explained.
(e) Reflexivity and cognition. The constant awareness that the phenomena of
knowing cannot be taken as though they are "facts" or objects out there that people can
504 Maturana& Varela 1987
sos Maturana & Varela 1987
506 Maturane & Varela 1987: 48-49
507 Sensemaking never starts and it never stops (Weick 1995: 43); Maturana & Varela 1987: 244
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grasp and then store in their heads. People are thinking beings and construct maps of
reality. Maps are relative and reality is a product of achievement through negotiation
and ongoing action.
(f) Organising and organisation. In the constructivist evolutionary-systemic view
of reality and the world, organisation is seen as the fundamental principle in being, the
essence of which is process through which this organisation is created. Therefore, the
ontology starts from actions, and is entwined with a negotiated epistemology out of
cognitive necessity (that is, to know what is happening and being able to deal with a
situationj.i'"
It is therefore reasonable to conclude by saying that both the systems view of
cybernetics, autopoiesis and Weick's evolutionary model constitute a description of a
cosmology and worldview. The next chapter continue with the discussion by focussing
attention on complexity theory that also adopts a systems, process cosmology and
ontology of reality.
508 Weick 200 I: ix
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CHAPTER 7
COMPLEXITY THEORY
AND
SENSEMAKING IN ORGANISATIONS
Introduction, complexity theory as interdisciplinary science and the organisation as a
complex adaptive system, self-organisation at the edge of chaos, organisational
sensemaking and organising
1. Introduction
In chapter 3 it has been pointed out that process thought has a long history. In our time,
David Bohm,509 a theoretical physicist, has, like Heraclitus around 500 B.C.,
developed a theory that invites an understanding of the universe as a flowing and
unbroken wholeness. Like Heraclitus, he argues a process view of the universe, that
flux and change are fundamentals of reality. This theory suggests that in order to
understand the secrets of the universe people have to understand the generative
processes that link, what Bohm calls the 'implicate' and 'explicate' orders.
Petzinger '" argues that complexity theory describes the world as it is - unpredictable,
non-linear, uncertain and turbulent. As such, complexity theory provides a different
explanation of the world than the Newtonian and Cartesian paradigms. Complexity
theory, in other words, is not a methodology or "toolkit", but a conceptual framework,
a way of thinking about and a way of seeing the world (cosmology). It offers the
following insights and challenges: to rethink the nature of order and organisation,
small changes can have large effects, ordered patterns of activity emerge from
spontaneous self-organisation, change is the product of tension between opposites, and
how organisational life is formed and transformed by underlying processes that have a
logic of their own. In sum, complexity theory provides a reason for studying
complexity: it explains and thus helps people to understand the nature of the world and
the organisations they live in. lts greatest affect is perhaps that it challenges almost
509 1980
510 1999
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every foundation on which existing theories of organisation is build. In this regard, it
has also been noted that Weick reformulates almost every standard assumption about
organisation and management in organisational theory. SII
Since complexity theory and the sensemaking framework have much in common, such
as a shared view of the world, systems theory and process thought (as will become
apparent), this chapter will limit itself to one other commonality, and that is the answer
to the question of how an organisation becomes what it becomes. To answer this
question, the focus is on emergence and self-organisation at the edge of chaos
(Weick's 'organising'), central concepts in both complexity and sensemaking theory.
Of importance will be to explain how sensemaking appears on organisational level in
the absence of outside interference.
It is perhaps useful, at this point, to briefly sketch a picture of the traditional notions of
management in order to see what complexity and sensemaking theory are up to.
Briefly, as to how the organisation changes, the dominant view is that of the manager
standing outside the organisation, as objective observer, able to design and control the
organisational system by general rules, rational planning and structural controls. The
purpose of which is to achieve organisational goals.Sl2 The why of change is to
maintain order (present and future), sameness, harmony, the control of activities and
the predictability of outcomes, all considered to be the keys to success. In complexity
theory as well as sensemaking in organisations the central alternative concept of
causality is that of self-organisation. This view departs from the dominant discourse in
which design, organising, directing, planning and controlling are seen as the very
essence of the management role. According to this view, the creative development
inherent in complex adaptive systems cannot be designed, planned or controlled.
WeicksI3 argues in this regard that any attempt to construct "the" design is doomed to
failure because there is no such thing. He also argues that in a "self-organising
organisation.v'!" the idea of an individual manager is a fiction; there is no such thing
511 See footnote 6 on p. 9-10 of this study.
512 van Niekerk 1988
5132001:65
514 2001: 4
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because management work is profoundly socia1.515 It therefore becomes important to
examine precisely what self-organisation is.
2. Complexity Theory as Interdisciplinary Science and the
Organisation
McKelvey516 argues that Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) has become the ultimate
interdisciplinary science focusing on how microstates self-organise into emergent
aggregate structures and defined microstates for organisation scientists to mean
"discrete random behavioural process events". Others argue that complexity theory
views organisations as complex adaptive systems (Weick517: "adaptive social forms")
that co-evolve with the environment through the self-organising behaviour of
autonomous agents navigating "fitness landscapes'<'! of opportunities and competitive
dynamics.i"
While it is sometimes useful to refer to the science of complexity'i" or simply the
complexity sciences it is important to note that there is no single Theory of
Complexity, but several theories arising from the various sciences of complexity, such
as biology, chemistry, computer simulation, evolution, mathematics and physics.
Those writing about complexity in human organisations usually draw on concepts to
be found in the work on complex adaptive systems (Goodmarr ", Kauffman522 and
Holland523), dissipative structures (Nicolis524 and Prigoginef"), autopoiesis
(Luhman.r'" Maturana and Varela527), chaos theory (Gleick528) and increasing returns
5151979:8;2001:70
516 1999: 5, 7
517 1995: 72
518 Kauffman 1995
519 Coleman 1999
52~ Stacey et al. 2000
521 1995
522 1993, 1995
523 1998
524 1994
525 1990
526 1990
527 1987
528 1997
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In econorrncs (Arthur529). In light of this, Sim530 states that we may consider
complexity theory to be a more advanced version of chaos theory.
Since all living organisms are adaptive systems, for the purposes of this study,
organisations will be referred to as complex adaptive social systems which suggest that
human systems are fundamentally different from other complex systems because they
have cognitive faculties that allow them to learn, make choices and to create and
change rules of interaction. This view, in other words, differs from chaos theory which
is based on the iteration of mathematical algorithms or simple sets of rules of
interaction that remain stable. One implication is that, instead of using chaos or
complexity as a metaphor or analogy to study human systems, they should be studied
as CAS in their own right.
The essence of self-organisation is that system structure often appears without explicit
pressure or interference from outside the system. This insight is captured in Stacey et
al.' S531 definition of self-organisation in a CAS as a "process in which local interaction
between parts in an organisation produces emergent patterns of behaviour (or action)
of a coherent kind in the whole, all in the absence of any design, grand plan or
control". In other words, the constraints on form (that is organisation) is internal to the
system, resulting from the interactions among the components and usually independent
of the physical nature of those components. What is also noteworthy is that the
organisation can evolve in either time or space, maintain a stable form or show
transient phenomena. General resource flows within self-organising systems are
therefore to be expected although it is not critical to the concept itself.
Cilliers532 adds another dimension to our understanding of CAS by making a
distinction between systems that are "complex" and those that are "complicated". He
reasons that a system - despite the fact that it may consist of a large number of
components - can be given a complete description in terms of its individual
constituents. Such a system is merely complicated. Things like jumbo jets and
computers are complicated, as opposed to complex. In a complex system, the
529 2002
530 2002
531 2000: 18
532 1998: viii-x
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interaction between the system and its environment, are of such a nature that the
system as a whole cannot be fully understood simply by analysing its components.
Relationships in complex systems also shift and change as a result of self-organisation.
If it is to be concluded that self-organisation is a property of only living systems,
because of their capability to continually create, or recreate, themselves by
transforming or replacing their components, then it is also reasonable to conclude that
the system function depends on the nature and arrangements of the parts and that
system function will change if parts are added, removed or rearranged.
Given the descriptions of CAS above, it is necessary to look at some of its other
aspects as well. Internal to a CAS are agents. Depending on the level of analysis, an
agent may represent an individual, a group or entire organisation. Agents have varying
degrees of connectivity with other agents through which information and resources can
flow. Agents possess schema that are both interpretive and behavioural. Schema may
be shared amongst the collective (e.g. norms, meanings, values, beliefs and
assumptions) or may be highly individualistic. Agents behave so as to increase the
"fitness" of the system they belong to and fitness is typically a complex aggregate of
both global and local states within the system.
Behaviour in a CAS is, however, induced by the simultaneous and parallel actions of
agents within the system and not by a single entity. Thus, the system is referred to as
self-organising if it undergoes a process whereby new emergent structures, patterns
and properties arise without being imposed on the system. In other words, the
behaviour of a CAS is emergent. While emergence means appearance of a property or
feature not previously seen through the process of interaction and the spontaneous
creation of order,533 it is critical to note that the spontaneous order is self-organisation.
Furthermore, both the concept of emergence and of self-organisation are linked to the
'whole', which means that the system needs to be studied as a complete and interacting
whole rather than as an assembly of distinct and separate elements. If the interaction
stops, the whole will degenerate and emergence will cease to occur.
53J Kauffman 1993
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With the introduction of 'open systems' imagery into organisational theory,534 it has
become customary to refer to the interaction between an organisation (system) and its
environment. As a result, it is now readily assumed that boundaries are recognisable
and that the organisation is adapting to a supposedly detached or separate
environment. However, while a CAS is a dynamic system able to change within and
adapt to a changing environment, it is important to note that there is no dichotomy
between a system and its environment in the sense that a system always adapts to a
changing environment. As have already been seen in chapters 5 and 6 of this study,
enactment places emphasis on reciprocal influence or the process of mutual
transformation, and is it not only inextricably linked with emergence and self-
organisation, but can it also not be designed or controlled. Enactment thus provides the
insight that organisations actively construct ("enact") an environment, in contrast to
mere "adapting to" an environment, which subsequently constrain their actions.
To put it slightly different, control over the environment is about the controlling of
cognitions. The reciprocal linkage between ecological change and enactment is
intended to depict the subjective origin of organisational realities. Enactment and co-
evolution can thus be thought of as endogenous when it applies to individuals and
groups within the organisation and as exogenous when the organisation is interacting
with the broader ecosystem. However, this may be seen as an oversimplification since
boundaries between the organisation and 'environment' are not clear-cut or stable.
3. Emergence and Self-Organisation at the Edge of Chaos
Complexity theory writers consider the optimal region for rapidly improving adaptive
fitness to take place at what is used as a metaphor for organisation, namely, the "edge
of chaos". 535Of interest, for the purposes of this study, is to explore the properties that
enable emergent self-organisation to occur, the coupling between components and the
place and nature of control.
The edge of chaos is described as the critical point of the system where a small change
can either push the system into chaotic behaviour or lock the system into a fixed
behaviour. It is also regarded as a phase change - a point at which the appearance of
534 Katz & Kahn 1966
535 e.g. Kauffman 1993
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the system changes suddenly. In other words, the edge of chaos is a region between
stable equilibrium and random chaos in a complex system.536 What gives those
systems a sense of being alive is their movement between critical values, for example,
between disorder/chaos and order/structure at some turning point. The edge of chaos is
therefore seen as the critical point of the system, the state between stability and
instability also described as the "paradox of stable ..i.nstability".537 It is at this point
where the system tends to gravitate, given the change to do so. It is useful to note that
the state or phase space means the total number of behavioural combinations available
to the system. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the possible number of states
will grow rapidly with complexity.
One characteristic of systems at the edge of chaos is the coupling between agents and
systems. What is regarded as "healthy" coupling (or ties) seems to be a balance
between neither too tight nor too loose and this, described as "equivalent to walls
separating attractors",538 contains the spread of change through a system when it is at
the edge of chaos. It is this very coupling that is neither too tight or too loose that
causes the combined stability and fluidity (coherence) of a system's structure and
behaviour. It is in this context that Marion's539 argument that self-organising
interaction seeks order or coherent pattern that is characterised by causality of a
formative and transformative kind, becomes particularly relevant. While 'formative'
refers to the number and strengths of connection between entities as the cause of the
patterns of behaviour in a system, 'transformative' refers to the inherent ability of
interacting, self-organising agents to produce truly novel, emergent and coherent form
that is in some respects similar, but in others radically different. In Kauffman's540
scheme form emerges through self-organising processes and is in perpetual
construction. Based on this, it is reasonable to say that the paradoxical quality of the
edge of chaos is characterised by a seeking of order/coherence/stability while in a state
far from equilibrium as the result of interacting or self-organising processes.
536 Goodwin 1994; Holland 1998; Kauffman 1993, 1995; Marion 1999
537 Stacey et al. 2000: 112
538 Stacey et al. 2000: 137
539 1999
540 1995
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In organisational terms the edge of chaos as metaphor for organisations means neither
too little nor too much structure and the balance between relative independence and
relative interdependence between parts. This aspect of an organisation also becomes
apparent in Coleman's'" argument that few and strong ties produce stability and many
and weak ties produce instability. Coleman also argues that values and belief systems,
for example, is equivalent to tight controls and management's confidence and trust as
equivalent to loose controls.
What too loose and too tight ties/controls refer to, then, is the degree of connectivity
between the parts of a system and the parts and the system as a whole. In other words,
for self-organisation to occur, the system must be neither too sparsely connected (so
that units are independent or isolated) nor too richly connected (so that parts are so
absorbed that it leaves them with no sense of freedom or autonomy). This concurs with
Coleman' S542 argument that the space for creativity and innovation is a dialectical state
of tension between over-control and chaos. If a system behaves only chaotically it
panics and is useless. On the other hand, if the system is too stable it stagnates and is
also handicapped. It can therefore be concluded that what the issue of coupling or
connectivity in essence implies, is that the degree and nature of the coupling between
parts in a system will affect its responsiveness to changes within and outside the
system.
Kauffman543 demonstrates in his computer simulations of the evolution of life that a
system consisting of a large number of entities, or agents, acting randomly with each
other, is likely to evolve into a connected, autocatalytic (self-organising) system in a
relatively short period of time. In other words, as entities interact randomly with each
other, some entities playa part in the construction of others, the process of catalysis. In
terms of causality, this means that entity A plays a part in the construction of B, which
plays a part in the construction of C, which plays a part in the construction of A. This
is in contrast to traditional linear thinking according to which a cause A results in
effect B. In other words, in circular or mutual causality the understanding is that A
cannot do things to B without being itself affected. By implication, since everything is
541 1999: 33-41
542 1999: 35,40
543 1995: 74-77
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related to everything else in the organisation, like a spider-web, it is reasonable to say
that not only will cause and effect relationships be difficult to identify, but will they
seldom remain stable because of repeated change and innovation. Novelty will
therefore emerge in radically unpredictable ways.
The whole aspect of control and stability through self-organising processes at the edge
of chaos makes the idea of an internal subject controlling the behaviour of the system
or the notion of an external designer suspect.j''" However, while no agent is "in
control" of the system's evolution, it is nevertheless evolving in a controlled manner
with the source of this control in the pattern of conflicting constraints.
Thus, at the edge of chaos, a CAS configures itself into closely connected clusters that
make it difficult for perturbations to cascade through it. This happens through
canalisation (restrictions), which means that many agents follow the same rules so that
there are many chances of the same responses and patterns of response being
reproduced.
Since the natural result of the sensemaking process is a specific intersubjectivity, to be
expressed in changed ways of thinking, talking and acting, of interest is to investigate
how sensemaking appears on organisational level.
4. Organisational Sensemaking and Organising
Sensemaking, it has been argued, is the activity that copes with reality as an ongoing
accomplishment that emerges from effort to create order, and to make retrospect sense
of what occurs. In a nutshell, sensemaking theory is rooted in an understanding of
human cognitive functions as the embodiment of complexity and is it therefore
reasonable to refer to organisations as complex bodies of cognition.
The need for sensemaking is assumed to increase when, for example, existing meaning
structures are questioned or change, when people's thresholds of dissatisfaction are
acceded, in moments of uncertainty, ambiguity, crisis situations, when ongoing
projects are interrupted or when there is a lack of fit between what people expect and
what they experience. In a word, on occasions when novel moments in organisations
capture sustained attention and people persist in trying to make sense of what they
544 Cilliers 1998; Lucas 2003; Stacey et al. 2000
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notice. In these moments people vest objects, utterances and actions with subjective
meaning that helps make their world intelligible. Actions toward "things", in other
words, depend on the meaning they represent to them and not the things themselves.I"
Although Weick546 discusses organisational sensemaking on both the individual and
organisational level, he takes great pains to show that it is a collective endeavour. He
uses the insights of Wiley547 to actually distinguish between four levels of
sensemaking. First, the level of the individual "I" (self, agent, subject), who has
thoughts, beliefs, feelings, experiences, intentions, etc. Here, meaning is within the
self. Secondly, the "I-You'' level, referred to as the intersubjective level. It is the level
of interaction between agents in conversations who interprets events and situations to
create shared meaning. It is important to note that at this level the meaning is not
within but between and among selves. Third, the "we" level of social structure that
emerges from social interaction, is characterised by a shift from the intersubjective to
generic subjectivity. Here, there are no selves and structure implies a generic self, an
interchangeable part - as filler of roles and follower of rules - but no concrete,
individual selves. The fourth level is that of culture, symbolic reality and ideology - of
pure meanings, divorced from individuals - referred to as the extrasubjective level of
sensemaking.
It is important to discuss Weick's548 understanding of organising in the context of
organisational sensemaking, as it correlates with the insights of self-organisation at the
edge of chaos discussed earlier. Organising is a self-organising process characterised
by movement (from vertical to horizontal; from less open to more openness to the
environment; from tight to looser couplings or structures among components; from
structure to natural process and from less ambiguity to more ambiguity), information
and communication, substitution and replacement, identity and interactive
relationship.i'" He introduces organising as something that comes into play in the
545 Bolman & Deal 1991
546 Weick 1995
547 1994; on page 43 of this study the focus was on the individual, that is, subjective level.
548 Weick's (2001: 58ff.; 181ff.; 284-286) discussion of improvised theatre and improvisations jazz musicians
serves as excellent illustrations to deepen understanding of self-organising processes.
549 Weick 1995: 70-72, 175
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movement between the intersubjective and genene subjectivity. That means,
organising is an activity between relative independence and relative interdependence
that serves several purposes. Because people can be replaced or substituted for in
organisations, organising (as process and quality of interaction) makes it possible for
understanding to be picked up by people who did not participate in the previous,
original intersubjective construction. It further serves to keep action and understanding
from getting stuck in either of the two social forms. Put differently, organising serves
as both a link and bridge between the two forms since intersubjective understanding
must translate into the generic in order for coordinated action to take place.
Earlier it has been noted that one of the insights from complexity theory is that change
at the edge of chaos is the product of tension, which may also be defined as a failure to
understand, confusion as a result of ambiguity and information overload, uncertainty
and interruptions. Another aspect of tension is the felt sense of urgency, defined as the
rate at which adaptive events take place - metaphorically expressed as an
organisation's metabolic or energy conversion rate. While Weick's organising can be
interpreted as the system's activity that seeks to reduce the tensions, it may also be
argued that the organising is the communication.P" In other words, only by virtue of
continuous communication are exchanges and interpretations of intersubjectivity and
the shared understandings of generic subjectivity, developed and maintained. If the
communication activity stops, organisation disappears.
As has been pointed out, the sensemaking framework is part of what is described,
typified and categorised as the constructionist school of thought. The important insight
derived from this school of thought is that reality (ontology) is constructed by
interconnected patterns of communication. If this insight is read together with the
discussion above, then it is reasonable to conclude that reality is defined not so much
by individual acts, but by complex and organised patterns of ongoing actions.
What the above analysis highlights, is that the conjuncture of these procedures,
interpretations and behaviours describes what organising does and what organisation
is. The important point is that no-one person rules, that order and control are made
possible by the mutual influence of interlocked behaviours and pattern of relationships.
550 Weick 1995: 75
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It has already been pointed out that complexity theory describes the world as it is. In
this regard, it is widely recognised that the business environment of most companies
today changes with incredible speed. Organisations and members feel themselves
pushed around by global market forces they can neither predict nor fully comprehend.
Corporate mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and restructuring impose radical
cultural and structural changes on the organisations involved.Y' Turbulence has
therefore become characteristic of organisational complexity. Weick552 defines
turbulence as "a combination of instability (frequency of change) and randomness
(frequency and direction of change)", and take complexity to mean "a greater number
(numerosity) of diverse elements (diversity) interact in a greater variety of ways
(interdependencej'V'" This picture is enhanced when technological complexity and
information overload is added to Weick's definitions ofturbulence and complexity.V'
It is thus noticeable that Weick's sensemaking framework fits in well with the
description of the world as provided by complexity theory. While the first provides
insight into and operates on the ontological level, the latter operates on the
cosmological level. If people are to adopt the view of complexity theory, and the
lessons from chaos and quantum theory that the world is largely unknowable and
unpredictable, then Weick555 makes sense when he says that sensemaking is all that
people have. The shift of a mindset of stability to one of complexity, turbulence and
uncertainty, therefore, places a greater premium on sensemaking.
To summarise this chapter, the focus was on organisational change, and the aim was to
provide an answer to the question of how an organisation becomes what it becomes.
Self-organisation was described and discussed as the cause of change and that
organising at the edge of chaos serves as a bridge between two social forms, namely,
the intersubjective and generic. The context in which the discussion took place was
organisational complexity as an occasion for sensemaking. It is to organisation and
organising that we tum to in the next and final chapter of this study.
551 Capra 2003; CasteIIs 2000
552 1995: 88
553 1995: 87
554 Weick 1995: 87
555 2001: 264
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CHAPTER 8
SENSING AND ORGANISING
Weick's "talking about organisations", organisation as non-physical entity, ontology and the
nature of time, organisation in the mind, organisation and organising as relationality, the nature
of time, beyond realism and idealism, organisation, organising and social construction as
becoming ontology
In the previous four chapters Weick's thought has been interpreted from the point of
view of four meta-perspectives and the theories they inform. Put differently, although
the previous four chapters have shown that Weick's sensemaking framework is
underpinned by various meta-paradigms, with process thinking at the core of them all,
the picture of organisation derived from the analysis and interpretation may still be
vague or obscured. It is therefore the aim in this chapter to focus attention primarily on
this important aspect of Weick's thought, as it is inextricably part of sensemaking in
organisations. It is thus reasonable to say that a failure to understand the one will result
in failure to understand the other.
For example, how is Weick's thought to be interpreted if he, on the one hand,
describes organisations as literally 'adaptive social forms ,556whose structure unfold
vertically (which represent the mechanical and generic) or horizontally (that is,
organically and intersubjectivelyj.Ï" organisations as evolutionary systems.f"
interpreting and sense making systems.r" and as entities that adapt to and co-evolve
with its environment.Y" and Weick, on the other hand, arguing that there is no such
thing as "the" environment or "the" organisation, 56I that the word 'organisation' is a
myth ("If you look for an organization you won't find it"),562that organisations simply
do not exist,563and that, paradoxically, organisations only exist in the mind? 564
556 1995: 70.72
557 1995: 170, 175-176
558 1979: 238-240, 252ff.; 200 I: 211
559 1995: 170-172; 2001: 22
560 1995:75
561 200 I: 184
562 1979: 88
563 1995: 69, 74
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In order to make sense of this apparent paradox, it is necessary to (l) be very attentive
to certain subtleties in Weick' S565"ways of talking about" organisations. Firstly to the
distinction between an internal and external view of organisations, that is, between a
participatory and observational position that, secondly, corresponds to a distinction
between the vocabulary of verbs and nouns, and (2) to take special notice of the phrase
"ways of talking about", since he566 states explicitly that his "theorizing" is
deliberately and intentionally focused that way. It is the contention here that Weick's
"way" represents the internal, the way of verbs, of movement and participation. In
other words, it is a way that is consistent with the concepts of enactment, closed
systems imagery and organising. This view contrasts sharply with that of observers (or
as Weick refers to them, "organizational watchers"),s67 the perspective of nouns, where
reference to the organisation is an abstraction.
What Weick in essence reasons is a way of understanding organisation in terms of
relating and becoming, as something that is never final, never complete, that has the
/
same nature as the world, which means that organisations are in no way different to or
separate from the world. There is thus no dualism of inside/outside -in his thinking. It
will be shown that Weick thereby gives social construction of reality an ontological
twist. It will therefore be necessary and useful to frame Weick's theorising in process
terminology (both organic and psychological) since it relates to the central thesis of
this study. Process theorist's conception of time forms an important aspect of the
interpretation offered below.
1. Weick's "Talking About" Organisations
To begin with the apparent paradox in Weick's thought, it is remarkable that Weick's
"talking about" organisations never explicitly refers to what they are, despite
discussing organisational sensemaking in the context of other's understanding and
conceptualisations.Y" However, 'through the lines', so to speak, the attentive reader is
able to discern Weick's own position, especially when he advances arguments for
564 2001: 199
565 1995: 69, 75
566 1979: 234
567 1979: 31; 200 I: 185, 204
568 See especially 1995: 69-76
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correction of a particular understanding and or pointmg out limits in a particular
formulation or argument. In fact, all his "talking about" may lead to the mistaken idea
that Weick is discussing "findings" or giving credence to substance. How is this state
of affairs to be understood?
This chapter proposes three answers to the question. Firstly, as hes69 explicitly reveals,
there is no such thing as a theory of organisations that is characteristic of the
sensemaking paradigm. Hence, only "ways of talking about" organisations that allow
sensemaking to be a central activity in the construction of both the organisation and the
environments it confronts. The first problem that has to be dealt with, then, is the fact
that 'organisation' is an ambiguous term; it can be used as either a noun or verb.
Secondly, in Weick's scheme of thought, the the organisation point toward an abstract,
a linguistic artefact, a socially constructed phenomena and is organisation as a noun
used merely for pragmatic reasons. As hes70 puts it, for instance, if it is "useful" and it
allows organisational members "to take reasonable action, fine". Lastly, much of
Weick's "talking about" is metaphorical. Thus, while metaphor is used as a figure of
speech or as a way to think about a phenomenon in order to illuminate aspects in novel
ways that cannot be otherwise understood, it is important to keep in mind that it does
not reduce the phenomena referred to, to their essences. In other words, metaphor is
not a literal application. It is, furthermore, important to keep in mind that, while
metaphor is a way of seeing, it is also a way of not seeing; while it reveals, at the same
time it also conceals.i" Thus, Weick's "talking about" is consistent with his
"theorizing"S72 which means that it is more open-ended and ongoing, something meant
to be never final or complete, in contrast to the use of the vocabulary of organisational
watchers that is characteristic of nouns, the static, the final and substance.
It should also already be evident that the verb form of organisation is uppermost in the
mind of Weick when he talks or thinks about organisations. If that is the case, on a
more fundamental level, the question is, what is organisation then? As an ontological
question it is perhaps the question, the question about the very nature of the
569 1995: 69
570 2001: 184
571 Morgan 1997
sn 1979: 26
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phenomena we are talking about. To reformulate the question: Is the organisation an
entity, and if so, how is its ontological nature to be interpreted and described?
2. Organisation as Non-Physical Entity
The point of departure is a footnote at the end of a discussion in the context of
enactment processes in organisations, where Weick573 states that, "The theory on
which this work is based views organizations as flows of experience". If this
formulation is taken as Weick's most single, concise and succinct description of the
ontology of organisation, then the rest is mere discussion and argument in order to
illuminate what would otherwise be misunderstood. Moreover, if this is the correct
interpretation, several things become clear that otherwise obscured in his "talking
about".
Attention has already been drawn to Weick's argument that since there is no theory of
the organisation that is representative of the sensemaking paradigm, all that remains is
talking or thinking about organisations (in the context of various other
conceptualisations of organisations). On page 75 of Sensemaking in Organisations'Ï"
he refers to Schall's description of organisations as "entities developed and maintained
only through continuous communication activity". Weick then argues that the
communication activity is the organisation. The first important point to take note of is
that Weick formulates his argument that way purely because Schall's575 description
may lead the reader to conclude that the organisation is something separate from the
communication activity, and hence, an independent objective physical entity that
requires development and maintenance apart from communication.
Secondly, what becomes problematic and perhaps confusing, IS the following
statement by Weick in the same context: "When we view organisations as entities that
move continuously between intersubjective and generic subjectivity ... ". How can
organisations as entities move between two levels of processes? In other words, what
is the relationship between organisation and entity in this context? If organisations are
people, must we conclude that organisations as people move between two levels of
573 200 I: 204 (emphasis added)
574 1975
575 1983
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people or entities that move between entities? The "organisations" refer to here as
entities can clearly not be physical, objective entities. The key to understand this is to
be found to page 72 where Weick states that Wiley576does not invoke "organisation"
as a specific level, and Weick arguing that "organising lies atop that movement
between the intersubjective and the generic subjective".
To elucidate the argument that organisations are not physical entities, on page 64
Weick refers to Porac et al. 'S577study of garment making in Scotland, to show how
sensemaking manifests in "actual" organisations. How is "actual organisations" as
entities, in this context to be understood? It must be stated again, Weick argues
consistently the same thing; if the "actual" here correspond to Whitehead's "actual
entity", which means, as we have seen in chapter 3 of this study, occasion or event,
then it means that organisations are non-physical entities, constituted by processes of
relating. In other words, while organisations may have physical manifestations, its
ontology is to be understood as social psychological processes - what is a social
process is psychological in nature, and what is a psychological process is social in
nature. The vocabulary is therefore of processes and relating and is thus representative
of an internal view of organisations.
This argument will become clearer in the following sections. For now it is important to
show how Weick's understanding of organisations as a single flow of experience
relates to time as pure duration, and following that, how organisations exist only in the
mind.
3. Ontology and The Nature of Time
(1) Ontology - one nature and one flow of experience. A very interestingly and
noticeable aspect of Weick's578 thought is the interchangeable use of 'everyday life'
with 'organisational life' and 'organisation' with 'world'. In other words, no sharp
dividing lines are drawn between them. This is interpreted to mean (a) that Weick
actually consider organisational life as no different from everyday life in the world,
and (b) that an inquiry into the nature of organisation and the world leads to an
576 1988
577 1989: 76-82
578 e.g. 1979: 65-68,117-118; 1995: 30-31, 40-45, 63,132: 2001: 8-9, 20, 84, 87
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understanding of one and the same nature. Different ways of talking about
organisations, in other words, only represent different conceptual orientations toward
the organisation/world. It follows that there is no single way of describing the
world/organisation or building the world through building a system. None of the
"ways" tell the way the world is, but each of them tells a way the world is. As has been
pointed out earlier, Weick states that his ways of talking about organizations is
"intentionally focussed this way" since he is concerned about metaphors and images
rather than with scientific ''findings".579
Part of the difficulty in grasping reality as one flow of experience is because people
have become accustomed to thinking in terms of 'things' and thus reification.58o
Instead of viewing "an" organisation as a thing, Weick581 argues that 'organisation' is
just a suitable word that abstracts temporal features of a situation in motion. To put this
differently, organisations are nothing but "superimposed structures",582 inventions583 of
people and that this imagery implies that there is no underlying "reality" waiting to be
discovered. "Events inside organizations resemble events outside organisations;
sensitivities of the worker inside are continuous with sensitivities of the worker
outside. Since people have as much desire to integrate the various portions of their
lives as to compartmentalise them, what happens inside affects what happens outside,
and vice versa". 584
Thus there is only one nature, one flow of experience, no fixed boundaries. The
important point to bear in mind here, is that what semantics emphasise is that the
symbol is not the thing.585
(2) The nature of time. Two concepts from the sensemaking perspective of Weick
that captures attention in a discussion of the nature of time, are 'retrospect' and
'ongoing'. It is the irony of life that one can make sense of occurrences, experience,
579 1979: 234.(emphasis added)
580 "Reification" means to treat an abstract concept "as if' it refers to a thing - Weick 1979: 34.
581 cf.1979:43ff.
582 1979: II; 20 I : 204
58] 1979: 12
584 1979: 31
585 Weick 1979: 249
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events and interruptions - the flow of experience - only in retrospect (hindsight), and
that life can and must be lived in the present / forward-mode of existence. However,
what people chose to label, punctuate and select to focus attention on, is only a
moment in586 one continuous stream of experience. 587This argument can be elucidated
with a description of process theorist's conception of time as pure duration, as a single
"indivisible continuity".588 We will do so with the help of Bergson" and Bemstein.59o
Bergson's argument is that science had paid almost no attention to this conception of
time, and that through history, time and space have been treated as "things" of a kind
in "juxtaposition" - and lays the blame on science and the everyday conventions of
language, as responsible for the confusion between "clock-time" (mathematics and the
need to measure) and time as pure duration (real time - its "essence is to flow, not one
of parts,,).591 In terms of the mathematical conception of time, time is conceived as a
straight line, from one point to the next, ad infinitum. However, the line that is
measured is immobile; the line is made or invented. It extracts and retains from the
material world that which can be repeated and calculated, and consequently that which
is not in a state of flow. If something happens between two points, reason intercalates
new positions - "it refuses to consider transition".592
Bemstein593 argues that the invention of the zero allowed mathematics to develop into
a science of the abstract that revolutionised the old numbering system, in that it
established new rules for adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing - that is, new
rules for computing. Bemstein594 quotes Whitehead who said that, "The point about
the zero is that we do not need to use it in the operations of daily life. No one goes on
to buy zero fish. It is in a way the most civilised of all the cardinals, and its use is only
forced on us by the needs of cultivated modes of thought". In other words,
586 Weick 1995: 33
587 Weick 1995: 25. Weick uses William James' image of "stream of experience" (note the singular).
588 Bergson 1974: 16
589 1974
590 1998
591 1974: 12
592 Bergson 1974: 15
59) 1998
594 1998: 33 (emphasis added)
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conventional time means artificial time, abstracted from real time, born out of the need
to control and to predict events in the unknown future, on the one hand. However, on
the other hand, by inventing time as something to be measured, people have come to
consider things as fixed, static and unchangeable. In everyday language nouns are
employed to point to that fixitity.
But as Bergsorr " pointed out, the moments of time and the positions of the mobile are
only snapshots that our understanding has taken of the continuity of movement and
duration. The "snapshots'Y" are only practical substitutes for time and movement
which conforms to the exigencies of language until such time as language lends itself
to the exigencies of computation; but people have only an artificial means of
recomposing: time and movement are something else. What the measuring of time is
counting on, in other words, is only a certain number of extremities of intervals, or
moments, in short, virtual halts in time. In contrast, pure duration, in the words of
Schutz,597 is a "coming-to-be and passing away that has no contours, no boundaries,
and no differentiation". It is in this sense that sensemaking and organising (as cut from
the same cloth) never starts. "The reason it never starts is that pure duration never
stopS".598It therefore follows that it is ongoing.
It has now become necessary to translate the discussion thus far into Weick's
organisational terms in order to show what he means when he asserts that
organisations exist only in minds.
4. Organisation in the Mind
If organisational life means that people are always "in the middle of things", "thrown
into situations", as Weick599 in Heideggerian terminology argues, then organisation is
nothing but a "snapshot", a project600 to impose order on seemingly disorderly events,
interruptions or ongoing flows - since "order, clarity, and rationality is an important
595 1974: 16
5% cf. Weick 1979: 42-43tT.
597 1967, in Weick 1995: 25
598 1995:43
599 1995: 43-44
600 1995: 45,105
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goal of sensemakingv.t'" Both the idea of order and the idea of disorder reside in the
mind, and is it those ideas that people have in their heads that are imposed on and
turned into reality, that is referred to as "the" environment. But as Weick points out, to
reason that that environment is something fixed, separate from people's minds, is to
become guilty of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness".602 In other words, when the
"the" is used, it is something people impose on experience in order to make
experience more meaningful.
What is thus clear is that organisation is nothing but organising processes - cognitively
constructed in the individual and socially between people, hence the 'social
psychology of organising'. The problem arose when "organizational watchers" draw
boundaries between what they consider to be fixed entities and describe with nouns
and a supposedly external, separate environment, when in reality it is organising that is
happening all the while. In the words of Weick,603 "Actors immersed in experiential
streams organize and punctuate those streams [cognitively] by positing organizations
and environments ... Thus people invent organizations and their environments and
these inventions reside in ideas that participants have superimposed on any stream of
experience" .
In other words, what observers taken to be "the" organisation, is actually only a
"snapshot", a "virtual halt", a moment in time, which understanding (mind) has taken
of the continuity of movement and pure duration. As such it is an abstraction that has
come to be associated with brick and mortar.ï'" or the institution. However, if
organisation could be grasped in terms of verbs, it should ceaselessly take on new
forms, as original and unforeseeable as people's states of consciousness.
Failure to see organisations in those terms must, in other words, be related to the
perpetual attempt to impose regularities upon the world (and hence "the" organisation)
and interpret it in terms of laws, rules and procedures forever invented by people who
wish to control it. It is therefore no surprise when people conclude that is the way
things work, and will always work. But, how does organisation comes into existence?
6011995:29
602 2001: 184
603 2001: 184,196
604 Weick 1979: 88
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Again the answer provided by Weick is, in and through the mind. For example, in the
form of cause or experience maps605and justifications.t'" that "watchers" then impose
on reality and call "the" organisation. Through cause maps people construct
connections of cause and effect and act as if it corresponds to reality. However, as
Weick607 reasons, "cause-and-effect" is arbitrary designations of people's experience.
David Bohrn608 puts forward the same argument and points out that the map in
people's minds is only a guide that corresponds to certain features of the territory, but
is never reality itself; it may also be distorted. In a similar way, people expect the
world to be put together the way their justifications say it is put together. Once that
happens, they selectively perceive what they see "as if' it were put together the way
their justifications say. In other words, what becomes reality, is the things in people's
minds. It is this process that both creates new organisation and reaffirms organisation
already in place, that is, in the mind, which is then imposed on the stream of
experience "as if' it is separate from the person imposing it.
It is in light of the understanding of time as pure duration and reality as one
continuous. ongoing process of flow, that Weick609 cautions his readers to be
especially careful how they portray process. He focuses our attention on the important
point that there is no result qfthe process, but only a moment in process. It follows that
the only way people can get the impression of something distinct from them, is by
"stepping outside the stream of experience and directing attention to it".6IOIt is also in
this sense that organisation can be spoken of as form. Yet, even in this way "the"
organisation is in the abstract, that is, organisation is only a moment in experience.
Thus they are always in transition, always in process of becoming. What it means,
then, is that there is simply no objectified it. There is only organising of experience as
the living present. To assume therefore that organisation exists separate from "the"
environment is to become guilty of what Whitehead and Weick refer to as the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness referred to earlier.
605 Weick 1979: 84; 2001: 201
606 Weick 200 I: x
607 200 I: 199-204
608 1985
609 1995: 32-33 (emphasis added)
610 Weick 1995: 25
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To translate Whiteheadian terms into Weickian terminology, "the" organisation is not
ontologically distinct from people. It is possible to think of this relation as being
analogous to the relation of the human mind to the body. In this sense, the organisation
is the body of the social organism, constitutive of people. The implication is clear, the
one cannot exist without the other; the social mind cannot exist without the social body
in which it indwells.
This view can also be contrasted with that of systems thinking, from which it radically
differs. In a mechanism, parts are fitted together to form the whole. In systems
thinking, the parts are subservient to the whole, defined and determined by the whole.
Here, the whole is prior to the parts, which means, the whole should already exist. It is
crucial to bear in mind that in Weick's thought, the whole ("the" organisation) is an
abstraction, an adaptive social form. To labour the point, it is unfortunate that in its
contemporary usage, form refers to formal, outward form. However, in ancient Greek
philosophy, the wordform meant an inner forming activity,611 the cause of the growth
of things and the development and differentiation of their various forms. What this
"inner forming activity" captures, is Weick's concept of organising. In this sense,
organising is organisation and organisation is organising at the same time. In other
words, organisation is not something separate from organising.612 The flow of fluid
such as a vortex and the family can be used to further illustrate the point.
Within the vortex, the fluid is a recurrent, stable pattern. It may be abstracted in the
mind as a vortex, though there is no vortex. There is nothing but a flowing of water. In
other words, "vortex" is only a convenient word to describe that pattern, from the view
of a spectator, of course.
While it is possible to point to the individuals in the family, it is not quite correct to
talk of the family in this way, because this would simply be numbering the whole (the
family) amongst its parts (the members) so that it would be separate from its parts in
the same way they are separate from each other. The point is simply that the family is
ongoing patterns of relationship betwe~n its members, arising between them; the
family is the interactions, arising only in those interactions. Each member of the family
611 Bohm 1980: 15
612 See also Stacey et al. 2000:39
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is also never there, never complete, because the identity of each member is also
perpetually under construction. From the theory of autopoiesis, it has been seen that
this phenomenon is a self-referencing (self-producing) phenomenon, in that the parts
are being formed by the whole while they are forming it at the same time. The example
illustrates this in that a family is formed by its members as it forms them at the same
time. Family and individual identities emerge together. In short, organising are the
interactions within which new forms arise; forms are never final, they change
constantly.
It is in this context that Weick613 refers to Follet's614 argument that it is more
appropriate to talk about 'relatings " to capture the idea of ongoing interpenetration,
interaction and reciprocal influence - meaning that, in the moment and process of
meeting between two things, they both become something different.
In chapter 5 it was shown how Weick615 defends his subjectivist position against
Burrell and Morgan and that he argues that people oscillate ontologically because that
is what is helping them to understand other people and their worlds. What is it that
Weick was actually trying to say? Is it perhaps that, instead of worrying about whether
reality might be "mind-dependent" (the idealist position) or independent of the mind
(the realist position), attention should shift to the relationship between linguistic
statements and the non-linguistic elements that are in the world? Put differently, if
people are to avail themselves of the language of relationalityi'" at least a few of them
would no longer declare themselves subjectivists or objectivists, but rather
relationalists. In other words, if the spotlight is turned on Weick's way of talking
about reality, it becomes evident that his reference to "ontological oscillation as a
constant in everyday sensemaking'f''" is merely done so for pragmatic purposes. In
other words, besides talking about reality as a subjective-objective-subjective
oscillation, Weick actually describes reality within the vocabulary of relating. As he618
613 1995: 33
614 1924
615 1995: 55-56
616 Weick 1995: 30-38, 43-44, 51
617 2001: 364
618 1995: 32 (emphasis added)
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puts it, "If we begin to think about sensemaking as relating, several classic issues in
organizational studies become recast".
It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at this vocabulary from asensemaking
perspective. In the following section the focus is on ontology in the vocabulary of
relating in order to expound on the preceding discussion and Weick's understanding of
organisations as flows of experience.
5. Organisation and Organising as Relating
In chapter 6 of this study it was noted that Weick619 refers to his 'organizing
formulation' as a 'metatheory' , as a "general set of prescriptions for anyone
developing his own theory of organizations". If Weick's metatheory is taken as an
attempt to connect both theory and reality, then it is reasonable to interpret the
relationship between Weick's cosmology and his theorising to mean that, whereas his
cosmology represents his view of the way the world hangs together, his organising and
sensemaking theory is primarily representative of his insight into how people can deal,
comprehend and cope with this world.
But first, Weick's thought has to be consolidated in light of which the rest of the
analysis is to follow.
Weick620 states very explicitly that what organising does, describes what organisation
is and that organisation emerges out of relationship and interaction between people. As
has been noted above, organisation (noun) is merely the external view of what is
actually an internal process, that of organising (ontologically). As such, organising is
about motion, process and emergence, something that would not be apparent without
verbs. The problem with nouns is that it draws attention to substance as the topic of
interest, which Weick dismisses as trivial,621 rather than pattern and form as the crucial
issue.622 'Pattern' here refers to the ways in which things happen, develop and is done
- the interactions that determine the outcomes. Weick623 points out that the basic
619 1979: 235
620 1979: 4,15
621 1979: 79
622 1979: 34
623 1979: 44, 79, 81
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property of interdependence is patterns, relationships and processes, which imply
impermanence and a concern with flows, flux and momentary appearances. It is
therefore the only reality people have to deal with and the only place where they can
make a difference, namely, at the "between" - the relationships.
(l) Beyond realism and idealism. According to Rorty, 624 the distinction between
the world "out there" and the world "inside" people's heads is somewhat ambiguous
and can be sometimes be misleading. For what is being called "realism" today is not
identical with that which had previously been juxtaposed with idealism. Rather than
being about distinctions about the "out there" and the "in here", the contemporary
debate has to do with whether or not the world can be represented. That is, whether
representations of the world do, in fact, somehow correspond to it. To avoid confusion,
Rorty suggests a speaking in terms of "representation" and "anti-representation". This
way of speaking should avoid implying that the debate has something to do with
whether or not there is something called "reality", and instead, draw attention to the
actual source of disagreement, that is, the possibility of representing the world in
language.v"
For representationalists, true statements are those that correspond to something in the
world. Statements can, in other word be falsified or proven through comparison with
that which is the world. For anti-representationalists, this is absurd. From this
perspective, there is no way of gaining unmediated access to the world and, as a result,
it is futile to define 'truth' in terms of correspondence with it. For this reason, 'truth' is
better defined in terms of coherence among statements, for at least this is something
people are capable of determining. What is suggested here is that it is the difference
between correspondence and coherence conceptions of 'truth' that differentiates
realism (duality and objectivity) and idealism (relativism and subjectivity)
respectively. In practice, however, the differences between the two are seldom
expressed in these terms. Instead, their differing conceptions of truth are manifested in
the particular ways of speaking associated with each and, in particular, the
metatheoretical assumptions that each encourages people to make.
624 1991
625 1989: 3-22
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(2) Ontology: the nature of reality. The language of realism encourages an
ontological primacy to things, whether they are 'subjects' or 'objects'. By this is meant
things entering into relationships with other things, whereas the vocabulary of relating
encourages speaking of things in terms of emerging or coming into being through
relationships. Whereas for a dualist there is no point of talking about 'relations' until
people have familiarised themselves with the things entering through these relations;
conversely, for a relationalist, it is only through relations that these things exist for
people. This, then, is the essence of the disconcordance between these two paradigms.
In order to explore this difference further, it is useful to draw a distinction between
'world' and 'reality'. If done so, the "world" would refer to the physical entity of
which people are part; to that which, at least in some sense, they are trying to cope
with or live within through their seeking knowledge of it. Nevertheless, until such time
that they can confidently assert that they know the world in its entirety, it is difficult to
fathom how they might actually speak of the world per se, that is, how could they
know what is meant by the world? So in light of this difficulty, people can use the term
"reality" to fill the gap. Thus understood, 'reality' would be the world as people know
it; it would be what they are actually thinking of when they think they are thinking of
something called the "world". This is not to deny that 'world' and 'reality' are
inextricably linked. Rather, it is to recognise that, despite their overlaps; the two need
not be the same.626
In other words, speaking in the vocabulary of dualism, the distinction between world
and reality serves little or no purpose. Because it speaks of truths (reality) as though
corresponding with the world, world and reality are one and the same. In other words,
for objectivists, the world "out there" is a singular reality, inhabited by us all. On the
other hand, for subjectivists, like Weick627 for example, the world/reality (and
therefore, the organisation) is thought to be "in here" - in the minds of people. As he
argues, the sensemaking model is not about object perception.v" "what ties an
626 Bhaskar 1989; Marsden 1993; Rorty 1991
627 200 I: 308
628 1995: 57
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organization together is what ties thoughts together,,629 - that is connections and
relationship. What is important for the discussion here is to take cognisance of Weick's
argument in the context of a lengthy quote of O'Keefe and Nadel's63o position, which
highlights that a person cannot be a "subject of an environment, one can only be a
participant. 631The very distinction between self and non-self breaks down cold. The
environment surrounds, .enfolds, engulfs and no thing and no one can be isolated and
identified as standing outside of and apart from it. .. The fact that they surround means
that one cannot observe an environment; rather the organism explores it". In the words
of Weick:632
"While the categories external/internal or outside/inside exist logically, they do not
exist empirically. The 'outside' or 'external' world cannot be known. There is no
methodological process by which one can confirm the existence of an object
independent of the confirmatory process involving oneself. The outside is a void, there
is only the inside. A person's world, the inside or internal view, is all that can be
known. The rest can only be the object of speculation. Therefore, when we object to
internal/external or inside/outside as arbitrary partitions that tend to confuse issues,
what we mean is simply that logical distinctions in this case do not necessarily
correspond to empirical distinctions. Actors immersed in experiential streams organize
and punctuate those streams by positing organizations and environments... If
organizational members discover that inside/outside is a useful punctuation, and
impose it, and retain it because it allows them to take reasonable actions, fine. We
simply don't want to put words into their mouths or images in their eyes ... The
misplaced concreteness of talk about the organization and the environment diverts the
attention of organizational theorists from crucial problems ... ".
From the subjectivist point of view, then, people can only speak about multiple,
socially constructed realities, because there are as many worlds/realities as there are
individuals. Furthermore, the world and reality need not to coincide. So, from a
sensemaking perspective, 'reality', rather than being a model of the world, is
understood as a strategy for living in that which is the world. For, as Weick633has put
629 200I: 308; he states that the form it takes is that of a "cognitive map" and that a "map" is "an aggregate of
interrelated information" (200I: 310)
630 1978 (in Weick 200 I:310)
631 See also Weick 200 I: 196, 200
632 200I: 184
633 200I: 188
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it, "reality is a metaphor". It simply means that to talk about "a reality" is just one way
that people try to make sense out of the stream of experience that flows by them. In a
similar vein he states that sensemaking is in 'it broadest sense also a metaphor in that.it
"focuses attention on the idea that the reality of everyday life must be seen as an
ongoing accomplishment. .. ",634 and because organisations resemble puzzling and
changing terrains, the task is to carve out some momentary stability in this continuous
flow. In other words, rather than speaking of getting to know the world, the vocabulary
of sensemaking and relating encourages a speaking of finding better ways to live in the
world.
Thus, what people hope to accomplish depends on the kind of vocabulary they adopt.
Different vocabularies constitute different realities for the individuals that adopt them.
From a sensemaking and relating perspective, these realities become shared, negotiated
and intersubjective; things like objects and subjects are therefore no longer understood
to be real things of the world - from a relating perspective, people gain access to the
world through language, as have been demonstrated. So, within relating, the terms
'object' or 'subject' is understood to denote particular sets of relations among the
attributes of that which is the world. In other words, neither the 'subject' of
Organisational Behaviour nor the 'object' of Organisational Theory actually exist. In
brief, it is not the subjects and objects that exist in this view, but rather the effects and
relations among them.
To conclude this section of the discussion, what we have hoped to achieve, is to show
that, if people adopt the vocabulary of dualism then it is possible to speak in terms of
things, which would lead to approach an object as a thing-in-itself. In other words, that
the essence of each subject or object can be revealed, were it possible to drain away
each and every contextual influence. In the language of relating no assertions such as
these do arise. In terms of Weickian and Whiteheadian terminology, this would be
described as the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". Dualism encourages a speaking
in terms of subjects acting upon objects, whereas the language of relating invites close
attention to the interdependent and interpenetration of activities, of ongoing
codetermination and the process of meeting.
634 2001: I I
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6. Organisation, Organising, and Social Construction as Becoming
Ontology
The discussion so far reached a stage where Weick's ontology can be described as
essentially a becoming ontology. In this section, the aim is draw attention to another
dimension of that ontology, namely that of the social construction of reality as it is an
indispensable part of his overall ontological thinking.
From a becoming perspective, reality is understood as in perpetual flux or change,
hence, unrepresentable through any static conceptual framework or paradigm of
thought.635 In this view the actual world is fundamentally in a process of becoming so
that every phenomena of which people are aware exist only as a stabalised moment in
an interminable process of becoming. Thus there are no fixed entities, no ultimate
terms, or essences. In short, transition and change are the ultimate facts.
Through the becoming perspective Weick emphasises basically four themes that
together outline a set of sensemaking theoretical priorities: (1) activity and movement
over substance and entities. Instead of thinking in terms of discrete individualities, the
emphasis is on the primacy of process, interaction and relatedness. This does not differ
from social constructivism in social science, which stress the social construction of
reality;636 (2) turbulence and change as the consequence of a world that is never
coming into being. On the contrary, change or flux is the essential existence of nature;
stability is only an abstraction; (3) in a constantly changing, unpredictable and
uncertain world, sensemaking is people's only way of dealing and coping with the
world; and (4) in this continuous process of becoming, every moment of activity is
already incorporated in the next moment.
In chapter 4 it was pointed out that the social construction of reality forms a rich part
of pragmatism and organisational life in general. The understanding of social
interaction as a constituent of our understanding of reality as a social constructed (and
enacted) phenomenon of consciousness made up one of the leading ideas in the
sensemaking perspective as well. This means that, on the one hand, reality is an
individual matter of subjective interpretation, forming a person's reality of the world
635 Chia 1996: 46
636 Berger & Luckmann 1967; Gergen 1994
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and life in general. On the other hand, this reality is also a social reality. However,
whereas a being ontology in social constructivism emphasises individual cognitive
structures, Weick is giving social constructivism a becoming ontological twist.
Taking a becoming perspective means that he radicalises understanding of process, by
focusing on verbs instead of arresting reality through nouns. Verbs capture the action
that lays down the path for sensemaking. As he637 puts it, "People who think with
verbs are more likely to accept life as ongoing events into which they are thrown, and
less likely to think of it as a turf to be defended, levels of hierarchy to be ascended, or
structures to be upended. Sensemaking itself is ongoing and the sense it makes,
transient. Verbs force us to face that. Nouns do not. Because verbs are closer to the
dynamics of a process, to change a verb is to take the first step to change a process". In
this respect, it can with all right be asked: why do people talk of organisations, when it
is organising that is going on? Or, for that matter, why talking of knowledge when
knowing in the concrete context is what matters?
In taking a becoming perspective, instead of regarding the social interaction as the
process that constitutes reality of everyday organisational life, Weick is actually taking
this process of social interaction (the social psychological processes of sensemaking)
as the reality or lifeworld itself. The process is not something that leads to reality, but
is, on the contrary, reality as lived in the present. In other words, from a becoming
perspective, Weick is arguing that reality is not something that can be passively called
forth, but is rather an active (enacted) process of life in which every lived moment is
brought into reality.
In social constructionism then, reality has the character of cognitive categories and
classifications, which is a stockpile of knowledge or repertoire of actions that can be
retrieved into any given situation as people's possibility, but can also restraint
sensemaking and the handling of this situation. Rethinking the concept of reality from
a becoming perspective then leads in the direction of a reality that emerges as a flux of
understanding in everyday organisational life, a flux of interpretation and ascription of
meaning that never comes into a state of being but is always in becoming as people try
to deal with their lives in a meaningful way.
637 1995: 188
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Weick's rethinking of reality implies that the sociality, which the organisation concept
refers to, will have to be considered an ongoing process of interpretation and creation
of meaning as regards this specific sphere of a person's world. In thinking of an
organisation as a social construction, from a becoming perspective, means that people
tum their attention towards social interaction and the process of creating, recreating
and organising meaning in the handling of everyday life, as the proper meaning of
organising. Instead of talking of organisations as social constructs, perhaps it would be
more apt to talk about organising (verb) as organisational flux - a social praxis of
enactment - interpretation - retention, a process in which organisation emerges as
organisational flux that never comes into being, but is always in the process of
becoming. In Weick then, ongoing processes now become the normal condition of
reality. Taking a becoming ontological perspective on organising (as organisation in
flux) therefore draws attention toward the question of how to understand this ongoing
process of change.
The answer lies in communication. Consistent with the becoming perspective, Weick
states that the communication activity is organisation.ï " Only by virtue of continuous
communication are the exchanges and interpretations of intersubjectivity, and the
shared understandings of generic subjectivity, developed and maintained.
Conversations, dialogues, meetings, arguments are always (ex)change of words, and
thereby never the same because the meaning of words are always reconstructed. People
never have exactly the same interpretation of a word, since they have already heard it
before, and will always relate it to the situations and relations, the context, that they are
in. Therefore everything is related and situated, and continuously reconstructed.
To conclude this chapter, the discussion of "organisation as flows of experience" gives
us the possibility to thematise change not as something stabilised through organising,
but as an immanent part of life as an unfolding flux of constructing and reconstructing
meaning. Relating it to Weick's discussion of verbs, it is then appropriate to talk about
organising and sensemaking in relation to this as it is about never-ending processes.
638 1995: 75
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Conclusion and Research Challenge
We conclude that Weick offers a radical challenge to the way life is viewed in general
and organisational life in particular. It is assumed that this study has established the
following: sensemaking means the activity that cope with reality as an ongoing
accomplishment that emerges from effort to create order, and to make retrospect sense
of what occurs; the sensemaking framework is rooted in an understanding of human
cognitive functions as the embodiment of complexity, and hence, psychological
processes as Weick's model for organisational sensemaking (organisations can thus be
viewed as bodies of cognition) and that organising and sensemaking are one and the
same process. As such, it is not organising "and" sensemaking, but organising as, for
and through sensemaking.
The aim was to show that Weick's thought is the embodiment of an interdisciplinary
perspective. Weick's thought and thinking has been analysed and interpreted from the
point of view of various meta-perspectives and the aim was to show how these
philosophies or conceptualisations underpin his own thought, and in tum influence his
theorising and conceptualisation of sensemaking in organisations and organising. In
other words, the sensemaking framework is too broad to be explained from a single
paradigm. It has also become clear how his cosmology runs consistently through all his
thinking, like a golden threat, as well as through the perspectives chosen for this study.
Although there is no such thing as a theory of organisations that is characteristic of the
sensemaking paradigm, the rationale behind Weick's talking and thinking about
organisations has been discussed. It has also been noted that an organisation is not a
text or tool. What Weick is calling for is a complete new understanding of
organisational life and reality such that it more closely resembles the world outside,
with all the latter's many disorders and social tensions. The emphasis is therefore on
processes that shape subjectivity rather than the process by which individual subjects
act upon the world.
Weick can with right be described as a process or becoming ontologist, with a distinct
constructivist organic-systemic (holistic) worldview. At the core of the organic-
systemic cosmology is organisation (verb). The essence of organisation has been
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described as process, through which organisation IS created. Process starts with
actions, and a process is constituted by a sequence of actions. As process and
organisation is to organic-systemic cosmology, so is it to Weick.639 Organising he
considers to be his meta-theory about theories, which suggests "that anyone who wants
to think about organizations should spend some time identifying specific rules by
which organizations assemble themselves'Y'"
The one question this position presents, is whether organisation can still be viewed as
the global that emerges from local organising processes or "interlocking
behaviours'v'"" In other words, is the vocabulary of micro/macro still a valid way of
thinking or talking about organisations? If organisation is known by its organising, just
as the organising effort is known by the interacting processes that comprise it, will a
micro/macro dichotomy not yield different and conflicting formulations and, hence,
continue to put theorists in a constant state of tension?
To continue with Weick, his ontology and epistemology is clearly evolutionary - not
static - in that it is action and process driven, constructed in relationship through
intersubjective organising. As such, in other words, it is ongoing; it happens out of
cognitive necessity in order to make sense, in order to cope and deal with what is
happening in the world. The world is a constructed world, as the self who is dealing
with it.
Weick leaves no one in the dark about his view of the world and reality. The picture he
gives of the real world is that it is not a tidy place. As the complexity sciences describe
the world as it is, so does Weick. His theorising (ontology) is primarily an insight, a
way of looking at the world, human life and, hence, organisational life. Indeed, if we
are to take the complexity sciences seriously, then sensemaking is all we have.
On a more fundamental level, Weick is showing us three things. Firstly, an overall
cosmology or worldview is indispensable for people's well-being. All people use
images based on some kind of general notions concerning the nature of reality that
cannot be divorced from how they conduct their lives. It has consequences for how
639 1979: 235ff.
640 1979: 235
641 1979: 3
132
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
they deal with the world and, as he so consistently argued, sensemaking, after all, is
about the world. Secondly, he brought back 'the world' into a discussion of
organisations. That is, Weick brought back issues of ontology and epistemology into
organisational theory, issues largely excluded from or neglected in psychology III
general and organisational theory and organisational behaviour in particular.642
It is perhaps appropriate to remind ourselves again of Weick's discussion of the
mindset required by sensemaking, in which the splitting of things has no place. And in
this regard, we wish to draw attention to Allnut's643 discussion of aircraft pilots:
"A pilot may say that he does not allow his work and his domestic life to mix; but this
statement can only be partly true. Human beings are 24 hour-a-day people, possessing
only one brain with which to control all their activities; and this brain has to cover both
work and play. In sum, events which happen in one segment of daily life, may therefore
influence what happens in other segments ... ". 644
Finally, by drawing on so many and diverse theoretical perspectives, Weick is showing
that no point of view is in itself complete, that a social process of thought is the means
by which understanding can be enriched.
Sensemaking is work, in other words, and the ideas of Karl E. Weick it represents, is a
slice of a creative process. They are presented not as final conclusions, but as an
example of one way that new ideas might be raised, inquired into, and allowed to
unfold further. We trust that we have succeeded in reaching our aim and purpose with
this study, and sincerely thank the reader for having stayed with us.
642 Shanon 2002: 1-6
643 in Weick 1995: 103-104
644 Emphasis added.
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